The Right and the Good

1. Introduction

The Right and the Good (1930) is W. D. Ross’s most influential contribution to moral philosophy and a central text in 20th‑century analytic ethics. The book articulates two tightly connected projects:

1. A theory of rightness that rejects the idea that all duties derive from a single master principle such as maximizing happiness.
2. A theory of goodness that treats moral value as plural, including virtue, knowledge, and pleasure.

Ross presents a form of pluralist deontology grounded in prima facie duties—fundamental moral reasons that always have some weight but can be overridden by stronger considerations. He contrasts these with our duty proper (or actual duty), which is what we ought all‑things‑considered to do in a particular situation.

Within the emerging analytic tradition, the work aims to provide a careful analysis of moral concepts while remaining closely tied to what Ross calls the “moral convictions of thoughtful and well‑educated people.” He develops his theory partly in dialogue with utilitarianism and with G. E. Moore’s ideal consequentialism, arguing that their focus on maximizing the good omits central features of ordinary moral thought, such as special obligations to promisees, benefactors, and victims of our past wrongs.

The book also advances a distinctive view about moral knowledge. Ross maintains that the most basic moral principles—such as the wrongness of breaking a promise for personal convenience—are known by a kind of rational intuition that is non‑inferential yet fallible, somewhat analogous to our knowledge of mathematical axioms.

Subsequent sections of this entry examine the historical background of the work, its internal structure, Ross’s distinctions and arguments, and the ways in which later philosophers have criticized, adapted, or extended his positions.

2. Historical and Intellectual Context

2.1 Early 20th‑Century British Moral Philosophy

The Right and the Good appeared in 1930 against the backdrop of intense debate about the foundations of ethics in British philosophy. The late 19th and early 20th centuries were dominated by forms of utilitarianism (Bentham, Mill) and ideal utilitarianism (Henry Sidgwick, Hastings Rashdall, G. E. Moore), which treated right action as the promotion or maximization of some form of value, usually happiness or an expanded list of intrinsic goods.

Ross writes within the emerging analytic style of philosophy, sharing with Moore a concern for clarity, argument, and the analysis of moral language and concepts. At the same time, he distances himself from both the metaphysical idealism of earlier British ethics (e.g., T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley) and the later emotivist and non‑cognitivist trends that would soon be developed by A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson.

2.2 Relation to Moore and Sidgwick

Ross is deeply influenced by Sidgwick’s rigorous method and his distinction between rightness and goodness, though Sidgwick remains a systematic utilitarian. Ross also engages critically with Moore’s Principia Ethica (1903):

Ross accepts Moore’s idea of intrinsic value and his rejection of hedonism, but he challenges Moore’s attempt to account for rightness purely in terms of maximizing value and revises Moore’s list of intrinsic goods.

2.3 Intuitionism and Common Sense

Ross is part of a broader intuitionist tradition that includes Henry Sidgwick, H. A. Prichard, and later writers such as C. D. Broad. Intuitionists typically hold that some moral truths are self‑evident and grasped directly by rational reflection, not inferred from empirical generalizations.

At the same time, Ross identifies strongly with “common‑sense morality”: the complex network of duties and special obligations many people already recognize in ordinary life. He aims to refine and systematize these convictions rather than replace them with a single, highly theoretical principle.

2.4 Wider Cultural and Academic Setting

The book is written in the interwar period, at a time when professional philosophy was increasingly specialized, and Oxford was a major center for classical scholarship and analytic thought. Ross’s dual identity as a classicist and moral philosopher shapes his style: he engages historically with Aristotle and the Stoics, while using the argumentative tools and conceptual distinctions of contemporary analytic philosophy. This mixed intellectual environment informs his effort to balance systematic theorizing with respect for everyday moral judgment.

3. Author and Composition

3.1 W. D. Ross: Background and Career

William David Ross (1877–1971) was a Scottish philosopher and classical scholar. Educated at the University of Edinburgh and Balliol College, Oxford, he became one of the leading figures in early 20th‑century Oxford philosophy. Ross is widely known for his editions and translations of Aristotle and for his historical work Aristotle (1923), as well as for his contributions to ethics.

He held several academic and administrative positions at Oxford, including Provost of Oriel College and, later, Vice‑Chancellor of the University. His philosophical output spans both ancient philosophy and modern moral theory, with The Right and the Good and the later Foundations of Ethics (1939) forming his main systematic ethical works.

3.2 Intellectual Development Leading to the Book

Ross’s ethical views develop in dialogue with:

• Aristotelian ideas about virtue and practical wisdom.
• The intuitionist ethics of contemporaries such as H. A. Prichard.
• The ideal utilitarianism of Moore and Rashdall, which he both admires and criticizes.

Earlier essays, including contributions to collections and journal articles, already display his dissatisfaction with monistic theories and his commitment to moral pluralism. Scholars often regard The Right and the Good as the point at which these ideas are first presented in a systematic, unified way.

3.3 Composition and Publication

The book was likely composed between roughly 1927 and 1929, drawing on a combination of lecture material, earlier articles, and new argumentation. It was published in 1930 by Oxford’s Clarendon Press, a major academic publisher closely linked to the university.

The structure of the book suggests that Ross aimed to cover, in compact form, the main areas of ethical theory:

3.4 Later Revisions and Related Works

Ross did not substantially revise The Right and the Good itself, but he revisited many of its themes in Foundations of Ethics and in various articles. Some interpreters suggest that his later work slightly modifies or clarifies certain claims—for instance, concerning the strength and number of prima facie duties—though there is debate over how far these changes represent genuine revisions.

The 2002 Clarendon critical edition, edited by Philip Stratton‑Lake, provides scholarly apparatus and an extensive introduction that reconstructs the book’s compositional and intellectual background, drawing on Ross’s papers and correspondence where available.

4. Structure and Organization of the Work

The Right and the Good is a relatively short treatise, yet it is tightly structured. Its seven chapters move from conceptual clarification to normative theory and finally to epistemology and meta‑ethics.

4.1 Overview of Chapters

4.2 Internal Progression

The book proceeds in a two‑stage manner:

1. Normative stage (Chs. 1–5)
   Ross first clarifies the main ethical concepts and then proposes positive accounts of rightness and goodness. Chapter 2 is devoted to duty and its grounds, while Chapters 3–4 develop an account of intrinsic value. Chapter 5 then compares and integrates the theories of right and good.

2. Epistemological and defensive stage (Chs. 6–7)
   After presenting his substantive views, Ross turns to methodological questions about how we know moral truths and whether intuitionism and pluralism can withstand critical scrutiny. This sequencing signals that he regards the normative theory as primary, with the epistemology constructed to explain how such a theory can be justified.

4.3 Stylistic and Methodological Features

Each chapter combines:

• Critical sections assessing rival theories (especially utilitarianism).
• Analytical sections clarifying key concepts (e.g., prima facie duty).
• Constructive sections outlining Ross’s positive proposals.

Ross frequently refers to “our” or “common‑sense” moral convictions, and he uses illustrative examples—often simple, everyday conflicts of duty—to motivate his distinctions.

The organization thus serves a dual purpose: to guide the reader from familiar moral judgments to more systematic reflection, and to show how a pluralist deontological view can be integrated with a pluralist theory of value and a form of rational intuitionism.

5. The Distinction Between the Right and the Good

Ross places the distinction between the right and the good at the center of The Right and the Good. He holds that many ethical confusions arise from conflating these two notions.

5.1 The Right

For Ross, rightness concerns what agents ought to do—their duties. Right acts are those supported, all‑things‑considered, by the balance of prima facie duties in a specific situation. The property of being right is thus fundamentally about obligation and required action, not about the overall value of states of affairs.

He insists that some duties arise from facts other than the promotion of good outcomes—such as a past promise or a prior wrong—so the right cannot be exhaustively defined in terms of producing good.

5.2 The Good

By contrast, goodness is a property of states of affairs, objects, or qualities that are valuable in themselves. Ross’s examples include virtue, knowledge, and pleasure. Something can be intrinsically good even if it is not anyone’s duty to bring it about in a given circumstance, and some good states may even be wrong to produce if they require violating stringent duties.

5.3 Logical and Priority Relations

Ross emphasizes that rightness and goodness are distinct but related:

He rejects the teleological claim (central to utilitarianism) that the right is wholly defined as that which maximizes the good. Instead, Ross holds that though right actions often promote good states of affairs, their rightness also depends on non‑teleological considerations, such as fairness or honoring commitments.

5.4 Implications

This distinction allows Ross to argue that:

• It may be wrong to bring about a slightly better outcome if doing so requires breaking a serious promise.
• Duties grounded in special relationships or past actions can override the aim of producing the best overall distribution of good.

Later sections of the book then explore in detail what makes actions right (through prima facie duties) and what constitutes intrinsic goodness (through a pluralist axiology), always maintaining this conceptual separation.

6. Ross’s Critique of Utilitarianism and Monistic Theories

Ross devotes substantial portions of The Right and the Good—especially Chapter 2—to criticizing utilitarianism and related monistic theories that derive all duties from a single fundamental principle.

6.1 Targeted Theories

He addresses both:

• Classical hedonistic utilitarianism (e.g., Bentham, Mill), which identifies the good with pleasure or happiness.
• Ideal utilitarianism (e.g., Moore, Rashdall), which allows additional intrinsic goods (such as beauty or friendship) but retains the claim that rightness consists in maximizing these goods.

Ross often treats these theories together under the label “utilitarian,” focusing on the common structural feature that the right is fully determined by consequences for overall good.

6.2 Main Lines of Critique

1. Inadequacy regarding special obligations
   Ross argues that utilitarianism cannot adequately account for:

   • The duty to keep promises (fidelity).
   • Duties of reparation for past wrongs.
   • Duties of gratitude to benefactors.
   • Special responsibilities to family and friends.

   In cases where breaking a promise would slightly increase total good, many people still judge promise‑keeping to be required. Ross claims that utilitarianism, by focusing solely on aggregate consequences, either misdescribes or must artificially reinterpret these judgments.

2. Dependence on “fictions” about motives and rules
   Some utilitarians try to rescue common‑sense duties by appealing to the long‑run consequences of having general rules or stable dispositions (e.g., that people usually keep promises). Ross contends that such strategies are unsatisfactory because they:

   • Attribute the wrong kind of reason (future utilities) to explain what appears to be a duty arising from a past act.
   • Risk making rightness depend on speculative empirical calculations about long‑term effects.

3. Reductionism about rightness
   Ross maintains that monistic theories oversimplify the variety of moral reasons. Instead of recognizing multiple, irreducible duty‑grounds, they aim to reduce all reasons to contributions to a single good. He claims this clashes with the “highly complex” nature of our actual moral convictions.

4. Overemphasis on impartial aggregation
   Utilitarianism requires that each person’s good be weighed equally in a single social sum. Ross does not dispute the importance of impartiality, but he holds that moral life also involves agent‑relative and relationship‑based reasons that impartial aggregation cannot fully capture.

6.3 Critique of Other Monisms

Beyond utilitarianism, Ross also criticizes other single‑principle views, such as certain forms of Kantianism that try to derive all duties from one basic law. He suggests that the diversity of duties—fidelity, justice, beneficence, etc.—resists derivation from one fundamental axiom, whether consequentialist or non‑consequentialist.

These criticisms set the stage for Ross’s own pluralist account of rightness in terms of multiple prima facie duties, which he presents as more faithful to the complexity of moral experience.

7. Prima Facie Duties and Duty Proper

The notion of prima facie duty is among the most distinctive contributions of The Right and the Good. Ross introduces it in Chapter 2 to explain how multiple moral considerations can be genuinely binding yet sometimes overridden.

7.1 Prima Facie Duties

A prima facie duty is a fundamental type of moral reason that:

• Always has real moral weight whenever it is present.
• Can be outweighed by other duties in particular circumstances.
• Is not derived from any more basic single principle.

Ross’s canonical list includes:

Ross does not claim this list is exhaustive or infallible, but he treats these categories as capturing the main types of reasons recognized in common‑sense morality.

7.2 Duty Proper (Actual Duty)

In a concrete situation, several prima facie duties may apply and may conflict. One might, for instance, have a duty of fidelity to keep an appointment and a duty of beneficence to aid a person in distress.

Duty proper (or actual duty) is:

• The action that one ought, all‑things‑considered, to perform.
• Determined by the comparative strength of the relevant prima facie duties in that specific context.
• Not mechanically calculable by a formula, but discerned through moral judgment.

Ross emphasizes that when a prima facie duty is overridden, it does not disappear; it remains a real moral reason, though not decisive on that occasion. This feature helps explain why agents may appropriately feel regret about failing to fulfill an overridden duty, even when they did what was right on balance.

7.3 Conflict and Deliberation

Ross denies that there is any strict lexical ordering among prima facie duties; their relative weight may vary with circumstances. He compares the process of determining duty proper to the exercise of perception or judgment in other practical domains, rather than to following a decision algorithm.

Later critics and sympathizers have debated whether Ross’s account offers enough guidance in hard cases. Within the book, however, Ross’s principal aim is to show that recognizing multiple, irreducible duties provides a better explanation of ordinary moral thinking than monistic theories.

8. Ross’s Pluralist Theory of Intrinsic Value

Beyond rightness, The Right and the Good develops a detailed account of intrinsic value—what is good “in itself.” Ross defends a pluralist axiology, rejecting both hedonism and the view that there is a single ultimate good.

8.1 Intrinsic vs. Instrumental Value

For Ross, something has intrinsic value if it is good in and of itself, independently of its consequences. By contrast, it has instrumental value if it is valuable as a means to something else that is intrinsically good.

He maintains that moral theory must identify the fundamental bearers of intrinsic value in order to assess the goodness of states of affairs, even though rightness is not reducible to value‑maximization.

8.2 Main Intrinsic Goods

Ross’s positive list includes several categories:

He also holds that vice (e.g., malice, cruelty) is intrinsically bad, and that some pleasures (such as sadistic pleasure) are bad because of their connection to vice or wrongdoing.

8.3 Structure and Comparison of Goods

Ross suggests that intrinsic goods admit of degrees and comparisons, but he denies that they can all be measured on a single, precise scale. Nonetheless, in ordinary moral reasoning, people make rough comparisons—for example, that a life rich in virtue and knowledge is better than one with only sensory pleasure.

He also emphasizes the value of fittingness: it is better, other things equal, that pleasure accompany virtue rather than vice, and that the virtuous, not the vicious, enjoy good fortune. Thus, the pattern of distribution of goods, not just their total amount, contributes to the goodness of a state of affairs.

8.4 Relation to Other Axiologies

Ross’s theory is shaped partly by Moore’s ideal utilitarian axiology, but he revises Moore in several ways:

• He gives greater prominence to virtue as intrinsically good.
• He stresses the importance of desert and distribution, not merely sum total.
• He is more cautious about positing very many distinct intrinsic goods beyond a core set.

Although Ross maintains that these value claims are known by intuition, his primary concern within the book is to articulate a value theory capable of reflecting the complexities of moral evaluation while remaining compatible with his pluralist account of duty.

9. Moral Knowledge and Intuitionism

Chapters 6 and 7 of The Right and the Good turn to the question of how we know moral truths. Ross defends an ethical intuitionism that is both objectivist and fallibilist.

9.1 Self‑Evident Principles

Ross claims that certain basic moral propositions—such as “other things equal, one ought to keep one’s promises”—are self‑evident. By this he means:

• They are known non‑inferentially, not deduced from more general premises.
• Their truth becomes evident upon adequate reflection by a mature, well‑informed mind.
• Recognizing their truth is analogous, in some respects, to grasping elementary axioms in mathematics or logic.

He does not suggest that these truths are obvious to everyone at first glance, but rather that they are evident to competent moral thinkers under the right conditions.

9.2 Intuition and Fallibility

Ross’s intuitions are not mysterious emotional flashes; they are a kind of rational insight. At the same time, he acknowledges that:

• People can err in their moral judgments.
• Different individuals or cultures may disagree about particular duties.
• Our initial intuitions may require correction in light of further reflection and experience.

Thus, intuition is not infallible, but it is still the fundamental source of justification for basic moral principles.

9.3 Levels of Moral Knowledge

Ross distinguishes between:

He holds that our knowledge is typically clearer and more secure at the general level than in complex particular cases, where uncertainty is common.

9.4 Analogy with Other Domains

To respond to worries about intuition, Ross draws analogies with:

• Perception: we trust our senses, though we know they sometimes deceive us.
• Mathematics: we accept certain axioms without proof and build more complex knowledge upon them.

Proponents of Ross’s view interpret these analogies as attempts to normalize moral knowledge, showing that reliance on basic, non‑inferential beliefs is common across domains.

Within The Right and the Good, this epistemological framework underpins Ross’s claims about prima facie duties and intrinsic values, explaining how such claims can be justified despite the absence of empirical or deductive proofs.

10. Philosophical Method and Use of Common Sense

Ross’s method in The Right and the Good is distinctive for its reliance on common‑sense moral convictions and its resistance to highly revisionary theorizing.

10.1 Appeal to “The Morality of the Plain Man”

Ross frequently invokes what he calls the “morality of the plain man” or the convictions of “thoughtful and well‑educated people.” By this he means:

• The considered moral beliefs that many reflective individuals share.
• Especially, judgments about specific types of actions—such as promise‑keeping, truth‑telling, or aiding those in distress.

He treats these convictions as data for moral theory: starting points that any adequate ethical system must take seriously and, where possible, preserve.

10.2 Method of Reflective Systematization

Ross’s philosophical method can be characterized as:

1. Collecting widely shared moral judgments about cases and types of duty.
2. Analyzing the concepts involved (right, good, obligation, value).
3. Systematizing these judgments into a structured set of prima facie duties and value claims.
4. Testing theoretical proposals against the original convictions, revising the theory when it conflicts sharply with them.

This approach resembles what later philosophers would call reflective equilibrium, though Ross does not use that term.

10.3 Moderate Conservatism

Ross’s deference to common sense gives his method a moderately conservative character:

• He is reluctant to abandon widely held moral beliefs unless there is strong reason.
• He criticizes theories—like some forms of utilitarianism—that produce too many counter‑intuitive implications about everyday moral life.

Supporters view this as a way to ensure that ethical theory remains practically relevant and recognizable to ordinary moral agents. Critics, however, have suggested that this stance risks codifying existing prejudices or failing to provide tools for radical moral critique.

10.4 Analytic Clarity

Within this broadly conservative framework, Ross employs the tools of analytic philosophy:

• Careful distinctions (e.g., right vs. good; prima facie duty vs. duty proper).
• Argumentative engagement with rival positions.
• Close attention to the logical structure of moral claims.

His method thus combines respect for everyday moral judgment with the aspiration to philosophical rigor, aiming to refine rather than overturn common‑sense ethics.

11. Key Concepts and Technical Terminology

The Right and the Good introduces or refines several terms that have become standard in ethical theory. This section focuses on the central concepts as they function within the work.

11.1 Right, Good, and Duty

• Right: A property of actions that are what an agent ought to do in a given context. For Ross, rightness is grounded in the balance of relevant prima facie duties.
• Good: A property of things or states of affairs that are intrinsically valuable, such as virtue, knowledge, and pleasure.
• Duty proper (actual duty): The specific action that is morally required all‑things‑considered in a situation, after weighing competing prima facie duties.

11.2 Prima Facie Duty

The term prima facie duty is Ross’s most famous technical contribution. It denotes:

• A basic type of moral reason that always counts in favor of certain actions.
• A duty that may be overridden, though never entirely cancelled, by stronger duties.
• A category that includes fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self‑improvement, and non‑maleficence.

Ross distinguishes prima facie duty sharply from duty proper, to explain how multiple genuine obligations can coexist and conflict.

11.3 Intrinsic Value and Desert

• Intrinsic value: Value that something has “in itself,” independent of consequences. Ross applies this to virtue, knowledge, pleasure, and certain patterns of distribution.
• Desert: A person’s moral worthiness to receive good or bad things. Ross builds desert into his account of value, holding that a world where good goes to the virtuous is better than one with the same amount of good randomly distributed.

11.4 Intuition and Self‑Evidence

• Intuition (ethical): A kind of non‑inferential rational awareness of basic moral truths, analogous to recognizing simple logical or mathematical axioms.
• Self‑evident: A proposition is self‑evident if its truth is apparent upon sufficient reflection by a competent thinker, without further proof. Ross uses this notion for both axioms of duty (prima facie obligations) and claims about intrinsic value.

11.5 Pluralist Deontology

• Pluralist deontology: A non‑consequentialist theory that recognizes multiple, irreducible sources of duty rather than deriving all obligations from a single principle. Ross’s view is paradigmatically pluralist, with his set of distinct prima facie duties.

These concepts together form the technical framework within which Ross articulates his theories of rightness, goodness, and moral knowledge.

12. Famous Passages and Representative Examples

The Right and the Good is relatively concise, but several passages and illustrative examples have become touchstones in discussions of Ross’s ethics.

12.1 Formulation of Prima Facie Duties

Ross’s explicit list of prima facie duties in Chapter 2 is frequently cited:

"

“[T]here are several forms of prima facie duty, each of which is a distinct source of obligation; and none of them can be reduced to any of the others.”

— W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good, ch. 2 (standard ed. pp. 19–21)

This passage is often used to exemplify pluralist deontology and to contrast Ross with monistic moral theories.

12.2 Prima Facie Duty vs. Duty Proper

In explaining conflicts of duty, Ross introduces his crucial distinction:

"

“I suggest ‘prima facie duty’ or ‘conditional duty’ as a brief way of referring to the characteristic... which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind... of being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind…”

— W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good, ch. 2 (around pp. 19–25)

This formulation has been widely discussed as a model for understanding overridden obligations and the phenomenon of moral regret.

12.3 Promise‑Keeping vs. Utility

Ross’s critique of utilitarian treatments of promise‑keeping is a classic example:

"

“If we have promised to do something, we do think ourselves specially bound to do it... not mainly because this will produce good, but because we have promised.”

— W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good, ch. 2 (roughly pp. 16–19)

This passage is frequently quoted to illustrate the claim that utilitarianism fails to capture the deontic force of promises.

12.4 Self‑Evidence and the Mathematical Analogy

In defending intuitionism, Ross draws an analogy with mathematics:

"

“The moral order... is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe... as is the spatial or numerical structure... The apprehension of it is like the apprehension of the axioms of geometry or arithmetic.”

— W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good, end of ch. 1 / beginning of ch. 2 (c. pp. 29–33)

This passage is emblematic of Ross’s view that moral knowledge can be rational and objective without being derived from empirical science.

12.5 Pluralist Account of Intrinsic Value

In Chapters 3–4, Ross offers a representative statement of his pluralist axiology:

"

“We must recognize... knowledge, virtue, and pleasure as different forms of intrinsic goodness, none of which can be reduced to the others.”

— W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good, mid‑book (c. pp. 95–125)

This text is often cited when explaining Ross’s departure from both hedonism and simpler forms of value pluralism.

13. Major Objections and Critical Responses

The Right and the Good has attracted sustained criticism, much of which Ross anticipates in the book itself. Later philosophers have elaborated and refined these objections.

13.1 Objections to Intuitionism

Critics argue that Ross’s appeal to intuition is epistemically problematic:

• It allegedly offers no independent test for the reliability of intuitions.
• Moral disagreement seems to undermine the claim that certain principles are self‑evident.
• The analogy with mathematics is questioned, since moral judgments appear more variable and culturally influenced.

Some philosophers, such as A. J. Ayer and later non‑cognitivists, take this to support emotivist or expressivist accounts of moral language. Others, including John Rawls, criticize intuitionism for lacking a constructive decision procedure, while still drawing on some of its ideas.

13.2 Concerns about Pluralism and Conflict

Ross’s pluralism is often attacked on the grounds that it leaves agents without clear guidance when prima facie duties conflict:

• There is no explicit algorithm or ranking among duties.
• It can appear that moral decision‑making is reduced to uncodified judgment, which may seem arbitrary or subjective.

Some responses, notably by Robert Audi and David Phillips, attempt to develop more systematic ways of weighing duties while retaining a broadly Rossian framework.

13.3 Conservatism and Status Quo Bias

Because Ross relies heavily on common‑sense moral convictions, critics worry that:

• His method may entrench prevailing norms, including unjust practices.
• It offers limited resources for radical moral critique or ethical reform.

Feminist and critical theorists, for example, have questioned whether the “convictions of thoughtful and well‑educated people” in Ross’s time adequately represented the interests and perspectives of marginalized groups.

Defenders reply that intuitionist methods can incorporate critical reflection and that moral progress often involves revising initial intuitions in light of broader considerations.

13.4 Treatment of Consequences

Consequentialists argue that Ross:

• Underestimates the moral importance of outcomes.
• Offers no clear explanation for why consequences matter at all, if not because of their contribution to overall good.
• Cannot easily handle cases where large differences in outcomes seem to trump other considerations.

Some hybrid theorists attempt to combine Rossian prima facie duties with a stronger role for consequences, while others maintain that Ross’s own framework can give consequences significant, though not exclusive, moral weight.

13.5 Metaphysical and Semantic Issues

Questions have also been raised about:

• The ontological status of intrinsic values and objective duties.
• How such properties fit into a naturalistic worldview.
• Whether Ross’s moral vocabulary should be understood in realist, non‑naturalist, or some alternative terms.

Later meta‑ethical debates—about moral realism, non‑naturalism, and the “queerness” of moral properties—have often used Ross as an example of an earlier, robustly realist position, leading to both critical scrutiny and renewed interest.

14. Influence on Later Moral Philosophy

Despite being initially overshadowed by other works, The Right and the Good has exercised a significant and varied influence on later ethics.

14.1 Development of Pluralist Deontology

Ross’s framework has been a major reference point for pluralist deontological theories:

• Philosophers such as Robert Audi have proposed updated Rossian systems, refining the list of prima facie duties and integrating more developed accounts of autonomy and respect.
• Debates about “Ross‑style pluralism” often examine whether a reasonable ethical theory must recognize multiple irreducible duties or can instead derive them from more basic principles.

14.2 Impact on Rawls and Contractualism

John Rawls engages critically with intuitionism in his early work and in A Theory of Justice. While he distances himself from Ross’s epistemology, he acknowledges:

• The importance of considered moral judgments as data for theory.
• The need to accommodate the plurality of moral considerations.

Rawls’s method of reflective equilibrium has been interpreted as a systematic, procedural descendant of some intuitionist ideas about starting from common‑sense convictions.

Contractualists such as T. M. Scanlon also exhibit affinities with Rossian pluralism, particularly in their emphasis on multiple distinct reasons such as respect, fairness, and responsibility, even though they ground these in different frameworks (e.g., what could be reasonably rejected).

14.3 Contemporary Rossian Ethics

In recent decades, there has been a revival of explicit Rossian approaches:

• David Phillips, Philip Stratton‑Lake, and others have defended Ross’s pluralism against objections, updated his theory of prima facie duties, and explored its implications for issues like global justice and personal relationships.
• Discussions of role morality, professional ethics, and special obligations often draw implicitly or explicitly on Ross’s typology of duties.

14.4 Influence on Axiology and Value Theory

Ross’s pluralist theory of value has informed later work on:

• The multiplicity of intrinsic goods (e.g., well‑being, achievement, meaningfulness).
• The importance of desert and the distribution of value, not just its aggregate amount.
• The idea that value may depend on fittingness relations between goods, persons, and circumstances.

Philosophers exploring non‑hedonistic accounts of well‑being and moral value frequently reference Ross as an early analytic proponent of value pluralism.

14.5 Role in Meta‑Ethical Debates

In meta‑ethics, Ross serves as a canonical example of:

• Non‑naturalist moral realism (objective, irreducible moral properties).
• Intuitionist moral epistemology.

Even critics of these positions, such as J. L. Mackie or contemporary expressivists, often use Ross as a foil, helping to shape the contours of modern realism–anti‑realism debates.

15. Legacy and Historical Significance

Over time, The Right and the Good has come to be regarded as a classic of 20th‑century moral philosophy, with a legacy that spans normative ethics, value theory, and meta‑ethics.

15.1 Position in the History of Ethics

Historically, the book occupies a key place:

• It represents the maturation of British intuitionism, alongside works by Sidgwick, Prichard, and Broad.
• It marks a shift from grand metaphysical systems toward a more analytic and conceptually precise approach to ethics.
• It serves as a bridge between earlier ideal utilitarianism and later non‑consequentialist theories, including contemporary deontology and contractualism.

15.2 Enduring Contributions

Several of Ross’s ideas have had lasting impact:

• The distinction between prima facie duty and duty proper has become a staple tool in ethical analysis, used even by theorists who reject his wider framework.
• His insistence on distinguishing the right from the good continues to structure debates between consequentialists and deontologists.
• His pluralist axiology prefigures later discussions of the many dimensions of value and well‑being.

These contributions have ensured that the book remains part of the standard philosophical canon and a frequent subject of teaching and commentary.

15.3 Shifts in Reception

Initially, The Right and the Good received respectful but limited attention compared with Moore’s Principia Ethica. The mid‑20th century rise of emotivism and later of formal decision theory pushed intuitionist and pluralist theories into relative eclipse.

However, from the 1970s onward, and especially following the 2002 Clarendon edition, there has been significant renewed interest:

• The resurgence of normative ethics and skepticism about purely utilitarian frameworks have led many philosophers to revisit Ross’s pluralist deontology.
• Meta‑ethical debates about moral realism and the nature of self‑evidence have drawn on Ross as a historically important exemplar of non‑naturalist intuitionism.

15.4 Continuing Relevance

Contemporary discussions of:

• Special obligations (to family, friends, compatriots).
• Conflicts of duties in professional and political life.
• The balance between impartial concern and personal commitments.

often trace conceptual lineage to Ross, whether or not they endorse his specific claims. As a result, The Right and the Good remains a key reference point—both as a source of ideas to develop and as a target for critical engagement—in ongoing attempts to understand the structure of moral reasons and values.