Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point

1. Introduction

Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (1981) is R. M. Hare’s most systematic attempt to link his earlier metaethical work on the logic of moral language with a substantive moral theory. The book proposes that understanding what moral judgments are—how they function in language and reasoning—yields a distinctive account of how we ought to deliberate morally and what ultimately makes actions right or wrong.

The work centers on three interconnected ideas signaled in its subtitle:

• Levels: Hare argues that moral thought operates on at least two levels. At the intuitive level, people rely on relatively simple, entrenched moral rules. At the critical level, they sometimes scrutinize and, if necessary, revise these rules using more explicit, demanding reasoning.
• Method: He develops a method of moral reasoning grounded in universal prescriptivism—the view that moral judgments are both prescriptive and universalizable. When combined with full imaginative engagement with all affected parties, this method is said to support a particular kind of consequentialism.
• Point: The book also examines what moral thinking is for—why human beings need moral concepts and reasoning at all, and what role these play in coordinating life within complex societies.

Hare uses stylized figures such as the Archangel (an ideally rational, omniscient moral thinker) and the Prole (an ordinary rule‑following agent) to illuminate the two levels of moral thought. On his account, sound moral theory must both respect the practical limitations of Prole‑like agents and provide guidance for more critical reflection in high‑stakes or unusual cases.

The result is what Hare calls a form of two-level utilitarianism, combining rule‑like intuitive guidance with a more explicitly consequentialist critical standpoint. The book’s arguments have been influential in debates about utilitarianism, moral psychology, and the connection between metaethics and normative ethics.

2. Historical and Intellectual Context

Moral Thinking emerges from mid‑ to late‑20th‑century analytic moral philosophy, especially debates over the meaning of moral language, the nature of moral reasoning, and the status of utilitarianism.

Postwar analytic ethics and metaethics

In the decades before 1981, English‑language ethics was strongly shaped by metaethical theories such as emotivism, prescriptivism, and early forms of noncognitivism, which examined moral language rather than defending particular moral principles. Hare’s earlier works, especially The Language of Morals (1952) and Freedom and Reason (1963), belong to this tradition.

At the same time, J. L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle, and other Oxford philosophers were using ordinary language analysis to illuminate conceptual problems, influencing Hare’s attention to the logical features of moral terms like “ought” and “good.”

Utilitarianism and its critics

Classical utilitarianism—articulated by Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and later Henry Sidgwick—remained a central reference point, but it faced objections from:

• Deontologists (including neo‑Kantians), who emphasized duty and constraints over outcomes.
• Intuitionists, who treated moral principles as self‑evident or knowable by a special faculty.
• Virtue ethicists, who were beginning to revive Aristotelian themes.

Hare’s project can be read as an attempt to defend a broadly utilitarian picture in a context where naive act utilitarianism had been widely criticized for neglecting rules, integrity, and common‑sense morality.

Broader philosophical influences

Hare’s universalizability thesis engages implicitly with Kant’s Formula of Universal Law, while his prescriptivism responds to debates about the cognitive or noncognitive status of moral judgments. Discussions with contemporaries such as J. L. Mackie, Philippa Foot, and later Derek Parfit inform the background against which he writes.

Political and social backdrop

The work is also situated against postwar concerns about ideology, fanaticism, and the moral justification of political authority. Hare’s examples—including colonial and missionary scenarios—reflect ongoing debates about cultural relativism, paternalism, and global justice, though interpreted through his analytic framework.

3. Author and Composition

R. M. Hare’s philosophical background

Richard Mervyn Hare (1919–2002) was a leading figure in 20th‑century analytic ethics. Educated at Balliol College, Oxford, and later a professor there, he was deeply influenced by his wartime experiences as a prisoner of war, which he later suggested sharpened his interest in moral reasoning under pressure. His early work developed universal prescriptivism, presenting moral judgments as both prescriptions and logically constrained by universalizability.

Moral Thinking represents a continuation and revision of ideas in The Language of Morals and Freedom and Reason, but with a more explicit turn toward normative theory and applied concerns.

Development and aims of the book

The book was composed in the late 1970s and published by Oxford University Press in 1981. Hare had already defended prescriptivism in various essays and lectures; Moral Thinking gathers these strands into a sustained argument about:

• The structure of everyday and ideal moral reasoning (two levels).
• The implications of universal prescriptivism for moral theory.
• The articulation of a utilitarian view that incorporates rules and common‑sense morality.

Hare states that one of his aims is to show how “a theory of moral reasoning” can guide legislators, policy‑makers, and individuals, and to explain why “we cannot do without moral thinking” given the complexity of modern societies.

Dedication and personal dimension

The volume is dedicated “To Kay,” Hare’s wife Catherine Verney Hare, reflecting the personal context of its composition. While the book is highly technical in places, Hare occasionally draws on autobiographical experiences and practical examples from politics and education, suggesting that the project grew partly from his engagement with moral problems outside philosophy.

Place in Hare’s oeuvre

Scholars often regard Moral Thinking as the culmination of Hare’s moral philosophy, integrating his earlier metaethical work with a developed form of preference utilitarianism. Later writings, such as articles collected in Essays on Political Morality, refine and apply ideas first systematized here, but the core framework of two-level utilitarianism is laid out most fully in this 1981 book.

4. Structure and Organization of the Work

Hare’s book is carefully organized to move from general questions about moral thinking to a specific account of two-level utilitarianism. It is divided into three main parts and a concluding reflection.

Part I: The Levels of Moral Thinking

Part I introduces the distinction between intuitive and critical moral thinking. Hare uses imaginative models—the Archangel and the Prole—to clarify what fully informed, perfectly rational moral thought would be like, and how it differs from the rule‑based reasoning typical of ordinary agents. This part sets out the problem any adequate theory must solve: explaining how these two levels relate and when each is appropriate.

Part II: Logical features of moral language

Part II turns to the metaethical underpinnings: the logical properties of moral terms, especially universalizability and prescriptivity. Hare analyses everyday uses of “ought,” “good,” and related words, and builds an account of how the commitments built into moral language constrain moral reasoning. This part also considers potential counterexamples, such as apparently consistent fanatics.

Part III: Point and method

With the logical groundwork in place, Part III articulates Hare’s positive account of two-level preference utilitarianism and the practical method of moral thinking. He explores how societies inculcate intuitive rules, how critical reasoning can revise them, and how this structure helps us manage moral complexity.

Conclusion

The concluding section reflects on the role of moral theory itself—how and for whom it is useful—and situates Hare’s account among more familiar ethical approaches without attempting a comprehensive survey.

The progression from levels, to logic, to method and point is designed to show how a theory of moral language can lead to a structured practice of moral deliberation.

5. The Levels of Moral Thinking: Intuitive and Critical

Hare’s central structural claim is that moral thinking operates on at least two distinct but interconnected levels: intuitive and critical.

Intuitive moral thinking

Intuitive moral thinking consists in the quick, largely unreflective application of general moral rules, maxims, or prohibitions. These rules are:

• Typically learned through moral education, socialization, and upbringing.
• Designed to be simple and easily remembered (for example, “Do not lie,” “Keep your promises”).
• Applied without detailed calculation of consequences in each case.

Hare compares intuitive rules to safety guidelines or classroom rules that function as rules of thumb. They are justified, on his view, by their general reliability in promoting good outcomes under ordinary conditions, especially given agents’ limited time, information, and cognitive capacity. Intuitive thinking is thus portrayed as indispensable for everyday moral life.

Critical moral thinking

Critical moral thinking is slower, more reflective, and more demanding. It involves:

• Considering all relevant facts, including long‑term and indirect consequences.
• Imaginatively identifying with the preferences or interests of all affected parties.
• Applying formal constraints of universalizability and impartiality.

At this level, agents may question, override, or revise intuitive rules when they appear to generate seriously suboptimal or unjust outcomes. Hare associates critical thinking with the kind of moral reasoning appropriate to legislators, policy‑makers, and theorists, and to individuals in unusual or high‑stakes situations.

Relationship between the levels

Hare insists that the two levels are not competing moralities but components of a single system. Critical thinking:

• Justifies the adoption and maintenance of certain intuitive rules.
• Determines when exceptions or revisions are warranted.
• Recognizes that, for most agents in most contexts, reliance on intuitive rules is the right way to act.

Different commentators interpret this structure variously as a sophistication of rule utilitarianism, a psychological model of moral cognition, or a practical compromise between theory and human limitations. Hare presents it as a principled response to the conditions under which real agents must make moral decisions.

6. Universal Prescriptivism and Moral Language

Universal prescriptivism is the metaethical foundation of Moral Thinking. Hare develops it by focusing on the logical features of moral language.

Prescriptivity

Hare maintains that moral judgments are prescriptive: they function primarily as guides to action rather than as purely descriptive statements. To say “You ought to do X” is, on this view, to issue a kind of imperative or prescription. A sincere user must be prepared, other things equal, to act in accordance with the prescription.

Prescriptivity distinguishes moral judgments from ordinary factual claims and aligns them with imperatives, recommendations, and decisions.

Universalizability

A second key feature is universalizability. When a person makes a moral judgment about a case, they are logically committed to making the same judgment in any relevantly similar case, regardless of who is involved. Changing the mere identity of the persons, without changing the morally relevant properties, should not change the judgment.

Hare draws on and modifies Kantian ideas here, but emphasizes the logical constraints of moral language use rather than metaphysical claims about rational nature.

Universal prescriptivism defined

Combining these features, universal prescriptivism holds that:

• Moral judgments prescribe actions or attitudes.
• These prescriptions must be consistently applied across relevantly similar cases.

Hare argues that anyone using moral language sincerely is bound by these logical properties, whether or not they acknowledge them explicitly.

Implications for moral reasoning

From this starting point, Hare claims that moral agents must be prepared to:

• Imagine themselves in the positions of all affected individuals.
• Accept the same prescriptions if they were in those positions, given the relevantly similar features.

This imaginative and logical exercise, he contends, has substantive implications for how we weigh different people’s interests or preferences. Critics, however, have questioned how far such logical features can take us toward a full moral theory.

7. From Universalizability to Preference Utilitarianism

A central argumentative ambition of Moral Thinking is to move from the formal features of moral language—universalizability and prescriptivity—to a substantive, preference utilitarian ethics. Hare proposes that if moral judgments must be universal prescriptions, then fully reflective moral thinking will converge on an impartial aggregation of preferences.

The basic line of argument

Hare’s reasoning can be schematically summarized:

On this view, universalization requires the agent to consider how they would be affected if they were any of the individuals involved, with their preferences and outlooks. The agent’s own position is not given special weight.

Preference focus

Hare emphasizes preferences rather than pleasure or happiness. He argues that:

• Different persons may value quite different things, not all reducible to sensations of pleasure.
• Respecting persons as agents involves taking seriously what they want or would choose, under suitable conditions.
• When preferences conflict, the appropriate critical procedure is to weigh them against one another, giving each preference equal initial consideration.

Thus, universal prescriptivism is said to support a form of preference utilitarianism, where right action is tied to the optimal satisfaction of considered preferences.

Fanatics and limits

Hare recognizes that a purely formal universalizability test might permit fanatics whose extreme preferences—such as a willingness to sacrifice themselves and others for an ideology—pass the consistency test. He attempts to address this by adding conditions on informed, empathetic preference consideration and by exploring which kinds of preference structures survive such scrutiny.

Critics contend that the move from the logical features of moral language to any form of utilitarianism is not compulsory, suggesting that other universalizable prescriptions (e.g., deontological rules, contractualist principles) remain coherent options.

8. The Archangel and the Prole: Ideal and Ordinary Agents

To illustrate the two levels of moral thinking and the constraints of human cognition, Hare introduces two idealized figures: the Archangel and the Prole.

The Archangel

The Archangel represents a perfectly rational, fully informed moral thinker. This figure:

• Has complete and accurate knowledge of all relevant facts and consequences.
• Can process complex information without error or fatigue.
• Always reasons at the critical level, explicitly applying universal prescriptivism and impartial preference weighing to each decision.

Hare uses the Archangel as a model of what ideal moral reasoning would look like if cognitive and informational limitations were absent. This figure’s judgments, in principle, instantiate the standards of fully critical moral thought.

The Prole

The Prole models an ordinary human agent:

• Information is partial and often uncertain.
• Time and cognitive resources are limited.
• Moral education has instilled a stock of relatively simple intuitive rules.

Proles characteristically apply these intuitive rules without engaging in sustained critical calculation. Hare does not use “Prole” pejoratively, but to emphasize that most agents in most situations must rely on rules of thumb if they are to function at all.

Function of the contrast

The Archangel–Prole contrast serves several functions:

Hare argues that a realistic moral theory must be framed with Proles in mind, while using the Archangel as a standard for assessing which rules Proles should internalize and when they might need to be overridden. Some commentators view the pair as illustrating a division between “ideal theory” and “non‑ideal” or “applied” reasoning, though Hare presents them primarily as tools for analyzing the levels of moral thinking, not as distinct moral statuses of persons.

9. Two-Level Utilitarianism and the Act/Rule Debate

Moral Thinking introduces and defends a form of two-level utilitarianism. This structure is designed to address long‑standing debates between act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism.

Act vs rule utilitarianism

• Act utilitarianism: Evaluates individual actions solely by their consequences for overall utility (or preference satisfaction), without independent reference to rules.
• Rule utilitarianism: Evaluates actions by whether they conform to rules whose general adoption would maximize utility.

Classical discussions often portray these as rival theories, with act utilitarianism accused of being too demanding and counterintuitive, and rule utilitarianism accused of “collapsing” into act utilitarianism or being unstable.

Two-level utilitarian structure

Hare’s two-level view attempts to integrate advantages of both:

• At the intuitive level, agents rely on entrenched rules similar to those endorsed by rule utilitarians: prohibitions on killing, norms of promise‑keeping, and so on.
• At the critical level, when rules conflict or exceptional circumstances arise, the agent employs act‑utilitarian reasoning—directly considering which action best satisfies the preferences of all affected.

On Hare’s account, intuitive rules are themselves justified and selected by critical, consequentialist reasoning. They are tools for real‑world decision‑making by limited agents, not ultimate moral determinants.

Relation to the act/rule debate

Two-level utilitarianism has been interpreted in several ways:

Hare himself presents the view as act‑utilitarian at the critical level, with rules justified instrumentally. Critics debate whether this fully resolves traditional worries about act utilitarianism, such as its willingness to permit rights violations in exceptional cases, and whether the division of levels risks instability or elitism.

10. Key Concepts and Technical Vocabulary

Moral Thinking employs a distinctive set of terms, some of which Hare helped popularize. Several key concepts are central to understanding the book.

Core metaethical terms

• Prescriptivity: The feature of moral judgments whereby they function as prescriptions or imperatives, intended to guide action rather than merely report facts.
• Universalizability: The requirement that one is committed to making the same moral judgment in all relevantly similar cases, regardless of personal identity or position.
• Universal prescriptivism: The combination of prescriptivity and universalizability as the defining logical properties of moral judgments.

Structural concepts

• Intuitive moral thinking: Quick, unreflective application of learned moral rules; used for everyday decisions under constraints of time and information.
• Critical moral thinking: Slow, reflective, fully informed reasoning that systematically considers the preferences of all affected parties.
• Two-level utilitarianism: A moral theory combining an intuitive level of rule‑guided thinking with a critical level of explicit, preference‑based consequentialist calculation.

Idealized agents and examples

• Archangel: Hypothetical perfectly rational and informed agent who always reasons at the critical level.
• Prole: Stylized ordinary agent mainly using intuitive rules; representative of typical human moral cognition.
• Fanatic: Hypothetical agent whose extreme and self‑sacrificing preferences meet the formal tests of universalizability but yield disturbing prescriptions.

Normative and evaluative notions

• Preference utilitarianism: Version of utilitarianism that takes the satisfaction of individuals’ preferences, rather than pleasure, as the basic measure of moral outcomes.
• Equal consideration of interests (or preferences): The requirement that, in critical moral reasoning, each person’s preferences are initially given the same weight, independent of who holds them.
• Rules of thumb: Simplified general rules (e.g., “Do not lie”) that are valued for practical reliability rather than perfect outcome optimization.

These terms interact systematically: universal prescriptivism underlies critical moral thinking, which, when applied with equal consideration of preferences, yields a two-level preference utilitarian framework in which Archangel‑like reasoning justifies Prole‑level rules of thumb.

11. Famous Arguments, Examples, and Objections

Several arguments and illustrative cases in Moral Thinking have become well‑known reference points.

The Archangel and the Prole

As discussed above, Hare’s contrast between Archangel and Prole serves as an argumentative device to motivate two-level thinking. It is often cited in discussions of moral competence, expertise, and the realism of moral theories.

The fanatic objection

Hare explores the possibility of a consistent fanatic: someone whose extreme commitments (for example, devotion to a cause that requires great sacrifice) satisfy the formal requirements of universalizability and prescriptivity. The fanatic:

• Is willing to prescribe harsh treatment of others and of themselves.
• Accepts that the same prescriptions apply to them if roles were reversed.
• Remains internally coherent under universalizability tests.

This figure challenges the claim that universal prescriptivism alone excludes morally repugnant views. Hare attempts to argue that full imaginative identification with all affected persons, under conditions of information and rational reflection, will dislodge many fanatical attitudes. Critics question whether this move imports substantive values beyond the logical features initially specified.

Missionary and colonial examples

Hare uses various thought experiments involving missionaries, colonial administrators, or culturally distant communities to illustrate:

• The difficulty of comparing and weighing incommensurable preferences.
• Tensions between paternalism and respect for local values.
• The role of informed, critical reflection in revising one’s own intuitive moral codes.

Such examples have provoked discussion both about preference utilitarianism’s handling of cross‑cultural conflict and about the implicit assumptions in Hare’s descriptions.

Rules of thumb and traffic rules analogies

Hare repeatedly compares intuitive moral rules to traffic laws or classroom rules: simplified directives designed for reliability rather than perfection in each instance. This analogy underpins arguments that:

• Having strict rules (e.g., “stop at red lights”) may be better overall, even if in some particular case breaking the rule would appear to have better consequences.
• Critical reasoning operates at a higher level, assessing when such systems of rules should be adopted, amended, or sometimes overridden.

These analogies have been influential in later discussions of rule‑consequentialism and the justification of moral education.

Objections arising from examples

Many commentators draw on Hare’s own examples to raise objections:

• That two-level utilitarianism may endorse problematic acts in extreme cases (e.g., sacrificing an innocent person).
• That the treatment of fanatics does not fully block coherent but deeply illiberal moral systems.
• That preference aggregation, even when informed and impartial, may neglect rights or desert.

These debates form a central part of the secondary literature on Moral Thinking.

12. Hare’s Philosophical Method

Hare’s method in Moral Thinking combines linguistic analysis, logical argumentation, and thought experiments, characteristic of mid‑20th‑century Oxford philosophy but directed toward substantive ethical conclusions.

Analysis of ordinary moral language

Hare begins from everyday uses of moral terms like “ought,” “must,” and “good,” examining:

• How these terms function in practical deliberation.
• What commitments are implicit in using them sincerely.
• How they differ from purely descriptive statements.

He treats this analysis as uncovering the logical features of moral language—particularly prescriptivity and universalizability—which then constrain any adequate moral theory.

Conceptual and logical argument

A large part of the book is argument by way of:

• Clarifying definitions and distinguishing senses of key terms.
• Drawing out implications of accepting certain logical properties.
• Using reductio and consistency tests (e.g., universalizability) to assess proposed moral principles.

The aspiration is that, once these logical features are accepted, certain forms of moral reasoning—culminating in two-level preference utilitarianism—emerge as the most coherent.

Use of thought experiments and idealizations

Hare deploys stylized cases and ideal agents—the Archangel, Prole, and fanatic—to probe the implications of his views:

• Archangel and Prole test how his theory accommodates ideal and non‑ideal reasoning.
• Fanatic cases test the limits of deriving substantive ethics from formal constraints.

These thought experiments are not intended as empirical models but as tools for clarifying conceptual commitments.

Normative theory from metaethics

A distinctive feature of Hare’s method is the attempt to move from metaethical analysis (what moral judgments are) to normative conclusions (what we ought to do). This contrasts with approaches that treat metaethics and normative ethics as largely independent. Supporters see this as a strength in integrating language, rationality, and morality; critics question whether the move from logical form to utilitarian content is warranted.

Engagement with rivals

Throughout, Hare engages with alternative positions—Kantian ethics, intuitionism, and various forms of utilitarianism—primarily through analytical comparison and counterexample, rather than detailed textual exegesis. His method is thus systematic and argumentative rather than historical or phenomenological.

13. Relation to Kantian, Intuitionist, and Other Theories

Moral Thinking situates Hare’s view within a broader landscape of ethical theories, engaging especially with Kantian, intuitionist, and other consequentialist approaches.

Kantian ethics

Hare’s notion of universalizability is explicitly reminiscent of Kant’s Formula of Universal Law. Both require that moral judgments be applicable to all relevantly similar cases. However:

• Hare interprets universalizability as a logical feature of moral language, not as derived from the nature of rational agency or autonomy.
• He combines universalizability with preference consideration and consequentialist aggregation, whereas Kantian ethics typically emphasizes duties, respect for persons, and constraints on using others merely as means.

Proponents of the Kantian tradition argue that Hare’s account lacks a robust notion of moral law or dignity; defenders of Hare see his view as capturing the core of impartiality without Kantian metaphysics.

Intuitionism

Hare also addresses intuitionist theories (e.g., associated with W. D. Ross), which posit self‑evident moral principles or a special faculty of moral intuition. In relation to these:

• Hare grants that ordinary intuitive judgments have epistemic importance but seeks to explain them via moral education and the practical function of rules, not via non‑natural moral properties.
• He argues that where intuitions conflict, critical, preference‑based reasoning provides a systematic way of resolving them.

Intuitionists may respond that Hare’s approach fails to account for the apparent categorical force of duties such as fidelity or nonmaleficence, which they treat as more than heuristic rules of thumb.

Other consequentialist theories

Within consequentialism, Hare’s view interacts with:

• Classical hedonistic utilitarianism, from which he departs by focusing on preferences rather than pleasure.
• Rule utilitarianism and rule consequentialism, which likewise stress the importance of rules. Hare’s two-level model is often compared to these, with disagreement over whether his critical level effectively makes the theory act‑utilitarian in foundation.
• Later consequentialist work (e.g., Parfit, Hooker), which adapts or critiques Hare’s two-level structure and his metaethical starting points.

Contractualism and rights theories

Although not a central focus of the book, Hare’s framework contrasts with contractualist and rights‑based theories, which derive moral principles from hypothetical agreement or inviolable rights. While some see affinities between his universalizability tests and contractualist reasoning, many contractualists argue that preference aggregation fails to respect the separateness of persons and the non‑aggregative nature of some moral claims.

Overall, Moral Thinking positions two-level preference utilitarianism as a competitor to both duty‑centered deontological theories and purely intuition‑based approaches, while offering metaethical arguments intended to explain the appeal and limits of each.

14. Applications and Practical Implications

Although Moral Thinking is primarily theoretical, Hare emphasizes its implications for practice, especially once the distinction between intuitive and critical levels is in place.

Everyday moral decision-making

For ordinary agents, the theory suggests that:

• Reliance on intuitive rules—truth‑telling, promise‑keeping, respect for life—is typically appropriate and morally justified.
• People need not, and often should not, perform detailed preference‑utilitarian calculations for routine decisions, given time and information constraints.
• However, in unusual, complex, or high‑stakes situations, agents may have reason to “shift levels” and engage in more critical reflection.

This framework has been applied in discussions of professional ethics, personal integrity, and the role of conscience in exceptional cases.

Policy and legislation

Hare explicitly addresses the role of moral theory for legislators and policy‑makers. On his view:

• Policy decisions, which affect many people over long periods, are prime candidates for critical moral thinking.
• Law and social institutions should be designed by considering the preferences of all affected, under conditions approximating informed and impartial deliberation.
• However, the resulting institutions will typically operate through clear, simple rules that citizens can follow intuitively.

This two-level structure has informed discussions about public health policy, criminal justice, and economic regulation, where simple regulations are justified by complex background reasoning.

Moral education

Hare’s account of moral education emphasizes:

• Teaching children robust, easily applied intuitive rules to foster reliable behavior.
• Later, exposing some individuals to critical methods, enabling them to scrutinize and, when necessary, revise accepted rules.

Educators and philosophers of education have debated how far this suggests a differentiation between moral “experts” and laypersons, and what role critical thinking should play in curricula.

Cross-cultural and global ethics

Hare’s use of cross‑cultural examples suggests applications to:

• Debates about humanitarian intervention, colonial legacies, and global distributive justice.
• Questions about how far one culture’s intuitive rules should be revised in light of others’ preferences and values.

Some see in Hare’s framework tools for justifying impartial concern for distant strangers; others question how well preference aggregation accommodates cultural diversity and power imbalances.

Overall, the book proposes that a sound moral theory can guide both personal conduct and institutional design by clarifying when to rely on intuitive rules and when to undertake more demanding critical reflection.

15. Critical Reception and Major Criticisms

Upon publication, Moral Thinking was widely regarded as an important contribution to analytic ethics, but it also drew substantial criticism from diverse perspectives.

Immediate and subsequent reception

Philosophers working in utilitarian and metaethical traditions engaged closely with Hare’s arguments. Many praised:

• The systematic integration of metaethics and normative ethics.
• The clarity of the two-level framework.
• The attempt to show how logical features of moral language have substantive ethical implications.

At the same time, reviewers raised fundamental doubts about key components of the project.

Derivation of utilitarianism

A major line of criticism targets Hare’s claim that universal prescriptivism entails utilitarianism (in a preference-based form). Critics argue that:

• Universalizability and prescriptivity are compatible with a range of moral outlooks, including deontological, contractualist, and even fanatical ones.
• The move from formal properties of language to substantive aggregation of preferences requires additional, non‑logical assumptions.

Some commentators maintain that Hare’s argument reveals an affinity between impartiality and aggregation but stops short of a strict logical entailment.

The fanatic problem

The fanatic example has become a focal point. Critics contend that:

• A coherent fanatic can pass Hare’s universalizability test while endorsing extreme or oppressive prescriptions.
• Hare’s attempts to exclude such cases—by appealing to imaginative identification or informed preferences—introduce substantive value judgments not derivable from prescriptivism alone.

This has led to broader debates about whether formal constraints on moral judgment can yield a full ethical theory.

Preference utilitarianism worries

Opponents also challenge preference utilitarianism itself:

• Preferences can be ill‑informed, adaptive to oppressive conditions, or morally objectionable.
• Discounting such preferences may implicitly rely on an independent notion of what is good or rational, potentially undermining the purported neutrality of preference satisfaction.

These concerns intersect with discussions in welfare economics and social choice theory about how to interpret and aggregate preferences.

Two-level practicality and elitism

The two-level structure has sparked debate about:

• Whether the division between intuitive and critical levels risks elitism, with a small group of “Archangels” guiding rules for “Proles.”
• How clear the criteria are for when agents should shift from intuitive to critical thinking.
• Whether, in practice, the critical level would justify exceptions to intuitive rules in ways that could erode trust and social stability.

Some critics see in Hare’s approach an unstable compromise between rigorous act utilitarianism and respect for common‑sense morality.

Deontic constraints and rights

From deontological and rights‑based perspectives, it is argued that:

• Hare’s theory cannot fully capture the force of strict prohibitions (e.g., against killing innocents) or inviolable rights, since all rules remain revisable in light of aggregated preferences.
• Even at the intuitive level, the justification of rules is ultimately consequentialist, which some regard as insufficient to ground moral constraints.

These criticisms have shaped subsequent developments in rule-consequentialism, contractualism, and non‑consequentialist theories of rights.

16. Legacy and Historical Significance

Moral Thinking has had a lasting impact on both metaethics and normative theory, particularly within utilitarian and consequentialist traditions.

Influence on consequentialism

Hare’s two-level utilitarianism has informed later work on rule‑consequentialism and sophisticated utilitarianism. Philosophers such as Derek Parfit and Brad Hooker engage with and develop ideas related to:

• The role of rules and institutions in a consequentialist framework.
• The distinction between ideal moral reasoning and decision procedures appropriate for limited agents.
• The balance between theoretical foundations and practical guidance.

Even where subsequent consequentialists diverge from Hare’s specific arguments, his structural insights remain a reference point.

Impact on ethical theory and metaethics

In metaethics, universal prescriptivism has been less widely adopted as a complete theory, but its analysis of moral language has contributed to:

• Discussions of noncognitivism, expressivism, and the meaning of normative terms.
• Debates about the connection between rational consistency, universalizability, and moral requirements.

The book is frequently cited as a major attempt to bridge the gap between linguistic analysis and substantive ethics.

Role in practical ethics and political philosophy

Hare’s students and interlocutors, including Peter Singer, have drawn on his preference utilitarianism and two-level structure in applied ethics, influencing debates on:

• Global poverty and obligations to distant others.
• Animal ethics and speciesism.
• Public policy design in health care and resource allocation.

In political philosophy, Hare’s emphasis on critical reasoning about institutions and laws has intersected with later work on ideal and non‑ideal theory, legitimacy, and democratic deliberation.

Continuing debates

Moral Thinking continues to be discussed in:

• Critiques of the derivation of utilitarianism from formal constraints (e.g., in relation to contractualism and constructivism).
• Analyses of the fanatic problem and the limits of universalizability tests.
• Evaluations of preference-based approaches to well‑being.

While some elements of Hare’s framework have been superseded or revised, the book is widely regarded as a landmark in systematic ethical theory, illustrating both the power and the limitations of attempting to derive a comprehensive moral outlook from the logic of moral discourse.