The Science Question in Feminism

1. Introduction

The Science Question in Feminism (1986) is Sandra Harding’s systematic attempt to clarify how feminist politics and modern science are related, and whether science can be a resource for, rather than an obstacle to, feminist emancipation. The book is situated at the intersection of feminist theory, philosophy of science, and sociology of knowledge, and it helped consolidate “feminist epistemology” as a recognizable field.

Harding frames the “science question” as a tension within feminist movements. On one side, feminists have exposed how scientific theories and institutions have contributed to sexism, racism, colonialism, and class domination. On the other, feminists also rely on scientific findings—for example, in reproductive health, environmental science, or social statistics—to challenge inequality. The book asks how these two impulses can be reconciled.

To address this, Harding examines how scientific practices are shaped by androcentrism and by wider social relations, and she surveys competing feminist responses to science. She distinguishes three broad epistemological strategies—feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint theory, and feminist postmodernism—and explores how each rethinks concepts such as objectivity, rationality, and method.

Throughout, Harding treats science as a historically specific, socially organized activity rather than a timeless embodiment of pure reason. She draws on case studies from biology, medicine, and the social sciences to illustrate how gendered assumptions can structure research questions, methods, and interpretations. At the same time, she examines whether and how scientific inquiry might be reconstructed so that it becomes more responsive to the experiences and interests of marginalized groups.

The work’s central proposals—especially the notions of standpoints, situated knowledge, and strong objectivity—have been influential far beyond feminist studies, entering debates in social epistemology and science and technology studies (STS). Subsequent sections of this entry situate the book historically, outline its argumentative structure, and map the main approaches and controversies it has generated.

2. Historical Context of Science and Patriarchy

Harding situates her project against a long history in which the development of modern Western science has been intertwined with patriarchal social orders. She draws on historical and sociological scholarship to argue that gender relations have shaped both who could participate in scientific work and what counted as legitimate knowledge.

Exclusion and Gendered Division of Labor

In the early modern period and into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, formal scientific institutions—academies, universities, professional societies—largely excluded women. Their contributions were often classified as “amateur” or relegated to supportive roles. Historians of science have documented what Harding calls a gendered division of labor in science, in which men typically occupied roles of theory construction and public authority, while women were concentrated in technical, clerical, or caregiving tasks.

This pattern, proponents of Harding’s analysis note, affected not only personnel but also research agendas. Topics associated with women’s lives—domestic labor, reproductive health, childcare, or sexual violence—were underfunded or framed through male-centered assumptions.

Enlightenment Rationality and Masculinized Ideals

Harding also draws attention to how ideals of rationality, objectivity, and the “scientific method” were historically coded as masculine. Intellectual histories of the Enlightenment have shown that reason was often contrasted with emotion, nature, and the body, which were feminized. Proponents of the feminist critique argue that this symbolism supported a cultural hierarchy: the rational (implicitly male) knower stood over against a feminized nature to be controlled and known.

Critics of this line of interpretation maintain that such symbolic associations should not be overgeneralized and that many Enlightenment thinkers also articulated egalitarian ideals. Nonetheless, Harding treats these gendered patterns as significant background for understanding why science has often appeared antagonistic to women’s interests.

Science, Empire, and Social Hierarchies

The rise of modern science coincided with European imperial expansion and the consolidation of capitalist economies. Historians have shown how scientific practices both relied on and helped legitimize racial, class, and gender hierarchies—for example, through eugenics, racial anthropology, or developmental models of “civilization.” Harding highlights this context to suggest that patriarchy in science is not an isolated phenomenon but is entangled with broader systems of domination.

By the mid-twentieth century, the women’s liberation movement, together with civil rights and anti-colonial struggles, began to systematically question these legacies. Harding’s book emerges from this moment, when feminist scholars were first developing sustained critiques of how science and patriarchy had coevolved.

3. Author and Composition

Sandra Harding (b. 1935) is an American philosopher and social theorist whose work has focused on feminist epistemology, philosophy of science, and postcolonial studies of knowledge. Trained originally in philosophy, she taught at institutions including the University of Delaware and later the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), where she held appointments in education and women’s studies. Her intellectual formation drew on analytic philosophy of science, Marxist theory, and emerging feminist scholarship in the 1970s.

Intellectual Background

Before The Science Question in Feminism, Harding had published essays on women and science, consciousness-raising, and the politics of knowledge. She was part of a generation of feminist philosophers—alongside figures such as Evelyn Fox Keller, Helen Longino, and Lorraine Code—who began to challenge standard accounts of scientific rationality from feminist perspectives.

Her engagement with Marxist and Hegelian traditions of standpoint theory, along with work in sociology of knowledge (e.g., by Karl Mannheim) and science studies, provided conceptual tools for thinking about how social position shapes knowledge. She also drew on experiences in feminist activism and teaching, where questions about the reliability and authority of “expert” knowledge were practically pressing.

Process of Composition

The Science Question in Feminism was composed in the early 1980s, a period of intense debate about whether feminist theory should reject, reform, or appropriate science. Portions of the book grew out of lectures, conference papers, and earlier articles, which Harding reworked into a more systematic monograph.

She organized the material to speak both to philosophers of science and to feminist scholars in the humanities and social sciences. The tripartite framework of feminist empiricism, standpoint theory, and feminist postmodernism crystallized during this period as Harding sought to map divergent feminist strategies for engaging with science.

Relation to Later Work

Although this entry focuses on the 1986 book, it is often read together with Harding’s subsequent Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (1991) and later writings, where she elaborates and revises some of the book’s positions in light of criticisms, especially around issues of race, coloniality, and global South perspectives. Nonetheless, The Science Question in Feminism remains the foundational articulation of her approach to feminist philosophy of science.

4. Publication Context and Textual History

The first edition of The Science Question in Feminism was published in 1986 by Cornell University Press, a venue known for works in philosophy, feminist theory, and the social studies of science. The book appeared as feminist scholarship was gaining institutional recognition in North American and European universities, and as debates over the social character of scientific knowledge were intensifying.

Academic and Political Climate

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, feminist critiques of science were emerging across disciplines:

• In biology and medicine, researchers documented sexist biases in research on reproduction, anatomy, and mental health.
• In the social sciences, scholars criticized androcentric models of the family, work, and development.
• In philosophy of science and STS, works by Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and others had opened space for questioning the neutrality and universality of scientific method.

Harding’s book entered this cross-disciplinary conversation, aiming to synthesize and systematically theorize feminist responses to science.

Editions, Translations, and Textual Stability

The 1986 Cornell edition serves as the standard reference for pagination and citations. The text has not undergone major revisions in subsequent English-language printings, though prefaces and introductions have occasionally been added in later print runs or translations.

The work has been translated into several languages, including French, German, and Spanish, extending its impact into non-Anglophone contexts. While there are minor terminological variations across translations—especially for key terms such as “standpoint,” “strong objectivity,” and “postmodernism”—no substantial textual divergences are widely reported.

Relation to Later Volumes

Harding’s edited collection Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? (1991) is sometimes treated as a companion or sequel. It includes essays that further develop themes from The Science Question in Feminism and respond to early criticisms. However, the original monograph remains a self-contained work.

There is no complex manuscript tradition associated with the book; it is a modern monograph based on typescripts and journal publications from the early 1980s, with the author alive and actively commenting on its interpretation. For scholarly purposes, the first Cornell edition is generally regarded as authoritative.

5. Structure and Organization of the Work

Harding organizes The Science Question in Feminism as a sustained argument that unfolds through distinct but interconnected parts. The structure reflects her dual aim: to diagnose problems in traditional philosophies of science and to map major feminist responses.

Overall Organization

While chapter titles and groupings vary slightly by edition, the book broadly follows this trajectory:

The Three Feminist Epistemologies

A distinctive organizational feature is Harding’s typology of feminist responses to science:

• Feminist empiricism is presented first, as it most closely resembles mainstream empiricist philosophy of science, differing primarily in its attention to correcting sexist bias.
• Feminist standpoint theory is introduced next, as a more radical challenge that links knowledge to social position and political struggle.
• Feminist postmodernism follows, emphasizing critiques of reason, subjectivity, and grand narratives.

Harding devotes separate chapters to each, followed by comparative discussion that highlights their convergences and tensions.

From Critique to Reconstruction

The latter part of the book shifts from mapping positions to proposing a reconstruction of scientific rationality. Here Harding introduces the concepts of strong objectivity and situated knowledge, arguing for institutional and methodological changes in science.

This progression—from historical background and critical analysis to systematic typology and then to reconstructive proposals—allows Harding to maintain continuity between empirical case material, philosophical argument, and normative recommendations, while keeping each type of discussion analytically distinct.

6. The Central ‘Science Question’ in Feminism

Harding formulates the “science question in feminism” as a problem internal to feminist theory and practice rather than as an external critique of science alone. The core question is whether, and under what conditions, science can serve feminist and other emancipatory goals given its historical entanglement with systems of domination.

A widely cited formulation appears early in the book, where Harding asks:

"

Is it possible to use for emancipatory ends the very sciences that have been so intimately involved in Western, bourgeois, and masculine projects of domination?

— Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (paraphrased from early chapters)

Tensions within Feminist Engagements with Science

Harding identifies several recurring tensions:

• Feminists have relied on scientific research to document discrimination, health hazards, and structural inequalities, suggesting that science can be a powerful ally.
• At the same time, many feminist critiques have shown how scientific theories about sex differences, reproduction, intelligence, or family life have reinforced sexist and racist stereotypes.

The science question thus concerns whether these two strands—critique and reliance—are compatible, and if so, how.

Competing Feminist Responses

Harding argues that feminist theorists have developed at least three broad responses:

1. Reformist use of science that seeks to purge bias while retaining core methods (feminist empiricism).
2. Structural critique that links scientific knowledge to power relations and advocates starting from marginalized standpoints (standpoint theory).
3. Radical skepticism or deconstruction of scientific rationality and universal claims (feminist postmodernism).

The book’s central task is to analyze these strategies, assess their resources and limitations, and consider whether a reworked conception of objectivity can sustain both critique and constructive use of science.

Scope of the Question

Harding treats the science question as encompassing:

• Epistemological issues (how knowledge is justified and whose experiences count).
• Methodological issues (how research is designed and evaluated).
• Political issues (how scientific authority is deployed in social conflicts).

By framing the problem in this multi-layered way, she moves beyond asking simply whether science is “good” or “bad” for women, toward a more complex inquiry into how scientific practices might be transformed.

7. Critique of Traditional Objectivity and the Value-Free Ideal

A central part of Harding’s argument is a critical examination of conventional notions of objectivity and the value-free ideal of science as developed in mainstream philosophy of science.

Traditional Conceptions

In standard empiricist accounts, objectivity is often associated with:

• Neutrality regarding social and political values.
• Disinterested observation and experimentation.
• A sharp distinction between the context of discovery (where social factors may intrude) and the context of justification (where only evidence and logic are said to matter).

According to this view, while scientists may be personally biased, proper methods and peer review are thought to filter out such distortions.

Feminist Critique

Harding argues that this picture obscures how gendered, racial, and class interests can shape not only the discovery of hypotheses but also the standards of justification themselves. Proponents of this feminist critique claim that:

• Research questions and categories are not neutral; they are selected within social contexts that privilege some interests over others.
• Background assumptions—such as models of the family, labor, or sexuality—enter into theory construction and data interpretation.
• The value-free ideal can function ideologically, making it harder to recognize and challenge these embedded assumptions.

Harding therefore rejects a strict separation between discovery and justification, arguing that social values are implicated at all stages of inquiry.

Reinterpretations of Objectivity

Rather than abandoning objectivity altogether, Harding contends that the traditional notion is too weak because it neglects systematic analysis of the social conditions of knowledge production. She engages with alternative philosophical accounts (e.g., Kuhnian paradigm theory, sociological approaches to science) that also challenge the myth of value-free inquiry, while noting that these accounts often under-theorize gender.

Critics of Harding maintain that her critique risks conflating bad science—where bias is indeed a problem—with the very idea of objectivity, and they argue that more rigorous application of existing methods can correct many biases without revising core epistemic ideals. Others, especially some postmodern theorists, suggest that even a revised objectivity may remain too committed to universalist aspirations.

Within the book, however, this critique of traditional objectivity primarily serves as a prelude to Harding’s proposal for strong objectivity, which attempts to incorporate social reflexivity into the very definition of objective inquiry.

8. Feminist Empiricism

Harding identifies feminist empiricism as one major strand of feminist engagement with science. This approach accepts many core commitments of traditional empiricism—such as the importance of observation, experimentation, and intersubjective testing—while insisting that sexist and androcentric biases must be systematically identified and removed.

Main Commitments

Proponents of feminist empiricism typically hold that:

• Sexist distortions in science result from poorly applied methods, biased sampling, or unexamined background assumptions, rather than from inherent flaws in empirical methodology itself.
• Once such biases are exposed—often through feminist critique—research designs can be improved to yield more accurate, less distorted results.
• Traditional standards of evidence and rationality are, in principle, adequate for correcting error, provided that they are applied inclusively and self-critically.

Examples often cited include revising medical research that historically used only male subjects, or reinterpreting psychological studies framed by stereotypical assumptions about gender roles.

Harding’s Characterization

Harding presents feminist empiricism as a necessary but limited strategy. She acknowledges its successes in:

• Demonstrating that many allegedly “natural” sex differences were artifacts of biased research.
• Encouraging better operationalization of variables related to gender, race, and class.
• Expanding participation in science and improving methodological rigor.

However, she argues that feminist empiricism tends to treat sexism as an external contaminant rather than as structurally embedded in scientific concepts and institutions. According to this critique, focusing solely on correcting individual studies may leave intact:

• Research agendas that systematically neglect questions central to women’s lives.
• Conceptual frameworks that presuppose hierarchical gender norms.
• Institutional power structures that shape what research is funded, published, or taken seriously.

Internal Variations and Debates

Within feminist empiricism, there are more reformist and more radical variants. Some theorists stress compatibility with mainstream philosophy of science, while others, influenced by social epistemology, emphasize the need to consider how community practices and diversity of perspectives contribute to objectivity.

Harding herself sometimes groups more socially oriented empiricist accounts, such as Helen Longino’s later work, at the boundary between feminist empiricism and standpoint approaches. Critics of Harding argue that she underestimates the transformative potential of empiricist methods when combined with institutional reforms, while supporters see her analysis as highlighting the need to go beyond methodological tinkering to examine deeper epistemic and social structures.

9. Feminist Standpoint Theory

Feminist standpoint theory is the second major epistemological approach Harding analyzes and develops. Drawing on Marxist and Hegelian ideas about standpoint, it proposes that social positions—especially positions of oppression—can provide distinctive and sometimes epistemically advantaged perspectives on social reality.

Core Claims

Harding characterizes feminist standpoint theory by several interconnected theses:

• Knowledge is socially situated: all knowers occupy particular locations in relations of power and privilege.
• Those who are marginalized or oppressed, such as many women, must learn to understand both their own experiences and the perspectives of dominant groups in order to navigate social life.
• This “double vision” can confer an epistemic privilege of the oppressed, particularly for understanding structures of domination, since dominant groups often have less incentive or opportunity to see how systems work from below.
• A standpoint is not merely a demographic position; it is an achieved epistemic and political position that emerges from collective struggle, critical reflection, and solidarity.

Distinctiveness from Empiricism

Compared to feminist empiricism, standpoint theory:

• Places greater emphasis on how power relations shape not just individual biases but the very frameworks of knowledge.
• Argues that starting inquiry from marginalized lives can reveal questions, concepts, and causal relations that remain invisible from dominant standpoints.
• Treats political engagement as enabling, rather than contaminating, certain forms of knowledge.

Harding maintains that standpoint theory offers a deeper critique of how scientific institutions and disciplines can be organized around androcentric norms, while also providing resources for reconstructive projects.

Internal Diversity and Criticisms

Within feminist standpoint theory, different authors emphasize different axes of oppression (gender, race, class, colonial status). Harding references work by theorists such as Nancy Hartsock and Dorothy Smith, who link women’s standpoints to labor, domestic work, and everyday experience.

Critics have raised several concerns:

• Essentialism: Some worry that talk of “women’s standpoint” risks homogenizing diverse experiences and ignoring differences of race, class, sexuality, and global location.
• Romanticizing the oppressed: Others caution against assuming that all members of oppressed groups automatically have clearer insight.
• Relativism vs. privilege: Skeptics question how standpoint theory can claim epistemic privilege without sliding into relativism or new forms of exclusion.

Harding acknowledges these criticisms and emphasizes that standpoints are partial, contested, and internally diverse. She argues that standpoint theory, properly understood, points toward more inclusive and reflexive scientific practices rather than toward a single authoritative “women’s” view.

10. Feminist Postmodernism and the Critique of Reason

The third approach Harding analyzes is feminist postmodernism, which adapts postmodern and poststructuralist critiques of subjectivity, language, and power for feminist purposes. This strand questions not only the practices of particular sciences but also foundational concepts such as Reason, the Subject, and Truth as they have been articulated in Western modernity.

Key Themes

Harding identifies several recurring themes in feminist postmodern work:

• Fragmented subjectivity: The idea that the knowing subject is not unified or transparent to itself, but multiple, decentered, and constituted through discourse and power relations.
• Skepticism toward grand narratives: Suspicion of universalist stories about progress, including narratives that depict science as steadily approximating an objective truth independent of history and culture.
• Discursive construction of reality: Emphasis on how categories like “woman,” “nature,” or “race” are produced and stabilized through linguistic and institutional practices, rather than simply reflecting pre-given essences.
• Deconstruction of binaries: Critical analysis of oppositions such as reason/emotion, mind/body, culture/nature, male/female, which are seen as hierarchical and mutually constitutive.

Feminist theorists influenced by postmodernism use these tools to show how claims to neutrality and universality can mask particular, often male-dominated, perspectives.

Relation to Science

In Harding’s account, feminist postmodernists often:

• Expose how scientific discourses participate in broader regimes of power/knowledge.
• Question the possibility of a single, coherent feminist subject or standpoint that could ground critique.
• Emphasize the contingency and partiality of all knowledge claims, including feminist ones.

This approach can lead to a more radical skepticism about the project of reconstructing science along feminist lines, suggesting instead a multiplicity of localized, situational knowledges.

Harding’s Assessment

Harding credits feminist postmodernism with sharpening awareness of:

• The instability of identities and categories.
• The dangers of new totalizing claims, including those that might arise within feminist theory itself.
• The limitations of appeals to a unified Reason or universal progress.

At the same time, she notes concerns raised by standpoint and empiricist feminists:

• If all knowledge is radically fragmented and contingent, it may become difficult to justify political critique or collective action.
• Excessive suspicion of categories may undermine efforts to document systematic patterns of oppression, such as gender or racial inequality.

Harding treats feminist postmodernism as an important, but incomplete, response to the science question: it offers powerful tools of deconstruction but faces challenges when it comes to constructing shared standards or goals for scientific practice.

11. Strong Objectivity and Situated Knowledge

In the later chapters, Harding proposes strong objectivity as a reconstruction of scientific rationality that incorporates insights from feminist empiricism, standpoint theory, and postmodernism while attempting to avoid their respective limitations.

Situated Knowledge

Building on the idea of situated knowledge, Harding argues that:

• All knowledge is produced from particular social and historical locations; there is no “view from nowhere.”
• Recognizing one’s own situatedness—through reflexivity about social position, interests, and assumptions—is a condition of more, not less, objective inquiry.
• Marginalized standpoints are especially valuable for revealing features of social and natural reality that dominant perspectives may obscure.

This view rejects the traditional equation of objectivity with detachment from particular perspectives, instead treating a plurality of critically examined perspectives as epistemically fruitful.

Strong vs. Weak Objectivity

Harding contrasts strong objectivity with what she sometimes calls “weak” or traditional objectivity. The distinction can be summarized as follows:

On Harding’s account, strong objectivity demands that scientists and philosophers:

• Systematically examine how gender, race, class, and other power relations shape research agendas, methods, and interpretations.
• Deliberately include marginalized perspectives in the design, conduct, and evaluation of research.
• Treat these practices as integral to objectivity rather than as external ethical or political add-ons.

Relation to Other Approaches

Strong objectivity retains from empiricism a commitment to evidence and critical scrutiny, from standpoint theory the idea of epistemic advantage associated with oppressed standpoints, and from postmodernism an awareness of the partiality and fragility of all knowledge claims. However, it resists thoroughgoing relativism by proposing more demanding criteria for objectivity, not fewer.

Critics debate whether strong objectivity is genuinely distinct from other social epistemologies, whether it can be operationalized into concrete methodological rules, and whether its emphasis on marginalized standpoints risks new forms of exclusion. In Harding’s framework, however, it functions as the central normative proposal for rethinking scientific rationality in light of feminist insights.

12. Methodological and Institutional Implications for Science

Harding’s reconceptualization of objectivity leads to specific proposals about how scientific research should be organized and conducted. These implications concern both methodological practices within research projects and the institutional structures that shape science.

Methodological Implications

From the standpoint of strong objectivity, several methodological shifts are suggested:

• Reflexive research design: Investigators would explicitly analyze how their social positions, interests, and background assumptions influence their choice of questions, methods, and interpretations.
• Diverse standpoint inclusion: Research teams and advisory bodies would intentionally incorporate members from marginalized groups, on the view that this diversity enhances critical scrutiny and reveals blind spots.
• Expanded evidential standards: Forms of evidence often discounted in traditional science—such as experiential knowledge from patients, workers, or community members—would be systematized and integrated where appropriate.
• Critical case selection: Studies would be designed to test how robust findings are across different social contexts, rather than assuming universality from narrow, often privileged samples.

Advocates of these implications argue that they can lead to more reliable and socially relevant research; skeptics question how such norms can be precisely codified without overburdening inquiry.

Institutional Implications

Harding also draws attention to how institutional arrangements shape objectivity:

Proponents see these changes as necessary to operationalize strong objectivity; they suggest that without institutional transformation, methodological reforms will remain limited.

Critics raise concerns about politicization: some worry that embedding explicit social and political aims within scientific institutions might undermine independence or invite partisan control. Others contend that many of these goals can be pursued within existing frameworks of research ethics and diversity initiatives.

Harding’s analysis does not supply a single blueprint for reform but indicates the kinds of organizational changes that, in her view, follow from taking feminist epistemological insights seriously.

13. Philosophical Method and Use of Case Studies

Harding’s work is philosophical in ambition but methodologically eclectic. She combines conceptual analysis, critique of existing theories, and engagement with empirical research and case studies.

Philosophical Technique

Several features characterize her philosophical method:

• Interdisciplinary synthesis: She draws on analytic philosophy of science, Marxist theory, feminist theory, sociology of knowledge, and STS, treating them as complementary resources.
• Immanent critique: Harding often works by taking mainstream claims about science—such as its commitment to objectivity or critical self-correction—and arguing that, if taken seriously, they support stronger attention to social and gendered influences than is usually acknowledged.
• Typological mapping: The tripartite framework of feminist empiricism, standpoint theory, and feminist postmodernism is constructed as an analytical tool. Harding uses it to organize a diverse body of work, clarify points of agreement and disagreement, and assess strengths and weaknesses.

Role of Case Studies

Empirical case studies play an important supporting role in the book. Harding does not conduct original empirical research, but she draws on examples from history and sociology of science to illustrate theoretical claims. These include:

• Biomedical research on women’s bodies and reproduction.
• Psychological and sociological theories of sex differences and family roles.
• Historical patterns of women’s exclusion from scientific institutions.

The case studies are used to show how:

• Androcentric assumptions can shape research questions and interpretations.
• Correction of overt bias (as in feminist empiricism) can improve specific studies but may leave deeper frameworks untouched.
• Standpoints associated with marginalized groups can reveal neglected phenomena or alternative explanatory pathways.

Balancing Generalization and Particularity

Harding’s method involves moving back and forth between general claims about science and particular historical or disciplinary examples. Critics caution that this can sometimes encourage overgeneralization from selective cases, while supporters argue that such an approach is necessary to bring philosophical reflection into fruitful contact with scientific practice.

Overall, her methodology exemplifies a form of social epistemology, in which philosophical arguments about knowledge are tested and illustrated through attention to the organization and history of actual research communities.

14. Famous Passages and Key Formulations

Several passages and conceptual formulations from The Science Question in Feminism have become widely cited in feminist epistemology and philosophy of science.

The Formulation of the Science Question

One of the most frequently quoted statements appears early in the book, where Harding articulates the central problem:

"

Is it possible to use for emancipatory ends the very sciences that have been so intimately involved in Western, bourgeois, and masculine projects of domination?

— Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (approx. pp. 9–11)

This formulation succinctly captures the tension between critique and reliance that structures the entire work.

The Three Feminist Epistemologies

Harding’s typology of feminist approaches is another enduring contribution. She describes how feminist discussions of science can be grouped into:

• Feminist empiricism, which seeks to correct bias within existing methodologies.
• Feminist standpoint theory, which emphasizes epistemic privilege associated with marginalized positions.
• Feminist postmodernism, which deploys deconstructive critiques of reason and subjectivity.

This tripartite division has been widely adopted, sometimes with modification, as a framework for organizing feminist debates about knowledge.

Strong Objectivity

A key formulation concerns strong objectivity. Harding writes that traditional conceptions of objectivity are “too weak” because they fail to systematically scrutinize the social situation of the knower. She proposes instead that:

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Strong objectivity requires that scientific research start from the lives of marginalized people and that it include as a necessary part of its method a critical examination of the social values, interests, and power structures that shape inquiry.

— Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (approx. pp. 138–186, paraphrased)

This idea has influenced later discussions of “situated knowledge” and “reflexive” or “critical” objectivity.

Critique of the Value-Free Ideal

Another recurrently cited theme is Harding’s critique of the value-free ideal of science. She argues that the supposed separation between values and facts can obscure how gender and other social factors are embedded in every stage of research:

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The belief that science can be value-free has functioned more to protect existing social relations from criticism than to guarantee the neutrality of scientific inquiry.

— Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (first third of the book, paraphrased)

These and related passages have become touchstones in debates over whether and how social and political values should enter into scientific practice.

15. Reception, Criticisms, and Debates

Upon publication, The Science Question in Feminism was widely recognized as a major contribution to feminist theory and philosophy of science. It quickly became a central reference in discussions of gender and knowledge, while also provoking significant debate.

Positive Reception

Supporters praised the book for:

• Systematically organizing diverse feminist critiques of science into the influential tripartite framework of empiricism, standpoint theory, and postmodernism.
• Bridging feminist theory with mainstream philosophy of science and sociology of knowledge.
• Introducing strong objectivity and situated knowledge as constructive alternatives to both naïve objectivism and radical relativism.

The work was adopted in graduate and advanced undergraduate courses across philosophy, women’s studies, and STS, helping to institutionalize feminist philosophy of science as a field.

Empiricist and Mainstream Critiques

Some empiricist philosophers and scientists contended that Harding:

• Overstated the pervasiveness and depth of androcentrism in scientific practice, especially in the natural sciences.
• Insufficiently distinguished between bad or biased science and science conducted according to rigorous standards.
• Risked undermining confidence in scientific results by emphasizing the social embedding of knowledge.

From this perspective, many argued that traditional empirical and statistical methods, when properly applied, are adequate for correcting bias, and that appeals to standpoints or social location are philosophically unnecessary.

Feminist Internal Debates

Within feminist circles, the book also sparked internal discussions:

• Feminist empiricists argued that Harding underappreciated the transformative potential of empiricist approaches and that her critique might inadvertently delegitimize practical reform efforts within existing scientific frameworks.
• Postmodern and poststructuralist feminists questioned Harding’s retention of terms like “objectivity” and “rationality,” suggesting that even “strong objectivity” might reproduce universalist or totalizing ambitions.
• Critics of standpoint theory raised concerns about essentializing “women’s standpoint” and insufficient attention to intersectional differences, such as race, class, and colonial position.

These debates led to refinements of standpoint theory and to more explicit engagement with intersectionality in later work by Harding and others.

Ongoing Influence and Contestation

Over time, The Science Question in Feminism has continued to be cited both by proponents of feminist epistemology and by critics skeptical of its claims about the social dimensions of science. Some view the book as a foundational text that opened up productive lines of inquiry; others use it as a foil in defending more traditional conceptions of scientific objectivity.

The persistence of these debates indicates the work’s enduring role as a touchstone in discussions of gender, knowledge, and scientific practice.

16. Legacy and Historical Significance

The Science Question in Feminism has had a lasting impact on multiple fields, shaping how scholars conceptualize the relationship between gender and scientific knowledge.

Institutionalization of Feminist Philosophy of Science

The book played a key role in establishing feminist philosophy of science as a recognized subfield. Its clear typology of feminist empiricism, standpoint theory, and feminist postmodernism provided a shared vocabulary for subsequent debates. Journals such as Hypatia and conferences in philosophy and STS frequently engaged with Harding’s arguments, and the text became a staple in curricula on gender and science.

Influence on Standpoint Theory and Social Epistemology

Harding’s articulation of feminist standpoint theory and strong objectivity contributed significantly to broader developments in social epistemology. Later authors, including Alison Wylie and others, refined the concept of standpoint, integrating intersectional and postcolonial concerns and exploring its implications for archaeological practice, environmental science, and other fields.

Her emphasis on the epistemic privilege of the oppressed influenced not only feminist theory but also critical race theory, disability studies, and decolonial epistemologies, which have adapted and critiqued her ideas in relation to their own contexts.

Debates on Objectivity and Values in Science

The notion of strong objectivity has become a key reference point in discussions about the role of social and ethical values in science. It is often cited alongside alternative approaches, such as Helen Longino’s account of “critical contextual empiricism” and Lorraine Code’s work on epistemic responsibility. Even critics who reject Harding’s specific formulation frequently engage with her arguments when defending more traditional conceptions of objectivity.

Cross-Disciplinary Reach

Beyond philosophy, the book has influenced research in:

• Science and Technology Studies (STS), where it is read alongside works by Donna Haraway and others on situated knowledge.
• Women’s and gender studies, as a foundational text in courses on gender and science.
• Sociology and history of science, where its emphasis on androcentrism and institutional exclusion has informed empirical studies.

Evolving Assessments

Later scholarship has both extended and qualified Harding’s contributions. Some argue that her early formulations did not fully anticipate the complexity of intersectional identities or the global politics of knowledge production. Harding herself addressed many of these issues in subsequent works, including Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?.

Despite ongoing revisions and critiques, The Science Question in Feminism is widely regarded as a landmark in the study of science and gender, marking a shift from treating women’s exclusion as a marginal topic to seeing gender as a central analytical category for understanding how scientific knowledge is produced and authorized.