The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin
The Concept of Anxiety analyzes the phenomenon of anxiety (angest) as the psychological and existential condition that accompanies human freedom, possibility, and the transition from innocence to sin, particularly in relation to the Christian doctrine of hereditary sin. Writing as Vigilius Haufniensis, Kierkegaard rejects purely speculative, Hegelian treatments of sin and instead explores how anxiety reveals the individual’s capacity for freedom and the ambiguity of possibility. Anxiety is described as a ‘dizziness of freedom’: it is neither mere fear of something determinate nor a simple pathology, but an ambivalent state that can lead to both sin and spiritual maturation. Through reflections on Adam, original sin, subjective appropriation, the stages of individual development, and the relation between psychology and dogmatics, the work argues that anxiety is indispensable to understanding guilt, responsibility, and the possibility of redemption.
At a Glance
- Author
- Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (writing under the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis)
- Composed
- 1843–1844
- Language
- Danish
- Status
- original survives
- •Anxiety as the ‘dizziness of freedom’: Anxiety (angest) is distinct from fear because it has no determinate object; it arises from the individual’s confrontation with the open realm of possibilities afforded by freedom. This vertigo of possibility is structurally necessary to human existence and underlies our capacity both to sin and to become spiritually inward.
- •Innocence, the Fall, and hereditary sin: The state of innocence is characterized by ignorance rather than moral purity and is ‘qualified as anxiety’ because it already includes an obscure relation to possibility. The transition from innocence to sin (prefigured in Adam’s Fall) is not explainable as a gradual development or as a rational mediation; it is a qualitative leap, and anxiety is the psychological condition making this leap possible. Hereditary sin is not a biological transmission but a universal condition into which every individual is born and which each must appropriate personally.
- •Qualitative leap versus speculative mediation: Against Hegelian speculative philosophy, the work insists that sin cannot be deduced or mediated as a necessary moment in the development of Spirit. The move from innocence to guilt involves a discontinuous ‘qualitative leap’ grounded in freedom. Anxiety is the inner psychological correlate of this leap and resists systematization, thereby refuting conceptions that reduce sin to a logical necessity or stage in a dialectical progression.
- •Anxiety as ambiguous: demonic entrapment vs. pedagogical possibility: Anxiety is ambivalent: it can become destructive when the individual closes in on possibility and becomes ‘demonic,’ or it can serve as a ‘schoolmaster’ leading towards spiritual profundity and faith. In its reflective form, anxiety can deepen self-understanding, preparing the individual for repentance and for receiving grace, so that anxiety is both symptom of alienation and condition of possible reconciliation.
- •The relation of psychology to dogmatics and the limits of science: The work argues that while psychology can describe the experience and structure of anxiety, it cannot itself explain sin away or replace theology. Anxiety belongs to the subjective, existential life of the individual and cannot be reduced to natural-scientific causation or abstract metaphysics. A proper psychology of anxiety is ‘orienting’ for dogmatics, clarifying how doctrines like hereditary sin and guilt are lived and inwardly appropriated rather than merely speculated about.
Over time, The Concept of Anxiety became one of the foundational texts of existential philosophy, existential theology, and phenomenological accounts of affect. Its analysis of anxiety as the dizziness of freedom influenced thinkers such as Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Paul Tillich, Jean-Paul Sartre, and later existential psychologists. It provided a sophisticated alternative to both rationalist and purely empirical accounts of human subjectivity, showing how the experience of anxiety discloses freedom, guilt, and the possibility of authentic selfhood. In theology, it reframed the doctrine of original sin in existential-psychological terms, emphasizing personal appropriation and individual responsibility. The text remains a central reference in discussions of anxiety, freedom, and the relationship between psychology and theology.
1. Introduction
The Concept of Anxiety is a mid-period treatise in Søren Kierkegaard’s authorship that examines how anxiety (angest) illuminates human freedom, sin, and the Christian doctrine of hereditary sin. Written under the pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis, it is presented as a “simple psychologically orienting deliberation,” meaning that it seeks to clarify how dogmatic concepts are lived and experienced by a single individual rather than offering a full systematic theology or an empirical science of the mind.
The work places special weight on anxiety as a distinctive mood that has no specific object and yet discloses the range of human possibility. Haufniensis argues that this anxiety accompanies the transition from innocence to guilt, both in the paradigmatic figure of Adam and in each individual’s life-history. In doing so, the book attempts to show how doctrines of sin and guilt presuppose a structure of existence in which humans are free, capable of qualitative leaps, and responsible for their own becoming.
Throughout, the text engages and criticizes contemporary Hegelian and speculative theology, especially their tendency to treat sin as a necessary moment in a rational process. Against this, The Concept of Anxiety insists that anxiety reveals the irreducible contingency and risk of freedom, thereby “orienting” both psychological description and Christian dogmatics without collapsing one into the other.
2. Historical and Theological Context
2.1 Nineteenth-Century Danish Theology and Hegelianism
The book emerged in 1840s Copenhagen, where Lutheran theology was being reshaped by German Idealism, especially Hegel. Many Danish theologians interpreted sin and redemption through a speculative, developmental lens, treating them as stages in the self-realization of Spirit. Proponents held that this approach safeguarded rationality and universality; critics argued it risked dissolving personal guilt into abstract necessity.
| Contextual Factor | Relevance to The Concept of Anxiety |
|---|---|
| Danish state Lutheranism | Provides the dogma of hereditary sin that Haufniensis reinterprets |
| Hegelian speculative theology | Target of the critique of “mediation” and necessity in sin |
| Emerging empirical psychology | Serves as foil to Kierkegaard’s non-clinical, existential psychology |
2.2 Doctrine of Hereditary Sin
Within Lutheran orthodoxy, hereditary sin (original sin) explained the universality of guilt and the necessity of grace. Interpretations varied:
- Some theologians emphasized inheritance in quasi-biological or legal terms.
- Others, influenced by idealism, treated sin more as a universal condition of consciousness.
Haufniensis situates his analysis within this debate, maintaining doctrinal continuity while recasting hereditary sin in terms of existential appropriation and anxiety.
2.3 Early Psychology and Anthropology
The period saw tentative moves toward scientific psychology and anthropology, often framed within philosophical systems. Haufniensis adopts psychological language yet resists naturalistic reduction, contributing to broader 19th‑century efforts to understand the human being as both natural and spiritual without collapsing one into the other.
3. Author, Pseudonym, and Composition
3.1 Kierkegaard and Vigilius Haufniensis
The Concept of Anxiety was written by Søren Aabye Kierkegaard but published under the Latin pseudonym Vigilius Haufniensis (“watchman of Copenhagen”). Scholars widely interpret this pseudonym as signaling a reflective observer who stands within, yet critically apart from, the theological culture of Copenhagen. The use of a pseudonym allows Kierkegaard to explore psychological and dogmatic themes without speaking in his own religious voice, in line with his broader strategy of “indirect communication.”
3.2 Relation to Earlier Works
The treatise was composed after major pseudonymous works such as Either/Or (1843) and Fear and Trembling (1843). Interpreters often see it as forming, with these texts, a cluster that develops themes of subjectivity, choice, and faith, now focused specifically on sin and anxiety. Some commentators argue that The Concept of Anxiety occupies a transitional place between Kierkegaard’s “aesthetic‑ethical” writings and his more explicitly Christian upbuilding discourses.
3.3 Composition and Publication
| Aspect | Detail |
|---|---|
| Period of composition | 1843–1844, in Copenhagen |
| First publication | 17 June 1844, by C.A. Reitzel |
| Authorial framing | Described as a “simple psychologically‑orienting deliberation,” not a dogmatics |
The surviving manuscripts, preserved in Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter (SKS 4), show careful revisions, suggesting that the intricate structure and terminology—especially concerning freedom, possibility, and anxiety—were the result of deliberate philosophical construction rather than casual reflection.
4. Structure and Organization of the Work
4.1 Overall Layout
The work is framed by a Preface and Introduction, followed by two main parts (editors sometimes count a third thematically distinct segment near the end) and a brief Conclusion.
| Section | Function |
|---|---|
| Preface | States limits of the project, distances it from speculative systems and empirical science |
| Introduction | Clarifies the task of a “psychologically orienting deliberation” vis‑à‑vis dogmatics |
| Part I | Analyzes anxiety as presupposition of hereditary sin, with focus on Adam and the Fall |
| Part II | Examines anxiety in individual development and across generations |
| Final chapters / Conclusion | Explore the demonic and anxiety’s educative role in relation to faith |
4.2 Internal Articulation
Within Part I, chapters move from:
- Innocence and anxiety in Adam
- Anxiety as related to freedom and possibility (“dizziness of freedom”)
- The qualitative leap into sin and critique of mediation
Part II turns to:
- Hereditary sin and transmission
- Developmental stages (childhood, sexual awakening, ethical consciousness)
- Social and cultural forms of anxiety, including concealment and distraction
- The demonic as intensified, self‑enclosed anxiety
The conclusion briefly synthesizes how the preceding psychological analyses “orient” but do not complete dogmatic reflection, pointing beyond themselves to theological considerations treated elsewhere in Kierkegaard’s authorship.
5. Central Arguments on Anxiety, Freedom, and Sin
5.1 Anxiety as “Dizziness of Freedom”
Haufniensis distinguishes anxiety from fear: fear has a determinate object, whereas anxiety arises from an indeterminate realm of possibility. When the individual confronts the openness of what they may become, freedom induces a kind of vertigo:
“Anxiety is the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when the spirit wants to posit the synthesis and freedom looks down into its own possibility.”
— Vigilius Haufniensis, The Concept of Anxiety
Proponents of existential readings emphasize this as a foundational account of human self‑experience; some psychologists, however, see it as overly abstract and distant from clinical phenomena.
5.2 Innocence, the Fall, and Hereditary Sin
The work argues that innocence is not fully conscious moral purity but ignorance “qualified as anxiety.” In the Adam narrative, the divine prohibition awakens anxiety before any actual transgression. The Fall occurs not via rational calculation but through a qualitative leap into sin, enabled by anxiety. This pattern is then generalized: hereditary sin is a universal condition into which all are born, yet it is also something each person freely appropriates.
5.3 Critique of Speculative Mediation
Against Hegelian models, Haufniensis contends that sin cannot be deduced as a necessary stage in the unfolding of Spirit. The transition from innocence to guilt is discontinuous and grounded in freedom, resisting philosophical mediation. Supporters of this view see it as safeguarding personal responsibility; critics argue that it underplays social, historical, and psychological determinants of wrongdoing.
5.4 Ambiguity and Pedagogy of Anxiety
Anxiety is described as ambiguous: it can harden into the demonic—self‑closed resistance to openness and grace—or function as a schoolmaster leading to deeper self‑knowledge, repentance, and ultimately faith. This pedagogical dimension is central to the book’s attempt to show why anxiety is not simply a pathology but a key to understanding human existence before God.
6. Key Concepts, Famous Passages, and Legacy
6.1 Key Concepts
| Concept | Brief Characterization |
|---|---|
| Angest (Anxiety) | Objectless mood revealing freedom and possibility; neither mere fear nor illness |
| Qualitative Leap | Non-gradual transition (e.g., from innocence to guilt) that cannot be logically mediated |
| Hereditary Sin | Universal sinful condition transmitted historically but personally appropriated |
| The Demonic | Closed inwardness in which anxiety is intensified and turned against openness |
| First / Second Immediacy | Pre‑reflective existence before sin-consciousness vs. life after awareness of guilt |
These notions have been variously interpreted as theological, existential‑phenomenological, or proto‑psychological categories.
6.2 Famous Passages
Several sections have become particularly influential:
- “Dizziness of freedom” (Part I, ch. II) articulates the classic definition of anxiety.
- Innocence “qualified as anxiety” (Part I, early pages) reinterprets the pre‑Fall state.
- Discussion of the demonic (Part II, ch. IV) offers a nuanced account of self‑enclosed despair-like states.
- Anxiety as educative (final chapter) portrays anxiety as preparing the individual for faith.
6.3 Intellectual Legacy
The conceptualization of anxiety has significantly shaped existential philosophy (e.g., Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre), existential theology (e.g., Tillich), and strands of phenomenological psychology. Some scholars regard The Concept of Anxiety as a bridge between classical Christian doctrines of sin and modern analyses of subjectivity, while others argue that its heavily theological framework limits its applicability to secular or empirical contexts. The terminology of possibility, freedom, and anxiety remains a staple reference point in discussions of existential affect.
7. Legacy and Historical Significance
7.1 Reception History
Initial reception in 1844 was modest; the book’s dense style and pseudonymous authorship limited its early impact in Denmark. Only later, especially in the 20th century, did it gain recognition as a key text in both Kierkegaard studies and existential thought.
| Period | Reception Pattern |
|---|---|
| Late 19th century | Limited, mainly theological interest in Scandinavia and Germany |
| Early–mid 20th century | Rediscovered by existentialists, phenomenologists, and neo‑orthodox theologians |
| Late 20th–21st century | Standard reference in philosophy of existence, theology of sin, and affect theory |
7.2 Influence on Philosophy and Theology
Philosophers such as Heidegger drew on Kierkegaard’s analysis of anxiety to articulate fundamental ontology, while Sartre appropriated themes of freedom and responsibility in a more secular, atheistic framework. In theology, Karl Barth and Paul Tillich engaged with the text when formulating modern doctrines of sin, estrangement, and courage.
Some interpreters emphasize its pioneering role in describing subjective inwardness, seeing it as a precursor to existential psychoanalysis. Others stress its continued significance for Lutheran and broader Christian theology, particularly in rethinking original sin as an existential condition rather than a merely inherited stain.
7.3 Critical Assessments
Critics from empirical psychology question the work’s lack of experimental grounding and its close linkage of anxiety with theological categories. Social theorists argue that its strong focus on the individual underplays structural and collective forms of evil. There is also ongoing debate about how successfully the text maintains the boundary between psychology and dogmatics.
Despite these disagreements, The Concept of Anxiety is widely regarded as historically significant for reframing the discourse on anxiety, freedom, and guilt, and for shaping subsequent conversations at the intersection of philosophy, theology, and psychology.
How to Cite This Entry
Use these citation formats to reference this work entry in your academic work. Click the copy button to copy the citation to your clipboard.
Philopedia. (2025). the-concept-of-anxiety-a-simple-psychologically-orienting-deliberation-on-the-dogmatic-issue-of-hereditary-sin. Philopedia. https://philopedia.com/works/the-concept-of-anxiety-a-simple-psychologically-orienting-deliberation-on-the-dogmatic-issue-of-hereditary-sin/
"the-concept-of-anxiety-a-simple-psychologically-orienting-deliberation-on-the-dogmatic-issue-of-hereditary-sin." Philopedia, 2025, https://philopedia.com/works/the-concept-of-anxiety-a-simple-psychologically-orienting-deliberation-on-the-dogmatic-issue-of-hereditary-sin/.
Philopedia. "the-concept-of-anxiety-a-simple-psychologically-orienting-deliberation-on-the-dogmatic-issue-of-hereditary-sin." Philopedia. Accessed December 11, 2025. https://philopedia.com/works/the-concept-of-anxiety-a-simple-psychologically-orienting-deliberation-on-the-dogmatic-issue-of-hereditary-sin/.
@online{philopedia_the_concept_of_anxiety_a_simple_psychologically_orienting_deliberation_on_the_dogmatic_issue_of_hereditary_sin,
title = {the-concept-of-anxiety-a-simple-psychologically-orienting-deliberation-on-the-dogmatic-issue-of-hereditary-sin},
author = {Philopedia},
year = {2025},
url = {https://philopedia.com/works/the-concept-of-anxiety-a-simple-psychologically-orienting-deliberation-on-the-dogmatic-issue-of-hereditary-sin/},
urldate = {December 11, 2025}
}