The Basic Problems of Phenomenology is a systematic exposition of Martin Heidegger’s ontological project in the period immediately following Being and Time. Framed as a university lecture course, it clarifies phenomenology as a method, reinterprets the history of metaphysics from Aristotle to Kant, and develops four fundamental ontological problems: the difference between Being and beings, the ontological priority of Dasein, temporality as the horizon of Being, and the basic structures of worldhood. Heidegger unfolds a rigorous analysis of intentionality, transcendence, and temporality to show how human existence (Dasein) discloses Being, while critically reworking and overcoming traditional subject–object and consciousness-centered paradigms in phenomenology and metaphysics.

At a Glance

Quick Facts

Author: Martin Heidegger
Composed: Summer semester 1927 (lecture course); editorial preparation 1975–1979
Language: German
Status: reconstructed

Key Arguments

•The ontological difference: Heidegger distinguishes rigorously between Being (Sein) and beings (Seiendes), arguing that Western metaphysics has largely forgotten this difference by treating Being as if it were a highest being or property, and that phenomenology must reopen the question of the meaning of Being.
•The priority of the question of Being: The inquiry into Being is not one topic among others but the most fundamental philosophical question, because all regional ontologies and sciences presuppose an understanding of Being; phenomenology must therefore begin with an explicit analytic of that entity for whom Being is an issue—Dasein.
•Dasein and intentionality: Heidegger reinterprets Husserl’s concept of intentionality by grounding it in the being of Dasein rather than in a subject of consciousness: comportment is always already a being-in-the-world, and intentional directedness is rooted in Dasein’s transcendence toward world, not in inner mental acts aiming at external objects.
•Temporality as the horizon of Being: Building on and revising Being and Time, Heidegger argues that the meaning of Being can be understood only through an analysis of time; original temporality (Temporalität), structured by ecstatic projection (future), thrownness (past), and being-alongside (present), is the horizon within which Being becomes intelligible.
•Critical transformation of the history of metaphysics: Through close readings of Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant, Heidegger maintains that major metaphysical positions tacitly presuppose structures of Dasein and temporality; by making these presuppositions explicit, phenomenological ontology both appropriates and transforms the metaphysical tradition.

Historical Significance

After its publication in the Gesamtausgabe in 1975 and especially following the 1982 English translation, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology came to be seen as a pivotal text in Heidegger’s early to middle period. It provides one of the clearest, most systematic presentations of his project of fundamental ontology and his reinterpretation of phenomenology, while documenting the transition from the existential analytic of Being and Time to his later, more historical and language-centered thinking about Being. It has been central for scholarship on the ontological difference, the concept of Dasein, and the relation between phenomenology and the history of metaphysics.

Famous Passages

Systematic formulation of the ‘ontological difference’(Early lectures, often indicated around §§2–4 in GA 24; Hofstadter translation, Part One, chapters on the basic task of ontology.)

Analysis of Dasein’s transcendence and the worldhood of the world(Middle lectures, GA 24 sections on transcendence and world (approximately §§15–23); Hofstadter translation, Part Two.)

Explication of temporality (Temporalität) as horizon of Being(Later lectures on time and Being, GA 24 final third (approximately §§24–30); Hofstadter translation, Part Three.)

Critical interpretation of Kant’s schematism and the problem of time(Sections dealing with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, in the later lectures; Hofstadter translation, chapters on Kant and the problem of temporality.)

Key Terms

Dasein (Da-sein): Heidegger’s term for the distinctively human mode of being whose essence lies in its existence and for whom its own Being is an issue, serving as the starting point for fundamental ontology.

Ontological Difference (ontologische Differenz): The fundamental distinction between Being (what it means for something to be) and beings (entities that are), which Heidegger claims has been obscured in the history of [metaphysics](/works/metaphysics/).

Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein): The basic structure of [Dasein](/terms/dasein/), indicating that human existence is not an inner subject confronting external objects, but a holistic being already situated and involved in a meaningful world.

Temporality (Temporalität): The primordial, ecstatic-unified structure of time—future, having-been, and present—that constitutes Dasein’s being and functions as the ultimate horizon for understanding Being.

Transcendence (Transzendenz): Dasein’s structural ‘going-beyond’ toward world and beings, by which entities become accessible as such, reinterpreted by Heidegger as an ontological feature of existence rather than a relation between a mental subject and external objects.

1. Introduction

The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie) is a lecture course delivered by Martin Heidegger at Marburg in the summer semester of 1927. It offers one of the most systematic expositions of his early project of fundamental ontology, closely related to, yet distinct from, Being and Time, which had appeared a few months earlier.

Heidegger presents phenomenology not merely as a descriptive psychology of consciousness but as a method for interrogating the meaning of Being. The lectures unfold around a set of “basic problems” that, he maintains, underlie and orient the entire Western metaphysical tradition: the ontological difference between Being and beings, the priority of Dasein as the entity that understands Being, the structure of worldhood and intentionality, and the role of temporality as the horizon in which Being becomes intelligible.

Throughout, Heidegger combines programmatic methodological reflections with detailed textual engagements, especially with Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant. The course has therefore been read both as a clarifying companion to Being and Time and as a key document for understanding Heidegger’s re-interpretation of phenomenology and his simultaneous appropriation and critique of the history of ontology.

2. Historical Context and Relation to Being and Time

2.1 Marburg Phenomenology in 1927

The 1927 Marburg lectures arise within an active phenomenological milieu shaped by Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and the neo-Kantianism of the Marburg school. Heidegger, then a rising professor, was elaborating his own existential-ontological transformation of Husserl’s project while teaching and revising material that would become Being and Time.

Date	Event
Early 1927	Publication of Being and Time (first half)
Summer 1927	Delivery of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology at Marburg
1928	Heidegger moves to Freiburg as Husserl’s successor

2.2 Companion and Clarification to Being and Time

Heidegger explicitly presents the lecture course as a systematic working-out of themes only sketched in Being and Time. Proponents of this “companion” view emphasize that the lectures:

Restate the question of Being and the ontological difference in a more didactic form
Deepen the analyses of intentionality, transcendence, and worldhood
Extend the account of temporality and its relation to traditional metaphysics

Other interpreters stress differences. They note that the lectures give greater prominence to the history of ontology and to Kant, which some see as marking an early shift toward Heidegger’s later, more historical thinking. There is debate over whether GA 24 primarily consolidates the project of Being and Time or already signals its reorientation.

3. Author, Composition, and Textual History

3.1 Heidegger as Author

Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), a central figure in 20th-century phenomenology and existential thought, composed The Basic Problems of Phenomenology as a university lecture course rather than as a book intended for publication. It reflects his Marburg period, during which he was developing his distinctive account of Dasein, Being-in-the-world, and temporality.

3.2 Composition of the 1927 Lecture Course

The course was prepared for the Marburg summer semester of 1927. Heidegger drafted extensive lecture manuscripts and working notes, which he used in class alongside extemporaneous elaborations. Students produced stenographic and expanded notes, several of which circulated privately. Scholars generally agree that the course was conceived as a deepening of arguments contemporaneous with Being and Time.

3.3 Reconstruction and Publication History

Heidegger did not publish the lectures during his lifetime, though he authorized their inclusion in his Gesamtausgabe (Complete Edition). The text was reconstructed for GA 24 (1975) under editor Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, primarily from Heidegger’s manuscripts, supplemented by student notes where necessary.

Stage	Approximate Date	Features
Delivery at Marburg	1927	Oral presentation based on Heidegger’s manuscripts
Editorial reconstruction	1975	GA 24 critical edition, combining manuscripts and student notes
First complete English translation	1982	Albert Hofstadter, Indiana University Press

Some commentators discuss the reliability of GA 24, noting minor discrepancies between the edited text and surviving student transcripts, but there is broad consensus that the volume faithfully represents Heidegger’s intentions for the course.

4. Structure and Organization of the Lecture Course

The lecture course is organized systematically around what Heidegger calls the “basic problems” of phenomenology, which he treats as problems of fundamental ontology rather than as issues of method alone.

4.1 Overall Architectonic

While different editions and translations segment the material slightly differently, the teaching plan follows four major lines of inquiry:

Part (schematic)	Main Focus
Part One	The task of ontology and the clarification of phenomenology as its method
Part Two	The existential-ontological analysis of Dasein, intentionality, and worldhood
Part Three	The explication of temporality as the horizon for understanding Being
Part Four	The “phenomenological destruction” of the history of ontology (Aristotle, Descartes, Kant)

4.2 Progression of Topics

The course moves from methodological clarification to increasingly concrete ontological analyses:

It begins with the question of Being, the ontological difference, and the need to start from Dasein.
It then examines comportment, transcendence, and the worldliness of the world, reinterpreting Husserlian intentionality.
The final sections develop a theory of original temporality and relate it to classical metaphysical treatments of time and Being.

This progression is often interpreted as moving from formal problem-setting to a phenomenological “destruction” of tradition, but some scholars emphasize that the historical analyses are structurally integrated rather than merely appended historical studies.

5. Central Arguments and Key Concepts

5.1 The Question of Being and the Ontological Difference

Heidegger argues that philosophy’s basic task is to clarify the meaning of Being and to recover the ontological difference between Being (Sein) and beings (Seiendes). Western metaphysics, he claims, has frequently treated Being as if it were a highest being or property, thereby obscuring the distinct question of what it means for something to be.

“The first and last and only theme of philosophy is the question of Being.”

— Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (paraphrased theme)

Proponents of this reading see GA 24 as one of Heidegger’s most explicit formulations of this basic thesis.

5.2 Dasein and the Priority of Fundamental Ontology

The lectures further develop the claim that access to Being must proceed via Dasein, the entity that already understands Being in some way. This leads to the distinction between fundamental ontology (the analysis of Dasein’s being) and regional ontologies (ontologies of nature, culture, etc.). Commentators differ over whether this privileges human existence in an anthropocentric way or simply identifies an unavoidable starting point for ontology.

5.3 Intentionality, Transcendence, and Worldhood

A central argument reinterprets intentionality. Rather than understanding intentionality as inner mental acts directed at external objects (Husserl’s early model), Heidegger grounds intentionality in Being-in-the-world:

Transcendence is treated as Dasein’s structural “going beyond” toward a world
Worldhood denotes the network of significance in which entities appear as usable, encounterable, or present-at-hand

This move is widely regarded as decisive for existential phenomenology, though some Husserlian interpreters question whether it misrepresents Husserl’s later, more holistic views.

5.4 Temporality as Horizon of Being

The later lectures elaborate temporality (Temporalität) as the horizon within which Being is understood. Heidegger distinguishes primordial temporality, characterized by the ecstatic unity of future, having-been, and present, from the ordinary, “vulgar” concept of time as a sequence of now-points.

Proponents argue that this temporalization of Being underpins the entire project of fundamental ontology, while critics suggest that the claim that Being must be understood temporally rests more on interpretive assertions than on explicit argument.

5.5 Phenomenological Destruction of the History of Ontology

Finally, Heidegger applies his ontological framework to re-read Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant. This Destruktion aims to uncover latent assumptions about Being, world, and time at work in their texts. Supporters view this as a productive way of retrieving forgotten insights; detractors argue that it risks subsuming diverse historical projects under Heidegger’s own problematic.

6. Legacy and Historical Significance

6.1 Posthumous Reception

Because The Basic Problems of Phenomenology was not published until 1975, its influence is largely retrospective. After the GA 24 edition and the 1982 English translation, scholars began to treat it as a key document for understanding Heidegger’s early thought and the genesis of Being and Time. It has been extensively discussed in Heidegger scholarship, particularly in German- and English-language secondary literature.

6.2 Role in Interpreting Heidegger’s Development

Many commentators regard GA 24 as crucial for tracing the transition from Heidegger’s existential analytic to his later, more historical and language-focused approach to Being. It:

Clarifies his reworking of Husserlian phenomenology
Elaborates the link between temporality and Being
Prepares, through its focus on Kant and the history of ontology, the later “turn” toward Being’s historical unfolding

Others contend that the lectures remain firmly within the framework of Being and Time and should be read less as a transitional text than as a parallel, more systematic restatement of its central theses.

The work has been influential for:

Phenomenology and existential philosophy, by refining concepts like worldhood, transcendence, and care
Hermeneutics and deconstruction, which draw on its analyses of the history of ontology and the ontological difference
Analytic engagements with Heidegger, where its relatively systematic style has facilitated reconstruction and critique of his arguments

Critics continue to question the anthropocentric implications of grounding ontology in Dasein, as well as the clarity and argumentative transparency of the lectures. Nonetheless, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology is widely regarded as a pivotal text for understanding both Heidegger’s project and the broader trajectory of 20th-century phenomenology.

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@online{philopedia_the_basic_problems_of_phenomenology,
  title = {the-basic-problems-of-phenomenology},
  author = {Philopedia},
  year = {2025},
  url = {https://philopedia.com/works/the-basic-problems-of-phenomenology/},
  urldate = {December 11, 2025}
}