On the Nature of the Gods

Context and Dialogue Structure

Marcus Tullius Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods (De natura deorum) is a philosophical dialogue composed in the final years of the Roman Republic, around 45–44 BCE. Written in Latin, it forms part of Cicero’s broader project of transmitting Greek philosophy to a Roman audience. The work is one of the most important surviving sources for Hellenistic theology, especially the religious doctrines of the Epicurean and Stoic schools, as well as the skeptical stance of the Academic tradition.

The dialogue is set in Rome and unfolds among three principal interlocutors, each representing a major school:

• Velleius (Epicurean),
• Balbus (Stoic),
• Cotta (Academic Skeptic, and a priest of the state religion).

The work is divided into three books. Book I contains Velleius’ exposition and defense of Epicurean theology, followed by Cotta’s critique. Book II presents Balbus’ systematic argument for Stoic theology. Book III offers Cotta’s extended criticism of Stoicism. Cicero himself appears only as narrator, maintaining a stance of methodological neutrality and not clearly endorsing any single position.

Epicurean and Stoic Positions

In Book I, Cicero has Velleius articulate the Epicurean view of the gods. This position maintains that:

• Gods exist, but they are perfectly blessed and immortal beings, living in complete tranquility.
• Because any involvement in the world would disturb their serenity, they neither create nor govern the cosmos.
• Consequently, there is no divine providence in the sense of a god who cares for human affairs or intervenes in nature.

The Epicurean concept of the divine thus aims to preserve divine perfection by denying that the gods experience effort, passion, or concern. Religiously, this undercuts traditional practices of prayer and sacrifice as attempts to influence divine will. Philosophically, it aligns the gods with an ideal of ataraxia (untroubled peace), mirroring the Epicurean ethical goal for humans.

In Book II, Balbus presents the Stoic alternative. The Stoics advance a robust natural theology, in which:

• The universe is a rational, ordered whole, permeated by logos (divine reason).
• God is not a distant person-like being but is often identified with nature itself, understood as a fiery, rational, creative principle.
• The order, beauty, and regularity of the world are taken as evidence of divine providence and design, sometimes expressed through teleological arguments (appeals to purposes in nature).

Balbus argues that the existence of intelligent, rational beings within the cosmos suggests that the cosmos itself must be governed by a superior, rational mind. The adaptation of organisms to their environments, the ordered motions of heavenly bodies, and the suitability of the world for human life are invoked as signs of a providential planner. The Stoic god, therefore, is both immanent in nature and providentially active, guiding events toward a rationally intelligible order.

Academic Skepticism and Method

The third main voice, Cotta, represents Academic Skepticism, a tradition stemming from Plato’s Academy as transformed in the Hellenistic period. Cotta’s role across all three books is largely critical: he questions both Epicurean and Stoic doctrines, testing their coherence and evidential basis.

Against the Epicureans, Cotta challenges:

• The claim that we can know the gods are perfectly tranquil yet utterly detached from the world.
• The adequacy of Epicurean accounts of how we form the concept of a god, asking whether such ideas stem from nature, custom, or philosophical construction.
• The compatibility of an ideal of divine perfection with the indifference attributed to the gods.

Against the Stoics, he raises classic skeptical and proto–problem-of-evil concerns:

• If the world is governed by a benevolent providence, why is there suffering, injustice, and apparent randomness?
• If god is identified with nature, can god still be said to have intentions, purposes, or moral concern?
• Do appeals to order in nature demonstrate a designing mind, or might such order be explained differently?

Cotta does not straightforwardly deny the existence of the gods; rather, he emphasizes the limits of human knowledge in matters divine. His approach illustrates the Academic practice of arguing “on both sides” (in utramque partem), exposing weaknesses and inconsistencies without necessarily offering a positive doctrine. Cicero’s framing suggests that, for him, theology is an area where suspension of judgment or cautious belief may be more appropriate than dogmatic certainty.

Legacy and Influence

On the Nature of the Gods is historically significant for several reasons. It preserves some of the most detailed surviving accounts of Epicurean and Stoic religious thought, including arguments that do not survive in the original Greek sources. Later philosophers, theologians, and historians have relied heavily on Cicero’s text to reconstruct Hellenistic debates about divinity, providence, and fate.

The work also became influential in the history of natural theology and the philosophy of religion. The Stoic arguments presented by Balbus resemble later design arguments for the existence of God, while Cotta’s objections anticipate subsequent discussions of the problem of evil and the epistemic limits of religious claims. Renaissance and early modern thinkers, including humanists and skeptically inclined writers, drew on Cicero as a model for presenting contrasting viewpoints in dialogue form.

Cicero’s refusal to declare a final victor among the positions contributes to the dialogue’s enduring interest. On the Nature of the Gods exemplifies an approach in which religious and metaphysical questions are treated as subjects for open philosophical inquiry, rather than settled dogma. As a result, it remains a central text for understanding ancient discussions about what can be known—or reasonably believed—concerning the nature of the divine.