Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence radicalizes Emmanuel Levinas’s project of an ethics prior to ontology by arguing that subjectivity is fundamentally responsibility for the Other, a passivity more passive than any receptivity, and an exposure to alterity that cannot be captured within the categories of being or essence. Rewriting phenomenology in terms of ethical signification, Levinas describes the self as hostage and substitution for the Other, for whom it bears an inescapable and asymmetrical obligation that precedes freedom, knowledge, and intentional consciousness. The book develops a dense conceptual vocabulary—trace, Saying and Said, persecution, obsession—to indicate how ethical relation exceeds thematic thought, while still requiring inscription within language and institutions. The work ends by connecting this irreducible responsibility with justice, politics, and the necessity of comparing and judging between multiple others, without collapsing ethics back into totalizing ontology.
At a Glance
- Author
- Emmanuel Levinas
- Composed
- 1968–1973
- Language
- French
- Status
- original survives
- •Ethics as first philosophy: Responsibility for the Other precedes ontology, knowledge, and self‑possession, such that the primary philosophical question is not "What is being?" but "How am I responsible for the Other?"
- •Subjectivity as substitution and hostage: The self is constituted not by autonomy or self‑identity but by being‑for‑the‑Other, a radical passivity and exposure in which I am taken hostage by the Other’s demand and substitute myself in their place.
- •Saying versus Said: Ethical signification (the Saying) is the living exposure and vulnerability to the Other that precedes and exceeds the fixed content of propositions and concepts (the Said), though it must inevitably be articulated within the Said.
- •Beyond essence and ontology: Traditional metaphysics and phenomenology, including Heideggerian ontology, totalize alterity by reducing it to presence and essence; Levinas argues that the Other and ethical responsibility are otherwise than being, irreducible to ontological categories.
- •From responsibility to justice: While the ethical relation is asymmetrical and personal (face‑to‑face), the presence of the third party (le tiers) introduces comparison, law, and institutions, requiring a transition from singular responsibility to justice and politics without negating the primacy of ethics.
Otherwise than Being has become one of the canonical texts of postwar continental philosophy, decisively shaping debates in ethics, phenomenology, theology, and political thought. It strongly influenced thinkers associated with deconstruction (notably Derrida), post‑structuralism, feminist ethics of care, post‑Holocaust theology, and discussions of responsibility and alterity in legal and political theory. The book is widely regarded as Levinas’s most rigorous and radical articulation of ethics as first philosophy, offering a sustained alternative to both Kantian and utilitarian models as well as to ontology‑centered phenomenology.
1. Introduction
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence, 1974) is Emmanuel Levinas’s second major systematic treatise and is widely regarded as the most demanding formulation of his project of “ethics as first philosophy.” The work rethinks subjectivity, language, and transcendence in terms of an irreducible responsibility to the Other that, Levinas claims, is “otherwise than being” and exceeds ontological categories such as substance, presence, and essence.
Where Totality and Infinity (1961) had presented the ethical relation primarily in terms of the face‑to‑face encounter and a critique of totalizing systems, Otherwise than Being returns to the same basic concerns while radically altering the conceptual vocabulary. It develops notions such as saying and the said, obsession, persecution, and substitution to describe a subject that is not first a self‑identical consciousness but a self exposed, accused, and obligated by the Other prior to any freedom or choice.
The text is both a philosophical treatise and a reflection on its own limits. Levinas explicitly problematizes the adequacy of language for expressing what he regards as a pre‑ or extra‑ontological ethical demand. This leads him to deploy a dense style full of reversals, neologisms, and paradoxes designed to signal that the ethical relation cannot be fully captured by the conceptual “said” of philosophy.
In contemporary scholarship, Otherwise than Being is treated as a central reference point for debates about alterity, responsibility, and post‑metaphysical thought. It is frequently read alongside phenomenology, deconstruction, theology, and political theory, both as a culmination of Levinas’s longstanding concerns and as a work that continues to provoke questions about the relation between ethics, language, and ontology.
2. Historical and Intellectual Context
Otherwise than Being was composed between 1968 and 1973, a period marked in France and Europe by intense political, intellectual, and cultural upheaval. Philosophically, the book appears at the intersection of late phenomenology, the critique of metaphysics, structuralism and post‑structuralism, and post‑Holocaust ethical reflection.
2.1 Phenomenology and Post‑Heideggerian Thought
Levinas’s work develops against the background of Husserlian phenomenology and Heidegger’s ontology of Being. Proponents of a phenomenological reading stress that Levinas radicalizes phenomenology by describing forms of “experience” (obsession, persecution, responsibility) that are not straightforwardly intentional. At the same time, he positions himself against what he presents as Heidegger’s prioritization of Being over ethics, proposing a move “beyond” ontology.
2.2 Structuralism, Language, and the “End of Metaphysics”
In the French context, the book appears amid debates on structuralism (Lévi‑Strauss, Althusser), psychoanalysis (Lacan), and the primacy of language. Levinas’s distinction between saying and the said is often read in dialogue with contemporaneous concerns about signification and discourse. While some commentators align Levinas with post‑structuralist critiques of presence (placing him alongside Derrida and Foucault), others emphasize his distance from structuralist reduction of subjectivity to systems or structures.
2.3 Postwar Ethics and Jewish Thought
The text is also shaped by Levinas’s postwar engagement with Jewish philosophical and Talmudic traditions, as well as by the aftershocks of the Shoah. Many interpreters argue that Otherwise than Being articulates a philosophical response to experiences of extreme violence and dehumanization, without becoming a historical or theological treatise. Levinas’s teaching at the École Normale Israélite Orientale and his Talmudic lectures inform the emphasis on responsibility, substitution, and the trace of the Infinite.
2.4 Relation to Contemporary Currents
Scholars situate Otherwise than Being in conversation with:
| Current | Typical Points of Contact |
|---|---|
| Analytic ethics (Kantian and utilitarian) | Contrast with duty grounded in autonomy or maximization of goods |
| Existentialism | Shared interest in responsibility and otherness; divergence on primacy of freedom |
| Deconstruction | Parallel critiques of presence and totality; debates over transcendence and theology |
There is no consensus on whether Levinas should be classified chiefly as a phenomenologist, post‑structuralist, religious thinker, or a unique combination of these strands; Otherwise than Being is frequently cited as a key text for this classificatory debate.
3. Author and Composition History
3.1 Levinas’s Intellectual Trajectory
By the time Levinas composed Otherwise than Being, he was an established philosopher and educator in France, known especially for Totality and Infinity. His earlier formation included studies with Husserl and Heidegger in the late 1920s, work in phenomenology, and postwar attempts to articulate an “ethical metaphysics” influenced by Jewish thought. Commentators often view Otherwise than Being as a late but not final work, synthesizing decades of reflection.
3.2 Period of Composition
Levinas indicates that the book drew on lectures and seminars from the late 1960s and early 1970s. Scholars commonly cite the years 1968–1973 as the intensive period of drafting and redrafting. During this time Levinas held positions at the University of Poitiers, the University of Paris–Nanterre, and later the Sorbonne, while also continuing to direct the École Normale Israélite Orientale. The intellectual environment of student movements and critiques of institutions forms a diffuse backdrop, though the work itself remains highly abstract.
3.3 Relation to Earlier Writings
Many of the motifs in Otherwise than Being—such as responsibility, the face, and transcendence—are already present in Levinas’s essays of the 1950s and in Totality and Infinity. The new book, however, involves a deliberate re‑working of these themes. Levinas himself, in the Preface, describes it as a “revision” and partial correction of his earlier book.
Some scholars trace the emergence of concepts like substitution and hostage to Levinas’s Talmudic lectures in the 1960s, where he explored notions of vicarious responsibility and the burden of the other’s suffering. Others point to essays such as “Substitution” (1968) and “Meaning and Sense” (1964) as direct precursors to the vocabulary and problems of Otherwise than Being.
3.4 Drafting and Self‑Critique
Although detailed genetic studies are limited, available evidence suggests multiple layers of revision. Levinas’s preface explicitly warns the reader about the “difficult” and “risk‑laden” language, indicating his awareness of the tension between what he wanted to say and the means available to say it. Some commentators interpret this as a sign that Levinas’s own process of composition involved ongoing self‑critique and experimentation, rather than the execution of a pre‑fixed plan.
4. Publication and Textual History
4.1 First Edition and Publishing Context
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence was first published in 1974 by Martinus Nijhoff in The Hague, in the “Bibliotheca Phaenomenologica” series, situating the work explicitly within phenomenological discourse while also challenging it. The French title, Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence, already encodes its dual aim: to think otherwise than being, and to go beyond essence.
4.2 Subsequent French Editions
Later French editions, notably those in the “Bibliothèque de philosophie” and mass‑market Le Livre de Poche format, have made the text more widely available. These editions typically preserve the original pagination and structure, which has become standard for scholarly reference. No major textual variants or competing versions of the French text are currently recognized, and Levinas did not publish a substantially revised edition during his lifetime.
4.3 Manuscript Tradition and Archival Material
The work’s manuscript tradition is relatively straightforward compared to classical texts:
| Aspect | Status |
|---|---|
| Authorial manuscript | Survives in archives (partially consulted by scholars) |
| Competing textual lines | None reported; no significant variant editions |
| Author’s corrections | Limited published information; minor corrections appear in later printings |
Specialists have begun to explore Levinas’s notes and drafts to clarify the genesis of certain terms, but a full critical edition has not yet appeared.
4.4 Translations
The book’s international reception has been shaped decisively by translation:
| Language | Translator | Year (1st major ed.) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Alphonso Lingis | 1981 | Standard translation; often praised for fidelity, sometimes criticized for opacity mirroring the French. |
| German | Ludger L. Dill; later Alexander Schnell (ed.) | 1980s–1990s | Facilitated discussion in German phenomenology and theology. |
| Italian | Silvano Petrosino (and others) | 1980s | Important for Italian debates on ethics and alterity. |
Interpretive disputes occasionally turn on translation choices for key terms such as dire/dit, otage, and substitution.
4.5 Citation and Reference Practices
Scholars commonly cite both the French original and Lingis’s English translation, often providing dual pagination because of the work’s difficulty and the importance of terminological nuance. This practice reflects a consensus that close engagement with the original French wording is frequently necessary for detailed exegetical work on Otherwise than Being.
5. Structure and Organization of the Work
Otherwise than Being is a systematically arranged but stylistically unusual treatise. Its structure is generally described as follows:
| Part | Title (approximate) | Main Focus (very brief) |
|---|---|---|
| Preface | — | Situates the project and warns about style and method |
| I | Beyond Intentionality and Phenomenology | Ethics prior to consciousness |
| II | Saying and the Said | Ethical signification and language |
| III | Subjectivity as Obsession, Persecution, Hostage | Extreme passivity of the subject |
| IV | Substitution and the Third | Responsibility, substitution, and justice |
| V | Beyond Essence | Ethical transcendence and the Infinite |
5.1 Preface
The Preface frames the work as a continuation and revision of Totality and Infinity and reflects on the risk of employing philosophical language to express what Levinas claims to be “otherwise than being.” It already introduces the tension between saying and the said that Part II will develop.
5.2 Part I: Beyond Intentionality and Phenomenology
Part I revisits phenomenological notions of intentionality and consciousness, proposing that ethical affectivity and responsibility precede any thematizing cognition. It sets the stage for an account of subjectivity no longer grounded in self‑possession.
5.3 Part II: Saying and the Said
Part II articulates the distinction between Saying (le dire)—exposure, address, responsibility—and the Said (le dit)—propositional content, thematization. It explores how ethical exposure both requires and disrupts the structures of statement and ontology.
5.4 Part III: Obsession, Persecution, Hostage
Part III turns to the subject, describing it as marked by obsession, persecution, and hostagehood. Here Levinas elaborates the idea of a “passivity more passive than passivity,” deepening the description of the self’s vulnerability to the Other.
5.5 Part IV: Substitution and the Third
Part IV introduces the notion of substitution, the self’s taking‑the‑place‑of the Other, and then complicates the dyadic relation by the advent of the third (other others). This part connects individual responsibility to questions of justice and comparison.
5.6 Part V: Beyond Essence
The final part reflects explicitly on what it means to go “beyond essence,” relating ethical responsibility to the trace of the Infinite and to institutions such as law and the State, while attempting to avoid a return to totalizing ontology.
6. From Totality and Infinity to Otherwise than Being
6.1 Continuities
Scholars generally identify strong continuities between Totality and Infinity (1961) and Otherwise than Being (1974):
| Theme | In Totality and Infinity | In Otherwise than Being |
|---|---|---|
| Ethics as first philosophy | Formulated as critique of totality and war | Radicalized as “otherwise than being” |
| The Other / face | Central figure of transcendence | Still present but less thematically central |
| Responsibility | Strong emphasis, but tied to face‑to‑face | Becomes constitutive of subjectivity itself |
In both, Levinas challenges what he takes to be Western philosophy’s tendency to totalize alterity, and he maintains the asymmetry of the ethical relation.
6.2 Shifts in Vocabulary and Emphasis
Many commentators view Otherwise than Being as a significant shift rather than a simple continuation. Key differences include:
- A move from an emphasis on interpersonal encounter (eros, hospitality, the face) toward an analysis of the inner structure of subjectivity as responsibility.
- The replacement of a more descriptive phenomenological style with a hyperbolic, self‑questioning discourse.
- The emergence of new central concepts—saying/the said, obsession, persecution, hostage, substitution—that reframe earlier themes.
Some interpreters argue that these changes represent a “radicalization” of the first book’s insights; others see them as a partial critique of Totality and Infinity’s reliance on notions like intentionality and experience.
6.3 Debates on Development
There is disagreement about the exact nature of the transition:
- One influential reading holds that Otherwise than Being is the systematic completion of Levinas’s early intuitions, finally freeing ethics from phenomenological and ontological presuppositions.
- Another view emphasizes discontinuity, suggesting that Levinas moves away from the more concrete, worldly descriptions of Totality and Infinity toward an abstract, quasi‑transcendental account of subjectivity.
- A further line of interpretation underscores self‑correction: Levinas is said to acknowledge that the earlier book still dealt too much in the “said” of ontology and hence undertakes a different style and conceptualization to avoid re‑totalizing the Other.
In all these perspectives, Otherwise than Being is treated as a decisive re‑articulation of Levinas’s project rather than a mere sequel.
7. Central Arguments and Claims
Commentators typically identify several interconnected central claims in Otherwise than Being.
7.1 Ethics as First Philosophy
Levinas reiterates and intensifies the thesis that ethics precedes ontology and epistemology. The primary philosophical question becomes “How am I responsible for the Other?” rather than “What is being?” or “How do I know?” Responsibility is said to be older than freedom, choice, or any theoretical stance.
7.2 Subjectivity as Passivity and Exposure
A key argument describes subjectivity not as autonomous self‑possession but as exposure and passivity:
- The self is “affected” before it can act.
- It is constituted by a demand it did not initiate.
- This passivity is “more passive than any passivity” encountered in standard phenomenology.
Levinas thus claims to redefine the subject as already for the Other, not first for itself.
7.3 Responsibility as Substitution
The work argues that the self’s responsibility is not limited or contractual but unlimited and asymmetrical. This responsibility is expressed as substitution: the self takes the place of the Other, bearing their burden and even their guilt. This claim underpins the description of the subject as hostage, responsible even for what it has not done.
7.4 Saying and the Said
Levinas proposes a structural distinction between Saying (ethical exposure, address, sincerity) and the Said (thematic content, propositions, ontology). He argues that ethical signification belongs to the order of Saying, which both requires and disrupts ontological discourse. Philosophy’s task is to let Saying resonate within the Said without reducing one to the other.
7.5 Beyond Essence and Toward Justice
Finally, the book claims that ethical responsibility is “otherwise than being” and thus beyond essence. Yet this “otherwise” must be inscribed in institutions, laws, and politics when the third appears. Levinas thus contends that while ethics is primary, it necessarily calls for justice, comparison, and public norms, even though these risk betraying the initial ethical asymmetry.
Different interpreters emphasize different aspects of these arguments—some focusing on the critique of ontology, others on the reconstruction of subjectivity or the implications for political thought—but they largely agree that these claims constitute the core of the work.
8. Key Concepts: Responsibility, Hostage, and Substitution
8.1 Responsibility
In Otherwise than Being, responsibility is not a voluntary assumption of duties but the very structure of subjectivity. Levinas presents it as:
- Asymmetrical: I am responsible for the Other more than the Other is for me.
- Unlimited: It does not end when juridical or social obligations are met.
- An-archic: It has no origin in the subject’s decision or contract; it precedes freedom.
Proponents read this as an attempt to describe an ethical demand that is irreducible to reciprocity or utilitarian calculation. Critics question how such unlimited responsibility can be lived or specified.
8.2 Hostage
The metaphor of the hostage (otage) intensifies the portrayal of this responsibility. The subject is:
- Bound to the Other without having chosen this bond.
- Exposed to accusation and persecution.
- Vulnerable in a way that undermines sovereignty and self‑interest.
Levinas speaks of the self as “held hostage” by the Other’s destitution and suffering. Interpretations vary: some see this as a phenomenological description of moral conscience, others as a theological or prophetic image. There is debate about whether the term risks glorifying suffering or passivity.
8.3 Substitution
Substitution (substitution) is the name Levinas gives to the structure in which the self takes the place of the Other:
“The I always has one responsibility more than all the others.”
— Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being (trans. Lingis)
Substitution is portrayed as:
- Vicarious: I bear the Other’s burden, even their fault.
- Constitutive: The self is itself only in and through this substitution.
- Non‑symmetrical: It is not an exchange, but a one‑sided taking‑on.
Some scholars relate this to notions of vicarious atonement or sacrificial figures in religious traditions; others insist on a secular reading, treating substitution as a hyperbolic way of describing radical responsibility.
8.4 Interrelations
These three concepts function together:
| Concept | Role in Subjectivity |
|---|---|
| Responsibility | Fundamental ethical orientation |
| Hostage | Metaphor for subject’s passivity and exposure |
| Substitution | Structural description of bearing the Other’s burden |
Debates continue about how literally these notions should be taken and how they relate to more conventional moral and political concepts such as obligation, guilt, and solidarity.
9. Saying and the Said: Ethics and Language
9.1 The Distinction
A central conceptual innovation of Otherwise than Being is the distinction between Saying (le dire) and the Said (le dit):
| Term | Characterization |
|---|---|
| Saying | Act of address, exposure, responsibility; temporally open and unfinished |
| Said | Thematized content, propositions, concepts; stabilizing and totalizing |
Saying is associated with ethical signification, the self’s offering of itself to the Other, whereas the Said corresponds to conventional linguistic and philosophical articulation.
9.2 Saying as Ethical Exposure
Levinas characterizes Saying as:
- Self‑exposure: A giving of oneself before any message or content.
- Vulnerability: To say “here I am” is to place oneself at the Other’s disposal.
- Temporal openness: Saying is ongoing, not closed like a completed proposition.
Proponents understand this as an attempt to describe the ethical dimension inherent in speaking to another person, prior to the information conveyed.
9.3 The Said as Ontological Fixation
The Said refers to:
- Statements, descriptions, and categorizations.
- The order of being and essence, where entities are identified and classified.
- The possibility of totalization, since the Said tends to encompass and systematize.
Levinas does not advocate abandonment of the Said; rather, he claims that philosophical discourse cannot avoid it but must remain aware of its tendency to neutralize alterity.
9.4 Their Interplay
Levinas insists that Saying must be inscribed in the Said to have public, communicable significance, yet this inscription always risks betraying the original ethical exposure. This tension shapes his own writing strategy, which attempts constantly to unsettle its own propositions.
Interpretive positions differ:
- Some commentators emphasize the linguistic and pragmatic implications of this distinction, aligning it with speech‑act theory or discourse ethics.
- Others accent its quasi‑theological resonance, reading Saying as a kind of ethical revelation that resists doctrinal capture.
- A further line of analysis treats Saying/the Said as Levinas’s response to structuralism: signification originates in a responsible address rather than in a formal system of signs.
Debates continue over how far this distinction can be formalized and whether it posits a stable hierarchy of ethics over ontology or reveals a more complex mutual dependence.
10. Beyond Ontology and Essence
10.1 Critique of Ontology
Levinas’s claim to move “otherwise than being” and “beyond essence” targets what he sees as a longstanding dominance of ontology in Western philosophy. He argues that:
- Ontology tends to totalize by reducing otherness to categories of presence, substance, or essence.
- Even phenomenology, focused on appearance and givenness, often presupposes a horizon of being within which phenomena are grasped.
- Ethical alterity cannot be adequately expressed in such terms.
Supporters of this reading contend that Levinas extends and radicalizes critiques of metaphysics associated with Heidegger and post‑Heideggerian thought, but redirects them toward ethics.
10.2 Otherwise than Being
The phrase “otherwise than being” names a dimension that is not simply another region of reality beyond entities, but a different order of significance:
- It is encountered in the self’s responsibility for the Other.
- It resists objectification; it is not “something” that is.
- It is marked as a trace of the Infinite rather than as a present object.
Some interpreters emphasize that “otherwise than being” is a way of displacing rather than denying ontology: ontology continues but is subordinate to ethical signification.
10.3 Beyond Essence
By going “beyond essence”, Levinas questions the idea that what matters most about anything is its definable what‑ness (essence). Ethical relation, he argues, is not grounded in a shared human nature, rational essence, or substance, but in the Other’s irreducible singularity and vulnerability.
10.4 Debates on the Status of Ontology
There is a substantial debate about whether Levinas successfully escapes ontology:
| Position | Main Claim |
|---|---|
| Strong “beyond ontology” | Levinas inaugurates a genuinely non‑ontological discourse oriented by ethics. |
| Moderate dependence | His language of “otherwise than being” still relies on ontological categories, even if it reorders them. |
| Phenomenological reinterpretation | The work should be read as an expanded phenomenology of ethical experience, not as a rejection of ontology. |
Some critics argue that completely leaving ontology is impossible while still speaking and thinking, suggesting that Levinas’s project is best understood as a self‑critical ontology of ethical responsibility rather than its pure outside. Others maintain that the point is not to abolish ontology but to limit its pretensions and subordinate it to an anterior ethical demand.
11. The Third, Justice, and Politics
11.1 The Third (le tiers)
While much of Levinas’s work focuses on the asymmetrical relation to a single Other, Otherwise than Being explicitly introduces the third—another Other beyond the immediate face‑to‑face. The third raises questions of:
- Comparison: Who should I help first?
- Impartiality: How can I be fair when faced with multiple others?
- Institutionalization: How can responsibility be organized socially?
The third thus disrupts the purely dyadic structure of responsibility and opens onto public life.
11.2 From Responsibility to Justice
For Levinas, justice arises when the presence of multiple others requires that responsibility take a comparative and calculative form. This involves:
- Weighing and judging between claims.
- Establishing norms and procedures.
- Introducing equality and reciprocity in some sense.
Yet Levinas insists that such justice must remain rooted in the original asymmetrical responsibility; otherwise it risks becoming a new totality.
11.3 Law, Institutions, and the State
Levinas sketches a view in which:
- Law and political institutions are necessary responses to the proliferation of others.
- The State is required to administer justice, distribute rights, and maintain order.
- These structures are always ambivalent: they can protect the vulnerable but also perpetuate violence and exclusion.
Proponents of a political reading argue that Otherwise than Being provides resources for thinking human rights, democratic institutions, and critique of unjust systems by referring them back to a more primordial responsibility.
11.4 Tensions and Interpretive Debates
Scholars diverge on how to evaluate Levinas’s account of politics:
| Reading | Emphasis |
|---|---|
| Ethical primacy | Politics must constantly be judged by the infinite responsibility to each Other. |
| Political deficit | Levinas’s focus on asymmetry undermines capacities for collective action and reciprocal citizenship. |
| Dialectical interplay | Ethics and politics are mutually conditioning: responsibility needs institutions, institutions need ethical critique. |
Some feminist and critical theorists argue that Levinas’s conception of the third does not fully engage with structural injustice, power relations, or concrete historical conflicts, while others adapt his framework to these concerns by extending the analysis of justice and institutional responsibility.
12. Famous Passages and Pivotal Formulations
Commentators often single out several passages of Otherwise than Being as especially influential and frequently cited.
12.1 The Subject as Hostage
In Part III, Levinas’s description of the self as hostage has become emblematic:
“The subject is a hostage. It answers for others, even for their responsibility.”
— Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being (trans. Lingis)
This formulation concentrates the themes of passivity, responsibility, and substitution, and is often referenced in ethical and theological discussions.
12.2 Saying and the Said
Part II contains the concise but dense introduction of the distinction between Saying and the Said, where Levinas writes of Saying as an exposure of oneself to the Other, and of the Said as the thematization that risks betraying this exposure. Short paragraphs in this section are frequently quoted to capture the idea of an ethics inherent in speech.
12.3 Substitution
The chapter typically titled “Substitution” develops the idea that the self takes the place of the Other, bearing their suffering. One oft‑cited line presents the self as:
“More responsible than all the others.”
— Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being (trans. Lingis)
This hyperbolic formula is used by interpreters to illustrate the excessiveness of Levinasian responsibility.
12.4 The Third and Justice
In the later sections, where the third appears, Levinas formulates the need to pass from pure responsibility to justice. Passages that juxtapose the command of the face with the necessity of institutions and law are central for political readings of the work.
12.5 Beyond Essence and the Trace of the Infinite
In the concluding part, Levinas links ethical responsibility to the trace of the Infinite, insisting that transcendence is not presence but a trace in the relation to the Other. Short formulations about the Infinite “passing in the ethical relationship” are commonly cited in discussions of Levinas and theology.
These passages serve as touchstones in secondary literature, though many commentators caution that extracting them from their dense argumentative context can obscure the complexities and tensions that characterize the work as a whole.
13. Philosophical Method and Style
13.1 Methodological Orientation
Levinas’s method in Otherwise than Being is widely regarded as hybrid:
- It draws on phenomenology, seeking to describe structures of experience (obsession, persecution, responsibility) that precede reflective consciousness.
- It incorporates quasi‑transcendental moves, positing conditions for any discourse or relation to the Other.
- It engages in critical genealogy, attempting to uncover ontological presuppositions in Western philosophy.
Different commentators emphasize different aspects: some classify the work as “ethical phenomenology,” others as a critique of phenomenology from within, and still others as a sui generis ethical metaphysics.
13.2 Use of Language
The style of Otherwise than Being is notoriously dense and self‑reflexive. Features include:
- Repeated paradoxes and reversals (“passivity more passive than passivity,” “anarchy” that precedes all principle).
- Neologisms and unusual combinations of terms (e.g., “diachrony,” “illeity”).
- Frequent self‑questioning: assertions are immediately qualified or unsettled.
Levinas presents this style as methodologically motivated: because ethical alterity is said to exceed the order of the Said, philosophical language must “strain” against its own tendency to totalize.
13.3 Relation to Systematicity
The work is carefully structured into parts and chapters, yet the argument does not proceed linearly in the manner of standard systematic treatises. Instead, Levinas often returns to the same themes from different angles, deepening or revising earlier formulations. Some readers see this as a deliberate resistance to system, reflecting the very ethics of non‑totalization he advocates.
13.4 Interpretive Responses
Responses to Levinas’s method and style vary:
| Response Type | Typical Evaluation |
|---|---|
| Sympathetic | The tortuous style enacts the tension between Saying and Said and is integral to the philosophy. |
| Critical | The obscurity makes it difficult to determine the exact claims and to assess their validity. |
| Mediating | The style is rhetorically excessive but can be reconstructed into more standard arguments. |
These methodological issues remain central in debates about how to read, translate, and apply Otherwise than Being in contemporary philosophical contexts.
14. Major Critiques and Debates
14.1 Obscurity and Argumentative Clarity
Many critics focus on the difficulty of the text. They argue that Levinas’s hyperbolic language and self‑subverting style obscure the structure of his arguments, making it hard to test or operationalize claims about “otherwise than being.” Others counter that the style is philosophically motivated and that careful reconstruction can yield coherent theses.
14.2 Asymmetry and Reciprocity
Levinas’s insistence on asymmetrical responsibility has provoked sustained debate. Critics question whether a model in which I am always “more responsible than all the others” allows for:
- Mutual recognition.
- Democratic reciprocity.
- Collective political agency.
Defenders suggest that asymmetry is a necessary corrective to self‑interest and that reciprocity can emerge at the level of justice and institutions without undermining the ethical priority of the Other.
14.3 Ontology and Its Supposed Transcendence
Philosophers steeped in phenomenology and metaphysics debate whether Levinas can truly step beyond ontology while still employing concepts such as being, subject, and relation. Some contend that his project inevitably remains parasitic on ontological discourse; others hold that he inaugurates a new kind of “otherwise‑than‑ontological” thinking.
14.4 Gender, Embodiment, and Concrete Others
Feminist and critical theorists have raised concerns about:
- The use of gendered metaphors (e.g., maternity, paternity, the feminine) that may, in their view, re‑inscribe stereotypical roles.
- The relative abstraction of the “Other,” which is rarely specified in terms of race, class, disability, or other axes of power.
Some scholars attempt to extend Levinas’s framework to address these issues, while others question whether his conceptualization of alterity and passivity can adequately account for structural oppression.
14.5 Historicity and Politics
Another line of critique targets the book’s limited attention to historical and socio‑political specifics. While Levinas speaks of justice, the State, and institutions, critics argue that he underplays:
- Economic and material conditions.
- Concrete political struggles and resistances.
- Systemic forms of violence and domination.
Responses vary: some theorists integrate Levinasian ethics with Marxist, postcolonial, or critical race analyses; others maintain that the abstractness is integral to Levinas’s aim to articulate an unconditional ethical demand.
14.6 Theological and Secular Readings
Finally, there is an ongoing debate about the theological status of Otherwise than Being:
| Reading | Claim |
|---|---|
| Secular | The work is a philosophical ethics that can be understood without reference to theology, despite religious resonances. |
| Implicitly theological | Concepts like the Infinite, trace, and illeity effectively reintroduce a God‑concept into philosophy. |
| Interreligious | Levinas offers resources for Jewish, Christian, and other theological ethics while remaining philosophically generative. |
These debates shape how the book is received across disciplines such as philosophy, theology, and religious studies.
15. Reception, Influence, and Legacy
15.1 Initial Reception
Upon its 1974 publication, Otherwise than Being was quickly recognized within French and continental philosophy as a demanding and innovative work. Early readers in phenomenology and post‑Heideggerian circles highlighted:
- Its radicalization of the thesis that ethics is first philosophy.
- Its challenging style, which some praised as necessary and others criticized as obscure.
The book’s impact in the Anglophone world expanded significantly after Alphonso Lingis’s 1981 English translation.
15.2 Influence on Continental Philosophy
The work has had substantial influence on:
| Area | Influence |
|---|---|
| Deconstruction | Derrida and others engaged deeply with Levinas’s notions of alterity, responsibility, and hospitality. |
| Post‑structuralism | Themes of non‑totalization and the critique of presence resonate with broader post‑structuralist concerns. |
| Phenomenology | Inspired “ethical turn” within phenomenology and re‑interpretations of subjectivity and embodiment. |
Thinkers such as Jacques Derrida, Jean‑Luc Marion, Jean‑François Lyotard, and many others have engaged with, extended, or contested Levinas’s claims.
15.3 Impact on Ethics and Political Theory
In moral and political philosophy, Otherwise than Being has been used to:
- Challenge models of the subject based on autonomy or rational choice.
- Support ethics of alterity, hospitality, and responsibility for the vulnerable.
- Inform debates on human rights, asylum, and post‑Holocaust ethics.
Some political theorists incorporate Levinas’s concept of the third and justice into democratic theory and legal philosophy, while others criticize perceived deficits in his account of power and institutions.
15.4 Interdisciplinary Reach
Beyond philosophy, the book has influenced:
- Theology: Jewish, Christian, and other theologians draw on Levinas’s notions of the Infinite and the trace.
- Literary and cultural studies: Concepts of alterity and ethical reading inform textual interpretation and postcolonial theory.
- Feminist and care ethics: Some authors connect Levinasian responsibility to practices of care, while also subjecting his gendered metaphors to critique.
15.5 Ongoing Legacy
Otherwise than Being remains a standard reference in discussions of ethics after metaphysics, often paired with Totality and Infinity as Levinas’s two major statements. Its central ideas continue to generate new interpretations, adaptations, and critical responses, securing its place as a canonical, if controversial, work in late twentieth‑century philosophy.
16. Legacy and Historical Significance
16.1 Place in Twentieth‑Century Philosophy
Otherwise than Being is widely regarded as one of the key texts of postwar continental philosophy. Its insistence on ethics as first philosophy offers a distinctive alternative to:
- Existentialist emphases on freedom.
- Structuralist and post‑structuralist emphases on systems and discourse.
- Traditional metaphysical and analytic approaches to moral theory.
It has become a central point of reference in histories of phenomenology, deconstruction, and post‑Heideggerian thought.
16.2 Reframing Subjectivity and Responsibility
Historically, the work is significant for its redefinition of subjectivity as responsibility, passivity, and substitution. This redefinition has contributed to the so‑called “ethical turn” in various disciplines, encouraging re‑evaluation of autonomy‑centered models of the self in philosophy, theology, and social theory.
16.3 Ethics Beyond Metaphysics
Levinas’s notion of the “otherwise than being” has played a role in broader discussions about the end or transformation of metaphysics. The book is often cited in debates over whether and how ethics can be grounded without recourse to traditional ontological or theological foundations, even as it itself is read in multiple ways on that question.
16.4 Influence on Subsequent Generations
Later generations of thinkers—such as Judith Butler, Simone Weil readers, Jean‑Luc Nancy, and many political and feminist theorists—engage with Levinas’s ideas, either building on his emphasis on vulnerability and exposure or contesting and revising it in light of concerns about power, embodiment, and social structures.
16.5 Canonization and Contestation
While Otherwise than Being is now canonized in many curricula and reference works, its legacy is not uniform:
| Aspect | Assessment in Scholarship |
|---|---|
| Innovation | Credited with pioneering a radical ethics of alterity. |
| Difficulty | Often cited as a paradigmatic example of philosophically challenging prose. |
| Debatability | Considered fertile ground for ongoing disputes about ontology, politics, gender, and theology. |
Historically, the work has helped shift the horizon of philosophical inquiry toward questions of responsibility, hospitality, and justice in the wake of twentieth‑century violence and disillusionment with grand metaphysical systems. Its significance lies as much in the debates it continues to provoke as in the specific theses it advances.
Study Guide
specialistOtherwise than Being is one of the most difficult works in twentieth-century philosophy: its prose is intentionally tortuous, the vocabulary is highly specialized, and core claims rework technical issues in phenomenology, ontology, and ethics. It is best approached after prior study of Levinas and basic phenomenology, ideally with secondary literature at hand.
The Other (Autrui)
The human other whose irreducible alterity confronts the self with an unconditional ethical demand that precedes recognition, knowledge, and reciprocity.
Ethics as First Philosophy
The thesis that responsibility for the Other is more fundamental than ontology or epistemology, making the primary philosophical question ‘How am I responsible?’ rather than ‘What is being?’ or ‘How do I know?’
Saying (le Dire) and the Said (le Dit)
Saying is the living act of address, exposure, and responsibility to the Other; the Said is the stabilized propositional content of discourse, where meanings are thematized and risk totalizing alterity.
Responsibility (responsabilité)
An asymmetrical, unlimited obligation for the Other that constitutes subjectivity itself and precedes freedom, contract, and reciprocity.
Hostage (otage), Obsession, and Persecution
Figures for a subjectivity that is passively exposed to the Other’s claim: ‘hostage’ evokes being bound without consent; ‘obsession’ and ‘persecution’ evoke a non-intentional, intrusive affectivity that precedes freedom.
Substitution (substitution)
The structural condition in which the self takes the place of the Other, bearing their burden, suffering, and even their guilt—‘more responsible than all the others’.
The Third (le tiers), Justice, and Institutions
The ‘third’ is another Other whose presence disrupts the purely dyadic relation and demands comparison, impartiality, and institutional justice (law, the State, norms).
Otherwise than Being / Beyond Essence
Levinas’s name for an ethical dimension that cannot be captured within categories of being, presence, or essence, and that appears as the trace of the Infinite in the self’s responsibility for the Other.
What does Levinas mean by ‘ethics as first philosophy’, and how does this slogan reshape traditional philosophical priorities rooted in ontology and epistemology?
How does the distinction between Saying and the Said illuminate Levinas’s own writing style in Otherwise than Being?
In what sense is the subject a ‘hostage’ in Levinas’s account, and how does this image challenge common philosophical notions of autonomy and freedom?
Can Levinas consistently maintain that responsibility is unlimited and asymmetrical while also acknowledging the need for justice, equality, and institutions when the third appears?
Does Levinas successfully move ‘beyond essence’ and ‘otherwise than being’, or does his project remain dependent on the very ontological categories he criticizes?
How might Levinas’s concept of substitution be compared to, or distinguished from, religious notions of vicarious suffering or atonement?
To what extent can Levinas’s abstract description of the Other and responsibility be adapted to address concrete structures of oppression (e.g., race, gender, class), as raised by feminist and critical theorists?
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title = {otherwise-than-being-or-beyond-essence},
author = {Philopedia},
year = {2025},
url = {https://philopedia.com/works/otherwise-than-being-or-beyond-essence/},
urldate = {December 11, 2025}
}