The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right

1. Introduction

The Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right is Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s most systematic statement of his political theory and one of the central texts in the history of modern political thought. Written in mid‑eighteenth‑century France and first published in 1762, it addresses a specific problem that Rousseau formulates at the outset: how to reconcile individual freedom with political authority so that obedience to law does not mean submission to another’s arbitrary will.

Rousseau’s answer is framed through the idea of a social contract: a foundational agreement by which isolated or oppressed individuals unite to form a body politic governed by laws that all have a part in making. In this framework, political obligation becomes a form of self‑obligation, and legitimate power is distinguished from mere force. Key to this solution is the distinction between the general will, which aims at the common good, and the sum of private preferences, the will of all.

The treatise is organized into four books. It moves from a critical discussion of natural freedom and existing justifications of authority, through an analysis of sovereignty and law, to an examination of governmental forms, participatory institutions, and civil religion. Throughout, Rousseau links political structures to psychological and moral transformation, arguing that citizens can acquire new forms of freedom—civil and moral—within a rightly ordered republic.

Interpreters have read The Social Contract in diverse ways: as a blueprint for direct democracy, a theory of popular sovereignty, a reflection on civic virtue and national identity, and, more critically, as a possible source for authoritarian or totalizing politics. The work’s technical vocabulary—especially terms like sovereign, citizen, and general will—has generated extensive commentary and competing reconstructions.

The following sections situate The Social Contract in its historical context, trace its composition, unpack its structure and arguments, and outline the main interpretive controversies and its long-term influence on political theory and practice.

2. Historical and Intellectual Context

2.1 Enlightenment Political Thought

The Social Contract emerged within the Enlightenment, a period marked by confidence in reason, criticism of inherited authority, and experimentation with new political forms. Rousseau’s treatise engages, often polemically, with prevailing theories of sovereignty, natural law, and rights.

A central backdrop is the social contract tradition:

Rousseau engages with this tradition but reconfigures it by locating sovereignty in the collective people rather than in rulers or representatives.

2.2 European Political Conditions

The treatise also reflects mid‑eighteenth‑century European politics:

• Absolute monarchy in France and other states raised questions about legitimacy, arbitrary taxation, and military conscription.
• Geneva, Rousseau’s native city‑republic, offered a living model of a small, formally republican polity riven by class conflict between patricians and citizens.
• The rise of commercial society, colonial expansion, and increasing social inequality provided empirical support for Rousseau’s earlier diagnosis of moral and political corruption.

Many scholars argue that Rousseau was responding both to the perceived inadequacies of existing monarchies and to the oligarchic tendencies of nominal republics.

2.3 Intellectual and Personal Precursors

Rousseau’s own earlier works form part of the context:

Scholars disagree about how far The Social Contract continues or departs from the more historical and anthropological approach of the Discourse on Inequality. Some emphasize continuity in the critique of inequality; others stress a shift from genealogy to normative institutional design.

The intellectual climate also included debates on natural law (Grotius, Pufendorf), republicanism (especially classical sources like Rome), and religious toleration. Rousseau’s treatment of sovereignty, virtue, and civil religion engages with all of these, sometimes by inversion: where Grotius used history to justify monarchy, Rousseau uses a hypothetical contract to question it.

3. Author and Composition History

3.1 Rousseau’s Biographical Situation

Jean‑Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), born in Geneva, spent much of his adult life in France and elsewhere as a writer, copyist, and intellectual outsider. By the late 1750s he had achieved notoriety through prize‑winning essays and his Discourse on Inequality. At the time he composed The Social Contract, Rousseau was separating himself from Parisian salon culture, emphasizing simplicity and independence.

Many commentators connect this personal withdrawal with his political thought: his suspicion of luxury and dependence in urban life appears to inform his preference for small, austere republics governed by citizens.

3.2 Genesis and Drafting

The composition of The Social Contract is intertwined with Rousseau’s unfinished project Political Institutions and with Emile, or On Education, both from the same period.

Scholars differ on whether The Social Contract should be seen as a fragment of a larger, unrealized system or as a deliberately concise theoretical core.

3.3 Publication and Censorship

When published in 1762, the book appeared anonymously but was soon associated with Rousseau. It quickly attracted the attention of censors.

The simultaneous condemnation of The Social Contract and Emile led to warrants for Rousseau’s arrest and his flight from France. This context of persecution shaped later readings of the book as a radical and dangerous text.

3.4 Relation to Other Writings

Interpreters often study The Social Contract alongside:

• Emile, written concurrently, which develops a model of education for forming the kind of moral agent who could be a citizen.
• Later works such as the Letters Written from the Mountain (1764), where Rousseau defends and applies his political principles to Geneva’s constitutional disputes.

Some scholars argue that Rousseau’s later defensive and autobiographical writings display a growing pessimism about the realizability of the political ideals articulated in The Social Contract; others maintain that the core normative doctrine remains stable despite changing practical assessments.

4. Structure and Organization of the Work

Rousseau divides The Social Contract into four Books, each addressing a different level of political analysis while building on preceding claims.

4.1 Overview of the Four Books

4.2 Progression of Argument

• Book I moves from a critical engagement with existing justifications of authority (patriarchal power, slavery, conquest) to the definition of the social contract and the transformation from natural to civil and moral freedom.
• Book II elaborates the properties of the sovereign and the general will, defining law as a general rule and introducing the ideal of the Legislator who founds political institutions without exercising sovereign power.
• Book III distinguishes sovereignty from government, categorizes forms of executive power (democracy, aristocracy, monarchy), and examines the conditions under which each can function while remaining subordinate to the people.
• Book IV treats institutional mechanisms—assemblies, voting rules, censorship, tribunate, and civil religion—that are supposed to preserve the connection between citizens and the general will.

4.3 Stylistic and Methodological Features

The work combines abstract theorizing with concrete institutional considerations. Each short chapter usually addresses a single doctrinal point, often framed by contrast with other theorists (e.g., Grotius, Hobbes).

Commentators highlight the alternation between:

• Normative argumentation, laying out what political right requires in principle.
• Prudential reflection, considering feasibility, corruption, and historical examples (e.g., Rome, Sparta, Geneva).

Some readers see a tension between the systematic, almost geometric structure suggested by the Book division and a more essayistic, occasionally fragmentary presentation. Others interpret the structure as mirroring Rousseau’s substantive view that legitimate politics must integrate principles, institutions, and civic culture in a tightly connected whole.

5. From Natural Freedom to the Social Pact

5.1 Critique of Existing Justifications of Authority

In Book I, Rousseau examines and rejects prevalent theories that ground political authority in force, paternal power, or slavery. He disputes the idea, associated with writers like Grotius, that conquest or paternal dominion can generate legitimate rights over subjects. For Rousseau, mere power does not create right: obedience based only on necessity lacks moral obligation.

5.2 The State of Nature and Natural Freedom

Rousseau sketches a conception of a pre‑political state of nature, continuous with but more schematic than his account in the Discourse on Inequality. Here, natural freedom is the “unlimited right” to pursue one’s own preservation, constrained only by individual strength. This freedom is insecure, largely solitary, and guided by instinct rather than law.

He argues that historical developments—population growth, the rise of property, and conflict—make this condition unsustainable. The key question becomes how individuals can unite for mutual protection without becoming the slaves of those who rule.

5.3 The Social Pact Defined

Rousseau’s answer is the social pact, formulated in Book I, chapter 6:

"

“Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.”

— Rousseau, The Social Contract, I.6

Through this act, a body politic is formed. Each individual, by uniting with all, obeys only himself as a participant in the general will, while still being bound to the collective.

5.4 Transformation of Freedom

The social pact involves a loss and a gain:

Rousseau insists that, properly constituted, the political association substitutes a moral and collective self for the merely natural individual, granting security and a higher form of autonomy. Interpreters differ on how literally to take this transformation: some stress its moral‑psychological depth; others see it as a juridical metaphor for equal citizenship.

6. Sovereignty, the General Will, and Law

6.1 Sovereignty as Inalienable and Indivisible

In Book II, Rousseau identifies the sovereign with the collective body of citizens exercising the general will. Sovereignty is described as:

• Inalienable: it cannot be transferred to a ruler or representative body without undermining its character as the will of the people.
• Indivisible: it cannot be partitioned into legislative, executive, or judicial “parts” without ceasing to be a single will.

This stance contrasts with theories of mixed or balanced constitutions. Some commentators view this as a normative ideal compatible with functional divisions; others read it as a categorical rejection of shared or representational sovereignty.

6.2 The General Will versus the Will of All

Rousseau distinguishes:

The general will is not merely the majority’s actual preference. It expresses what citizens would will when considering only the common interest. Critics argue that this notion is obscure or vulnerable to manipulation; defenders maintain that it encodes a requirement of impartiality and reciprocity in lawmaking.

6.3 Law as Expression of the General Will

For Rousseau, laws are:

• General in their origin (made by the people as a whole),
• General in their object (addressing categories, not individuals),
• Directed toward the common good.

"

“When the entire people decrees about the entire people, it considers only itself; and if a relation is formed, it is between the whole object taken from one point of view and the whole object taken from another. Then the matter upon which it decrees is general, as is the will that decrees.”

— Rousseau, The Social Contract, II.6

This definition distinguishes law from decrees or administrative acts. A measure singling out a person or group is, for Rousseau, not a true law.

6.4 Infallibility and Error

Rousseau sometimes describes the general will as “always right” with respect to the common good. Yet he also acknowledges that the deliberations of a people can be mistaken when citizens are misinformed or factionalized. Interpreters reconcile this by distinguishing between:

• A normative general will (what would be willed under ideal conditions), and
• The empirical will expressed in actual votes.

Debates continue over how to interpret this distinction: some see it as anticipating later ideas of ideal deliberation, while critics see a risk that political elites may claim privileged insight into the “true” general will.

7. Government, Magistrates, and Forms of Regime

7.1 Sovereign versus Government

Book III draws a sharp conceptual line between:

The government is an intermediary between sovereign and subjects. It is created by the sovereign and remains its agent, not its owner. Rousseau presents this distinction as crucial to prevent confusion between popular sovereignty and the apparatus that executes its commands.

7.2 Forms of Government

Rousseau classifies governments according to how many persons hold executive power:

He does not declare any one form universally best. Instead, he argues that climate, territory, population, and national character influence which government fits a given people. Commentators differ on how prescriptive this typology is; some read it as largely descriptive, others as a veiled endorsement of certain mixed arrangements.

7.3 Degeneration and Usurpation

Rousseau outlines mechanisms by which governments tend to corrupt:

• The government’s particular will may oppose the general will of the sovereign.
• Magistrates may seek to make their offices hereditary or independent.
• The government can “usurp” sovereignty by acting as if its will were law.

He suggests that over time all governments drift from their original institution, with executive power gaining at the expense of popular sovereignty. Periodic assemblies and other devices are proposed to counter this drift.

7.4 Assemblies and Control over Magistrates

While detailed voting procedures are treated in Book IV, Book III already stresses the need for:

• Regular popular assemblies where the people confirm or revoke the government’s mandate.
• Clear procedures for appointing and dismissing magistrates.

Some interpreters see here a model of a republic with a strong, periodically mobilized citizenry overseeing a more or less professional executive. Others focus on the tension between Rousseau’s ideal of constant citizen vigilance and the practical demands of complex administration, questioning the feasibility of such oversight in larger or modern states.

8. Citizenship, Freedom, and Civic Virtue

8.1 Citizen and Subject

Rousseau gives each member of the political community a dual status:

This duality is meant to unify freedom and obligation: one submits as a subject to laws one has helped make as a citizen.

8.2 Civil and Moral Freedom

The social contract, according to Book I, replaces natural freedom with:

• Civil freedom: secured by law and equality before it.
• Moral freedom: the capacity to obey laws one gives oneself as part of the collective.

Rousseau claims that moral freedom distinguishes humans from animals, insofar as it introduces duty and self‑legislation. Critics argue that this conception may justify coercion in the name of an individual’s “true” will; defenders suggest it articulates a demanding ideal of autonomous citizenship.

8.3 Civic Virtue and Education

While The Social Contract itself provides only brief remarks on education, Rousseau repeatedly insists that the viability of a republic depends on civic virtue—dispositions such as public‑spiritedness, willingness to sacrifice private advantage, and attachment to the laws and homeland.

He suggests that:

• Institutions (e.g., assemblies, festivals, censorship) can shape character.
• Laws and customs should inculcate a love of equality and the common good.

Interpretations diverge concerning how strong and homogeneous this civic ethos must be. Some emphasize parallels with ancient republicanism (Sparta, Rome), highlighting strict discipline and unity; others argue that Rousseau allows for a range of characters compatible with loyalty to the general will.

8.4 Inclusion and Exclusion

Rousseau indicates that citizens should be relatively equal and attached to the community, which has raised questions about:

• The status of women, servants, and foreigners, rarely mentioned directly in the treatise.
• The feasibility of broad inclusion in a model that relies on high levels of virtue and homogeneity.

Feminist and postcolonial readers have debated whether Rousseau’s conception of citizenship is inherently exclusionary or whether its core principles of equality and popular sovereignty can be extended beyond the limits he appears to assume.

9. Religion, Civil Religion, and Political Unity

9.1 Types of Religion

In Book IV, chapter 8, Rousseau distinguishes three kinds of religion:

He criticizes both theocracy (fusion of Church and state) and forms of Christianity that detach believers from their civic obligations.

9.2 Civil Religion

As a proposed solution, Rousseau outlines a civil religion: a minimal set of dogmas that the sovereign may require of citizens to support political cohesion.

"

“There is therefore a purely civil profession of faith of which it belongs to the Sovereign to fix the articles, not precisely as religious dogmas but as social sentiments without which a man cannot be a good citizen and a faithful subject.”

— Rousseau, The Social Contract, IV.8

These articles include belief in a just deity, an afterlife where virtue is rewarded, and the sanctity of the social pact. Intolerance and persecution are condemned, though Rousseau controversially argues that those who reject the civil profession may be banished, and those who publicly violate it after accepting it may be punished.

9.3 Interpretive Controversies

Interpretations of Rousseau’s civil religion diverge:

• Some see it as a proto‑liberal attempt to secure religious pluralism by confining public religion to a thin moral core, leaving private belief largely free.
• Others interpret it as an illiberal imposition of official doctrine that threatens freedom of conscience.

Debate also centers on how this doctrine relates to Rousseau’s earlier “Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar” in Emile, which emphasizes personal religious sentiment over institutional forms. Some scholars view the two accounts as complementary—private religion for individuals, civil religion for citizens—while others perceive tension between them.

9.4 Political Unity and Symbolism

Rousseau suggests that rituals, festivals, and shared symbols can express and reinforce the social bond. Civil religion contributes to unity by:

• Sacralizing the laws and the patria (homeland),
• Framing obedience as a moral and even religious duty.

Critics contend that this may encourage sacralization of the state and stifle dissent. Supporters argue that Rousseau identifies a persistent need for shared narratives and values in any stable political order, anticipating later discussions of “civil religion” in modern democracies.

10. Philosophical Method and Use of the Social Contract Idea

10.1 Hypothetical versus Historical Contract

Rousseau’s social contract is not presented as a historical event but as a normative device. He explicitly distances his argument from mere history, using a hypothetical agreement to test the legitimacy of political authority.

Commentators often compare this move to earlier and later contract theories:

Some interpreters see in this approach an anticipation of later “constructivist” methods, where principles are justified by what free and equal persons would agree to under specified conditions.

10.2 Abstraction and Idealization

Rousseau frequently abstracts from empirical complexity to focus on:

• Small, relatively homogeneous republics,
• Citizens motivated by public spirit,
• Laws oriented to the common good.

This idealization has been read in two main ways:

• As a regulative ideal against which real societies can be critically measured.
• As a practically intended model for certain kinds of polities (e.g., city‑republics), though not necessarily for large modern nation‑states.

Debates hinge on how strictly to interpret Rousseau’s numerous practical caveats and contextual remarks.

10.3 Integration of Normative and Empirical Elements

Rousseau’s method combines general principles with attention to historical examples (Rome, Sparta, Geneva) and sociological factors (climate, size, economy). He repeatedly insists that “political right is not a matter of mere theory,” yet also constructs highly general definitions.

Some scholars see this as a dual‑level method:

• A “pure theory” of right (sovereignty, general will),
• A “theory of application” sensitive to circumstances.

Others argue that empirical and normative elements are more tightly interwoven, making it difficult to separate abstract doctrine from concrete institutional recommendations.

10.4 Use of Paradox and Rhetoric

Rousseau employs striking paradoxes—such as citizens being “forced to be free”—and vivid formulations to unsettle readers’ assumptions. Analysts of his rhetoric note that:

• These phrases often encapsulate complex normative claims (e.g., about autonomy).
• They also contribute to divergent interpretations, as they can be read in either emancipatory or authoritarian ways.

The combination of rigorous definitions with provocative language has led some to describe the work as oscillating between “geometric” exposition and prophetic exhortation.

11. Key Concepts and Terminology

This section highlights central terms as used within The Social Contract, many of which have specialized meanings.

11.1 Core Political Terms

Rousseau plays on these dual roles to express his claim that citizens are both authors and addressees of the law.

11.2 Freedom and Will

11.3 Law and Institutions

11.4 Civic Culture and Religion

Interpreters stress that these terms often diverge from everyday or later liberal usage. For example, sovereignty refers strictly to legislative authority, not to the whole apparatus of state power, and democracy designates an executive form rather than a general regime of popular self‑rule.

12. Famous Passages and Their Interpretation

12.1 “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains”

"

“Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.”

— Rousseau, The Social Contract, I.1

This opening sentence is often read as encapsulating Rousseau’s project. Some commentators treat “born free” as a reference to a natural condition prior to social conventions; others interpret it more normatively, as an assertion of human capacity for autonomy. The “chains” are variously identified with unjust social relations, oppressive governments, or even corrupt desires.

12.2 Definition of the Social Pact

The passage from I.6 defining the social pact has been central to debates over collective identity and autonomy (quoted in §5.3). Interpreters disagree on whether the resulting “moral and collective body” should be seen as:

• A metaphor for the legal unity of citizens, or
• A stronger claim about the emergence of a shared social persona.

This affects how one understands the scope and limits of collective decision‑making.

12.3 General Will versus Will of All

Book II, chapter 3, contains Rousseau’s canonical distinction between general will and will of all. The famous line that one must “subtract the pluses and minuses” of private interests to obtain the general will has been taken by some as proto‑mathematical aggregation, and by others as an argument for filtering out private interests through deliberation.

12.4 “Forcing to be Free”

"

“Whoever refuses to obey the general will will be constrained to do so by the entire body: which means nothing other than that he will be forced to be free.”

— Rousseau, The Social Contract, I.7

This formula has been intensely contested. Critics read it as legitimizing coercion in the name of a supposed “true” self. More sympathetic interpretations stress that Rousseau is describing the enforcement of laws to which the citizen has consented as a co‑author, suggesting that compulsion upholds rather than violates autonomy.

12.5 The Legislator and Civil Religion

Passages on the Legislator (II.6–7) and civil religion (IV.8) have been read as indicating Rousseau’s awareness of the symbolic and quasi‑religious dimensions of politics. Some interpret the Legislator as a mythic device to explain constitutional founding, others as evidence of Rousseau’s reliance on extraordinary, even charismatic, figures. The civil religion chapter is frequently quoted in discussions of the relationship between religion and modern nationalism.

13. Contemporary Reception and Controversies

13.1 Official Condemnation

Upon its 1762 publication, The Social Contract faced immediate official backlash:

Authorities reacted particularly strongly to the doctrines of popular sovereignty and civil religion, seen as subversive of both monarchical and ecclesiastical authority.

13.2 Enlightenment Responses

Among Enlightenment figures, reactions were mixed:

• Some philosophes admired Rousseau’s critique of despotism and defense of the people’s rights.
• Others were uneasy about his hostility to luxury and commerce, and about his insistence on small, austere republics.

Voltaire, for example, famously mocked Rousseau’s apparent romanticization of primitive life, while more sympathetic readers saw in the treatise a powerful statement of republican ideals.

13.3 Genevan and Swiss Debates

In Geneva and other Swiss cantons, The Social Contract entered into ongoing struggles between oligarchic elites and popular parties. Rousseau’s insistence that sovereignty belongs to the people resonated with reformers but was perceived as threatening by ruling councils.

Some contemporaries attempted to appropriate Rousseau’s language in support of their own political aims, contributing to early disputes over how radical or moderate his proposals really were.

13.4 Early Misgivings and Criticisms

Even during Rousseau’s lifetime, critics raised concerns that anticipate later debates:

• The notion of the general will was described as vague and susceptible to abuse.
• The insistence on unity and virtue was seen as potentially incompatible with pluralism and personal independence.
• The doctrine of civil religion was criticized as both religiously heterodox and politically intrusive.

These early controversies helped frame the work’s reputation as simultaneously inspiring and dangerous, a duality that has persisted in subsequent interpretations.

14. Major Criticisms and Debates

14.1 General Will and Authoritarianism

A long‑standing criticism holds that Rousseau’s general will concept can legitimize authoritarian rule: leaders or majorities may claim to embody the true general will and suppress dissent. Critics such as Benjamin Constant and later Isaiah Berlin argued that prioritizing collective self‑rule (positive liberty) over individual rights risks political oppression.

Defenders respond that Rousseau constrains the general will through requirements of generality, publicity, and equality, and that he anticipates safeguards against faction and manipulation. Debate continues over whether these constraints are sufficient.

14.2 Unity versus Pluralism

Rousseau’s emphasis on civic unity and homogeneity has been criticized as inhospitable to modern pluralistic societies. Critics argue that the demand to subordinate private interests and comprehensive doctrines to a shared common good may marginalize minorities and dissenters.

Alternative readings suggest that the common good in Rousseau is compatible with significant diversity, provided basic equality and loyalty to the laws are maintained. Contemporary republican and deliberative theorists have revisited Rousseau’s ideas to explore conditions under which robust disagreement could coexist with a shared political identity.

14.3 Scale and Feasibility

Rousseau’s insistence that his model fits small, relatively simple states raises questions about its applicability to large, complex polities. Skeptics see his ideal as impractical for modern nation‑states; others contend that his principles—popular sovereignty, civic participation—can be realized through representative or federal structures, even if not in the exact institutional form he envisaged.

14.4 Individual Rights and the Collective

Some liberal critics fault Rousseau for giving insufficient priority to individual rights as constraints on the collective. They worry that his framework allows the general will to override personal liberties. Supporters note passages where Rousseau affirms property rights, due process, and protection from arbitrary rule, and they argue that the general will itself incorporates respect for persons as equals.

14.5 Religion and Conscience

The doctrine of civil religion has been criticized from both secular and religious perspectives: as an undue politicization of faith and as a restriction of theological freedom. Debates focus on whether banishment or punishment for rejecting the civil profession is compatible with freedom of conscience.

Interpretive work has explored whether Rousseau’s civil religion can be re‑appropriated as a thin, rights‑respecting public ethic or whether it is inseparable from more robust, uniform beliefs.

15. Legacy and Historical Significance

15.1 Influence on Revolutionary Politics

The Social Contract significantly influenced the rhetoric and ideological frameworks of the American and especially the French Revolution. Terms such as sovereignty of the people, general will, and citizen entered revolutionary discourse.

While some revolutionaries cited Rousseau explicitly, others drew more loosely on a shared republican vocabulary to which he had contributed.

15.2 Nineteenth‑ and Twentieth‑Century Thought

Rousseau’s work informed diverse traditions:

• Republican and nationalist movements appropriated his emphasis on the people as a unified sovereign.
• Socialist and radical thinkers drew on his critique of inequality and luxury.
• Liberal theorists engaged critically with his conception of freedom and the role of the state.

In the twentieth century, scholars debated whether totalitarian regimes misused Rousseauian ideas of the general will and political unity or whether such applications represented a distortion of his fundamentally egalitarian and participatory project.

15.3 Place in Social Contract Theory and Democratic Thought

Alongside Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau stands as a canonical figure in social contract theory, but his version is distinctive in tying legitimacy to collective authorship of law rather than to protection of pre‑existing rights alone.

Later political philosophers, including John Rawls, have revisited Rousseau’s idea that just institutions are those that free and equal persons would agree to, under fair conditions. Deliberative democrats and civic republicans have looked to his vision of active citizenship and public reason, while often modifying his requirements of homogeneity and virtue.

15.4 Continuing Relevance

Contemporary discussions of:

• Participatory democracy,
• The balance between rights and collective self‑government,
• Civic education and shared public values,

frequently engage, directly or indirectly, with themes from The Social Contract. The work’s combination of a demanding ideal of political freedom with acute awareness of social inequality ensures that it remains a major reference point in both normative political philosophy and the history of political ideas.