The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination
The Imaginary is Sartre’s systematic phenomenological study of imagination, arguing that imaginative consciousness is an intentional, spontaneous positing of an unreal object rather than the manipulation of internal images or copies of perception. Sartre distinguishes sharply between perception and imagination, contending that imaginary objects are experienced as “irreal” and as absent from the world, and that this irrealizing power underlies human freedom, emotion, aesthetic experience, and our capacity for negation. Through critical engagement with earlier theories (Hume, Berkeley, Kant, Bergson, and contemporary psychology), he claims that imagination is not a degraded form of perception but a fundamental mode of consciousness that reveals the transcendence and nothingness at the heart of the human subject.
At a Glance
- Author
- Jean-Paul Sartre
- Composed
- 1934–1935
- Language
- French
- Status
- original survives
- •Imagination is an intentional, conscious act that posits its object as unreal, rather than a passive reception or reproduction of internal images; the so‑called 'image' is nothing over and above the structure of this imaginative act.
- •Perception and imagination are radically distinct modes of consciousness: perception presents its object as present, continuous, and inexhaustibly rich, whereas imagination presents an object as absent, fixed, and essentially unreal or 'irreal'.
- •The imaginary object is given as a 'nothing' of the world: it is not located in physical space or in the brain, but is transcendent to consciousness while being posited as non-existent, thereby revealing the role of nothingness in human experience.
- •Imagination is a source and condition of human freedom; by distancing us from the factual world and allowing us to posit alternatives, ideals, and possibilities, it underlies emotion, desire, aesthetic contemplation, and the capacity to negate and transform our situation.
- •Prevailing psychological and philosophical theories of the image (empiricist associationism, Bergsonian spiritualism, Gestalt psychology) misdescribe imagination by treating images as inner objects or weakened perceptions, whereas a phenomenological method shows that imagination is a sui generis mode of consciousness with its own structures, temporality, and affectivity.
The Imaginary has come to be seen as one of Sartre’s most important early works and a cornerstone of twentieth-century phenomenological philosophy of mind. It lays the conceptual groundwork for his later existential ontology in Being and Nothingness by developing notions of nothingness, freedom, and transcendence through the analysis of imagination. The treatise influenced subsequent debates on mental imagery, intentionality, and the cognitive role of fiction and aesthetic experience, and it remains a central reference point in phenomenological psychology, existentialism, and contemporary discussions of the imagination’s relation to belief, perception, and emotion.
1. Introduction
The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination is Jean-Paul Sartre’s early systematic study of how human beings imagine. Written in the mid‑1930s, it proposes that imagination is not a faded copy of perception or a picture hidden “in the mind,” but a distinct mode of consciousness that actively posits its object as unreal.
Sartre’s inquiry is framed as a phenomenological psychology: instead of asking how the brain produces images, he asks how images are experienced from the first-person point of view. He argues that only by carefully describing what it is like to imagine—seeing a friend’s face in their absence, picturing a landscape, following a novel—can one understand what an “image” really is.
Within this framework, The Imaginary introduces several influential notions:
- Image-consciousness as an intentional act directed at an absent or non-existent object
- The irreal status of imagined objects, which are given as “nothing” of the real world
- The role of imagination in emotion, aesthetic experience, and freedom
The treatise is primarily theoretical, but its themes intersect with issues in psychology, aesthetics, ontology, and later existential philosophy. Sartre’s analysis has since become a key reference point in debates about mental imagery, the nature of fiction, and the structure of conscious experience more broadly.
2. Historical and Intellectual Context
2.1 Phenomenology and Husserl
Sartre’s project is shaped by Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, especially the idea that consciousness is always intentional—directed toward something. In the 1930s, French philosophy was increasingly engaging with German phenomenology. Sartre adopts Husserl’s descriptive method but reworks Husserl’s theory of image-consciousness, emphasizing spontaneity and nothingness more strongly than Husserl typically did.
2.2 French Psychology and Philosophy of Mind
The Imaginary responds to dominant French psychological traditions that treated images as:
| Tradition / Figure | Typical View of the Image |
|---|---|
| Empiricist/associationist | A faint copy of sensation, linked by associations |
| Experimental psychology | An internal representation with measurable features |
| Spiritualist/Bergsonian | A quasi-spiritual “memory-image” mediating body and mind |
Sartre situates his work against these views, which he claims objectify the image as a thing rather than a way of being conscious.
2.3 Broader Philosophical Background
The treatise also intervenes in longer-running debates:
- From Hume and Berkeley, Sartre inherits questions about the status of mental images but rejects their “copy” model.
- From Kant, he takes the centrality of imagination in cognition, while seeking a more concrete phenomenological description.
- From Bergson, he engages the link between image, memory, and duration, while disputing Bergson’s ontology of images.
In this milieu, The Imaginary contributes a distinctively phenomenological and proto‑existential account of imagination and unreality.
3. Author and Composition
3.1 Sartre’s Early Career
When composing The Imaginary (1934–1935), Sartre was an emerging French philosopher, trained at the École Normale Supérieure. He had studied contemporary psychology and had recently encountered German phenomenology during time spent in Berlin. The book belongs to his “phenomenological” phase, alongside works on emotion and the ego.
3.2 Genesis and Aims of the Treatise
Sartre’s interest in imagination developed partly from dissatisfaction with the image theories taught in French philosophy and psychology. Drawing on Husserl, he aimed to construct a “phenomenological psychology of the imagination” that would:
- Clarify what an image is from the standpoint of lived experience
- Distinguish imagination from perception, memory, and dream
- Provide a basis for later analyses of emotion, art, and freedom
The book was written relatively quickly, and commentators suggest it synthesizes materials from lectures, reading notes on Husserl and Bergson, and reflections prompted by contemporary psychological experiments.
3.3 Publication and Early Position in Sartre’s Oeuvre
| Aspect | Detail |
|---|---|
| French publication | 1936, Librairie Félix Alcan (Paris) |
| Original language | French (L’Imaginaire) |
| Genre | Theoretical treatise in phenomenological psychology |
| Relation to later works | Prefigures Being and Nothingness (1943) on nothingness and freedom |
Although initially read mainly by specialists, The Imaginary established Sartre as a significant participant in phenomenological debates and provided conceptual tools he would later radicalize in his existential writings.
4. Structure and Organization of The Imaginary
Sartre organizes the treatise into an Introduction and four main parts, each addressing a distinct layer of the phenomenon of imagination.
4.1 Overall Layout
| Section | Main Focus |
|---|---|
| Introduction | Problem of the image; justification of phenomenological method |
| Part I: Image and Consciousness | Descriptive analysis of image-consciousness as such |
| Part II: Critique of Traditional Theories | Systematic critique of earlier image theories |
| Part III: Imagination and the Irreal | Ontological status of the imaginary object |
| Part IV: Imagination, Emotion, and Human Freedom | Wider existential and affective implications |
4.2 Internal Organization
- The Introduction frames the central problem: how an image is given as image and why this requires a phenomenological, rather than purely empirical, approach.
- Part I develops the basic structure of image-consciousness, using examples such as photographs, absent friends, and imagined landscapes to articulate features like intentionality, absence, and schematism.
- Part II is largely historical and critical, taking up empiricist, spiritualist, Bergsonian, and Gestalt accounts in turn, and using Sartre’s own descriptions to argue that they misconstrue the nature of images.
- Part III shifts the focus to ontological questions: the mode of being of the imaginary, the notion of the irreal, and the “nihilating” function of imagination in relation to the real world.
- Part IV extends the preceding analyses to domains such as emotion, aesthetic experience, and freedom, treating them as structured by imaginative irrealization.
The progression moves from description, through critique, to ontological clarification, and finally to broader psychological and existential applications.
5. Central Arguments and Key Concepts
5.1 Image-Consciousness and the Irreal
A central thesis is that an image is not a mental object but a mode of consciousness. In image-consciousness, the object is:
- Posited as absent or non-existent
- Given as irreal—a “nothing” of the world, not located in physical space
This contrasts with perception, where the object is given as present and inexhaustibly rich. Sartre repeatedly insists that the so‑called “image” is just the structure of this imaginative act, not a picture stored in the mind.
5.2 Analogon and Schematism
Sartre introduces the notion of the analogon: a material support (e.g., photograph, painting, word) that can “stand in” for the absent object and trigger image-consciousness without being itself the imaginary object. Imaginary objects are also schematic: they present a simplified, selective grasp of the object, in contrast to the dense detail of perceptual experience.
5.3 Nihilation and Freedom
In imagination, consciousness actively introduces nothingness into the world by positing what is not there. Sartre calls this nihilation (néantisation) and treats it as revealing a fundamental power of consciousness. This power underlies:
- The ability to negate given reality (“things could be otherwise”)
- The capacity to envision possibilities, ideals, and alternative futures
5.4 Distinction from Other Mental Acts
Throughout the work, Sartre insists on the irreducibility of imagination to:
| Act | Sartrean Characterization |
|---|---|
| Perception | Presents the object as present, continuous, and rich |
| Memory | Refers to a past real event, not to an irreal object |
| Dream | Lacks the positional, voluntary structure of imagining |
These distinctions support his broader claim that imagination is a sui generis form of intentional consciousness with its own laws.
6. Legacy and Historical Significance
6.1 Place in Sartre’s Philosophy
Commentators widely regard The Imaginary as a foundational text for Sartre’s later existential ontology. Its analyses of nothingness, freedom, and the transcendence of consciousness anticipate central arguments in Being and Nothingness. The work also complements his phenomenological studies of emotion and the ego, forming a coherent early corpus on consciousness.
6.2 Impact on Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind
Within phenomenology, the book has become a standard point of reference for theories of image-consciousness. It has influenced discussions of:
- The phenomenology of fiction and aesthetic experience
- The role of imagination in selfhood and temporality
- The nature of negation and absence in consciousness
In philosophy of mind, Sartre’s act-centered account has been engaged by both supporters and critics of representational theories of mental imagery. Some see it as an alternative to inner-picture models; others treat it as a phenomenological complement to cognitive and neuroscientific accounts.
6.3 Interdisciplinary and Historical Reception
Over time, The Imaginary has informed research in:
| Field | Typical Use of Sartre’s Ideas |
|---|---|
| Literary theory | Understanding fictional worlds and readerly imagination |
| Film and art theory | Analyses of images, spectatorship, and aesthetic “irrealization” |
| Psychology | Phenomenological perspectives on imagery, emotion, and fantasy |
Historically, the treatise is now viewed as a key twentieth‑century contribution to the study of imagination, bridging classical debates on images with contemporary concerns about consciousness, representation, and the cognitive value of the imaginary.
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urldate = {December 11, 2025}
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