Two Treatises of Government

1. Introduction

Two Treatises of Government is a late seventeenth‑century work of political philosophy by John Locke, often regarded as a foundational text of modern liberal thought. Composed against the backdrop of intense conflict over monarchy, Parliament, and religious authority in England, it aims to identify what Locke calls the “true original, extent, and end of civil government.”

The work is divided into two distinct but related treatises. The First Treatise is largely polemical, directed against Sir Robert Filmer’s doctrine of patriarchal, divinely sanctioned monarchy. Locke challenges the claim that political authority descends from Adam’s supposed paternal dominion and that kings inherit absolute power as Adam’s heirs.

The Second Treatise offers Locke’s constructive political theory. It develops a series of interconnected ideas: a state of nature in which individuals are free and equal under natural law; natural rights to life, liberty, and estate; a social contract through which individuals consent to form a political community; the establishment of government as a fiduciary power limited to securing the public good; and a conditional right of resistance when rulers become tyrannical.

Interpreters disagree about whether the Treatises are best understood primarily as a theoretical work in moral and political philosophy, a Whig revolutionary pamphlet, a religiously grounded defense of equality, or an ideological justification of emerging capitalist and imperial practices. Contemporary scholarship tends to treat it as simultaneously a work of political argument in a specific historical controversy and a long‑term source of concepts—such as consent, property, and rights—that have shaped later constitutional and democratic theories.

Throughout both treatises, Locke uses a mixture of biblical exegesis, rational argument, and appeals to common experience. The text thus sits at a crossroads between older natural‑law and theological traditions and newer, more secular and individualist forms of political reasoning.

2. Historical and Political Context

The Two Treatises emerged from the political crises of late Stuart England, especially disputes over succession, religious toleration, and the limits of monarchical power. Scholars generally connect the composition to the Exclusion Crisis (1679–1681) and the later justification of the Glorious Revolution (1688–1689), though they differ on which context is primary.

Stuart Monarchy and Constitutional Conflict

After the English Civil War and the Interregnum, the Restoration of Charles II (1660) revived questions about royal prerogative versus parliamentary authority. Tensions intensified over the prospect that Charles’s Catholic brother, James, Duke of York, would inherit the throne. Whigs sought to exclude James to preserve a Protestant succession; Tories defended hereditary right and stronger royal authority.

Sir Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha (published posthumously in 1680) provided an influential defense of divine‑right, patriarchal monarchy, arguing that kings inherited Adam’s paternal authority. Locke’s First Treatise directly confronts this doctrine.

Religious and Intellectual Climate

Religious divisions between Anglicans, Dissenters, and Catholics intersected with political faction. Debates about religious toleration, persecution, and church–state relations formed part of the background. At the same time, broader natural law and social contract discussions—influenced by thinkers such as Hobbes, Grotius, and Pufendorf—circulated among educated elites.

Locke, involved with Whig figures around Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, drew on these debates. Some interpreters (e.g., John Dunn) stress the Treatises’ role as Whig polemic tailored to Exclusion politics; others (e.g., Jeremy Waldron) emphasize the underlying, more general theological and egalitarian commitments.

From Exclusion to Revolution

The failure of Exclusion, the accession of James II (1685), and his attempts to expand royal and Catholic power intensified opposition. The Glorious Revolution installed William and Mary and led to a new constitutional settlement. When the Two Treatises appeared in 1690, Locke’s arguments about consent, limited government, and resistance were widely read as a retrospective justification of that revolution, even if parts had likely been drafted earlier.

This multi‑layered context—civil war memory, Restoration politics, religious conflict, and emerging natural‑rights discourse—frames both Locke’s critique of patriarchalism and his alternative vision of political authority.

3. Author and Composition

John Locke (1632–1704) was an English philosopher, physician, and civil servant. Educated at Oxford, he became associated with the circle of Anthony Ashley Cooper (later Earl of Shaftesbury), serving as his physician, advisor, and political ally. Locke’s experience in medicine, experimental science (through the Royal Society), and public administration informed his empiricist and practical outlook.

Locke’s Political Engagements

Locke’s political fortunes followed Shaftesbury’s. During the Exclusion Crisis, Locke was drawn into Whig opposition to the succession of James, Duke of York. When Shaftesbury fell from favor and went into exile, Locke’s association with him rendered Locke politically suspect. After the alleged Rye House Plot (1683), Locke spent several years in the Netherlands, a center of republican and Protestant thought.

Many scholars regard this period of exile as crucial for the drafting and revising of the Treatises. Locke’s correspondence and notebooks suggest he reworked the manuscripts repeatedly, adjusting arguments as circumstances changed.

Dating and Purpose of Composition

The dating and intended purpose of the Two Treatises are contested:

Locke did not sign the first edition, and even among friends he sometimes downplayed his authorship, presumably for reasons of prudence.

Relation to Locke’s Other Writings

The Treatises are intertwined with Locke’s other major works. His epistemology in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding and his writings on toleration share themes of individual rational capacity, limitations on authority, and the moral equality of persons. Nevertheless, interpreters differ on how tightly unified Locke’s intellectual project was, with some emphasizing a coherent liberal program and others highlighting shifts in focus and audience across his career.

4. Publication History and Textual Tradition

The Two Treatises were first published anonymously in London in 1690, though the title page bore the date 1689. The imprint framed them as a defense of the “true original, extent, and end of civil government,” aligning the work with debates following the Glorious Revolution.

Early Editions and Anonymity

The first edition included:

• a brief “Epistle to the Reader” (unsigned) explaining the work’s aims;
• a dedicatory epistle positioning the Treatises as a response to theories of absolute monarchy.

Locke’s authorship became an “open secret” in some circles but was not publicly acknowledged in print during his lifetime. Anonymity likely served to protect him from political reprisals and to direct attention to the arguments rather than the author.

Subsequent seventeenth‑ and eighteenth‑century editions introduced minor alterations, orthographic updates, and rearrangements of notes. Editors and printers occasionally altered paragraphing or punctuation without systematic record, which later complicated textual scholarship.

Manuscripts and Lost Materials

No complete authorial manuscript of the Treatises survives. Scholars rely on printed editions, scattered notes, and references in Locke’s correspondence. It is generally thought that earlier drafts, possibly reflecting more overtly partisan or context‑specific material, were destroyed or heavily revised. This absence explains why reconstructing the compositional history remains partly speculative.

Modern Critical Editions

Twentieth‑century scholarship produced critical editions that collate early printings and contextual materials. The most influential is Peter Laslett’s 1960 Cambridge edition, which:

• compared early editions to establish a reliable text;
• supplied extensive historical commentary;
• advanced the thesis of early (Exclusion‑era) composition.

These editions, along with digital facsimiles of early printings, constitute the main textual basis for contemporary study. Disagreements persist about some interpretive headings and paragraph boundaries, but there is broad consensus on the substantive text.

5. Overall Structure of the Two Treatises

The work consists of two separate but interrelated treatises, each with its own argumentative trajectory and internal division into chapters and numbered sections.

First Treatise: Negative, Anti‑Patriarchal Argument

The First Treatise of Government is primarily a refutation of Sir Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha. It:

• summarizes and criticizes Filmer’s claim that all political authority descends from Adam’s paternal dominion;
• scrutinizes biblical texts used to support patriarchalism;
• argues that Filmer’s position yields no clear line of succession or practical rule for identifying the rightful sovereign.

This treatise is heavily exegetical and polemical, using scriptural interpretation and logical analysis rather than constructing a positive political theory.

Second Treatise: Positive Theory of Civil Government

The Second Treatise of Government, subtitled “An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government,” is Locke’s systematic account of legitimate political authority. Its internal structure can be outlined as follows:

The Second Treatise’s sequencing is often read as moving from pre‑political conditions to the establishment of political society and then to the organization, abuse, and breakdown of government. Some interpreters stress its systematic, quasi‑geometric progression; others emphasize its responsiveness to contemporary controversies about monarchy, Parliament, and revolution.

The two treatises thus function together as destruction and construction: the First dismantling a rival account of absolute authority, the Second offering an alternative grounded in natural rights and consent.

6. The First Treatise: Critique of Patriarchalism

The First Treatise targets Sir Robert Filmer’s patriarchal theory of monarchy, especially as expressed in Patriarcha. Filmer had argued that Adam received from God absolute authority over his descendants and the world, that this paternal dominion passed by inheritance to later patriarchs and ultimately to kings, and that subjects therefore owed absolute obedience to monarchs as to fathers.

Critique of Adamic Dominion

Locke contests the claim that Adam possessed such sweeping authority. He examines biblical passages (e.g., Genesis 1 and 3) that Filmer cites as granting Adam dominion over the world and over his offspring. Locke argues that:

• scriptural “dominion” over creatures does not entail political sovereignty over other humans;
• parental power is limited and shared by both parents, undermining the idea of a singular, monarchical paternal right;
• the Bible does not clearly assign Adam a transmissible property in the whole earth.

Proponents of Locke’s reading highlight his insistence on close textual interpretation and the distinction between stewardship and dominion. Critics have suggested he sometimes overstates ambiguities in the text to weaken Filmer’s position.

Inheritance and Indeterminacy

Locke further maintains that even if Adam had possessed absolute authority, no clear rule of succession could be derived from scripture or tradition. Without a determinate heir, no present‑day monarch can credibly claim Adamic title. He satirically observes that if Filmer’s principle were true, most governments would be usurpations.

This line of argument aims to show that patriarchalism fails both theologically and practically: it neither accords with scripture nor provides a workable criterion for identifying rightful rulers.

Separation of Paternal and Political Power

Throughout the First Treatise (and anticipated more systematically in the Second), Locke stresses that paternal power—a limited, care‑oriented authority over children—differs fundamentally from political power, which involves law, coercion, and the common good. This distinction is used to undermine Filmer’s attempt to derive political absolutism from family relations.

Interpreters differ on the First Treatise’s significance: some treat it as a historically specific anti‑Filmer polemic of limited lasting interest, while others see it as important for Locke’s broader rejection of theological justifications of absolute authority and for early critiques of patriarchy as a political model.

7. The Second Treatise: State of Nature, Law, and Rights

The opening chapters of the Second Treatise set out Locke’s account of the state of nature, natural law, and natural rights. These ideas underpin his later arguments about property, consent, and political obligation.

State of Nature

Locke describes the state of nature as:

"

“a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature… A state also of equality.”

— Locke, Second Treatise, II, §4

Key features include:

• absence of a common judge or political superior;
• existence of moral norms (natural law) binding all;
• potential for peace and cooperation, but also for conflict when people are biased judges in their own cases.

Locke explicitly contrasts this with the state of war, a condition of unjust aggression and enmity arising when someone attempts to subject another to arbitrary power.

Natural Law and Natural Rights

For Locke, natural law is accessible to human reason and commands the preservation of oneself and others, so far as consistent with one’s own survival. From this law follow natural rights—notably to life, liberty, and property (estate). Everyone has an obligation to respect these rights and, in some circumstances, a right to execute natural law by punishing transgressors.

Commentators disagree on the grounding of this law. Some emphasize its theological basis (God’s ownership of humanity), others its rational or proto‑secular character. Most agree, however, that Locke treats these rights as pre‑political and inalienable in important respects.

Implications for Political Theory

Locke’s portrayal of the state of nature contrasts with Hobbes’s more violent depiction. It is not inherently a state of war, though it is insecure and inconvenient. This allows Locke to argue that individuals have reasons to form political society without conceding that any form of centralized power—even absolute monarchy—is preferable to the natural condition.

Debate continues over whether Locke intends the state of nature as a historical condition, a conceptual device, or both; different passages support different emphases, and scholars often interpret it as a flexible heuristic rather than a strict historical anthropology.

8. Property, Labor, and Economic Relations

Chapter V of the Second Treatise presents Locke’s influential account of property, connecting it to labor, natural law, and emerging market relations.

Labor Theory of Property

Locke begins from the premise that God gave the earth “to mankind in common.” He then argues that individuals can justly appropriate parts of this common stock by mixing their labor with unowned resources:

"

“Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided… he hath mixed his labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”

— Locke, Second Treatise, V, §27

Labor is treated as an extension of the self, and thus as generating a moral claim to the products it transforms.

Provisos: “Enough and as Good” and Spoilage

Locke conditions initial appropriation by two notable provisos:

These limitations are read variously: some view them as stringent egalitarian constraints, others as relatively weak moral guidelines that become largely inoperative once money is introduced.

Money and Inequality

Locke argues that the invention of money, by tacit consent, allows people to accumulate durable wealth without violating the spoilage proviso. This, he suggests, legitimizes inequalities of holdings, provided the initial acquisitions were just.

Critics such as Rousseau and later Marxian interpreters have claimed that Locke’s theory naturalizes emerging capitalist relations, including wage labor and large‑scale accumulation. Others, like James Tully, argue that Locke’s property theory remains constrained by natural law and obligations to the poor.

Colonial and Economic Dimensions

Scholars have also debated the relation between Locke’s property doctrine and colonial expansion. Some argue that Locke’s emphasis on “improvement” by labor implicitly devalues lands used in non‑European ways, thereby rationalizing expropriation of Indigenous peoples. Others caution against straightforward identification of Locke’s abstract theory with later imperial practices, pointing to his insistence that property acquisition is bound by moral limits and the rights of others.

These interpretive disputes shape contemporary assessments of Locke’s contribution to theories of ownership, markets, and distributive justice.

9. Consent, Social Contract, and Political Society

Chapters VI–VIII articulate Locke’s account of how political society arises from the consent of free and equal individuals.

From Families to Political Communities

Locke distinguishes paternal and conjugal relations from political relations. Families are natural associations for procreation and mutual support, but they do not by themselves constitute a commonwealth. Political society arises only when individuals agree to unite into one body and submit to a common authority.

The Social Contract

The core idea is a two‑stage process (though Locke does not always present it formally as such):

1. Formation of the community: Each person consents to join with others to form a body politic, thereby authorizing majority decision as the community’s rule.
2. Establishment of government: The community then determines the form of government (legislative, executive arrangements) and entrusts it with powers for the public good.

This contract is justified by the advantages of leaving the state of nature: stable laws, impartial judges, and effective enforcement, especially for the protection of property in the broad Lockean sense.

Express and Tacit Consent

Locke famously distinguishes express from tacit consent:

• Express consent (e.g., an explicit promise) permanently makes one a member of the political community.
• Tacit consent is inferred from actions such as residing in, or enjoying the protection of, a government’s territory and laws.

Proponents of Locke’s view argue that tacit consent captures the practical ways individuals bind themselves without formal oaths. Critics contend that mere residence under unavoidable political authority does not constitute genuine, voluntary consent, raising questions about the legitimacy of obligations for most subjects.

Majority Rule and Political Obligation

Once united, the community decides by majority. Individuals are bound by these decisions because they have agreed in advance to accept majority determination as the mechanism of collective choice. Interpretations diverge on whether Locke’s theory implies a strong, ongoing requirement of popular participation or primarily justifies deference to established constitutional processes.

Debates also concern how Locke’s consent theory relates to later notions of popular sovereignty and democracy: some see Locke as a precursor to robust self‑government, while others emphasize the limited, property‑centered nature of the constituency he likely had in mind.

10. Forms, Powers, and Limits of Government

In Chapters IX–XIII, Locke analyzes the ends of political society, the forms of government it may adopt, and the powers government wields under moral and constitutional constraints.

Ends of Political Society

Locke argues that people enter political society chiefly for the “comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another” and the secure enjoyment of property. This requires:

• known and standing laws;
• a legislative power to make those laws;
• an executive power to enforce them;
• sometimes a distinct federative power to manage foreign affairs.

Legislative, Executive, and Federative Powers

Locke assigns supremacy to the legislative as the expression of the community’s will. However, “supreme” does not mean unlimited. The legislative:

• must govern by promulgated laws, not arbitrary decrees;
• must aim at the public good;
• cannot take away a person’s property without their consent (direct or via representation);
• is fiduciary—a trust that may be forfeited if abused.

The executive applies and enforces the laws; the federative handles war, peace, and diplomacy. Locke recognizes that executive and federative functions are often united in the same hands, whereas the legislative may be distinct or intermittent.

Forms of Government

Locke allows for various constitutional forms—democracy, oligarchy (aristocracy), and monarchy—depending on where the legislative power ultimately resides:

He treats these less as ideal types than as institutional arrangements subject to the same moral constraints. Interpretations vary on whether Locke favors any particular form; many argue he was especially concerned to justify a mixed, limited monarchy suitable to the English constitution.

Limits and Accountability

Crucially, all governmental powers are limited by natural law and the original purposes of political society. Government cannot:

• arbitrarily deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property;
• transfer its law‑making authority irreversibly to another body;
• act contrary to the known consent and interest of the community.

These limitations set the stage for Locke’s later account of prerogative and resistance, connecting the internal organization of government with conditions under which it may be judged to have failed in its trust.

11. Prerogative, Conquest, Usurpation, and Tyranny

Chapters XIV–XVIII address extraordinary forms and deformations of political power: prerogative, conquest, usurpation, and tyranny.

Prerogative

Locke defines prerogative as a discretionary power in the hands of the executive to act without, or even contrary to, the law where the law is silent or rigid and where the public good plainly requires action:

"

“The power to act according to discretion for the publick good, without the prescription of the Law, and sometimes even against it.”

— Locke, Second Treatise, XIV, §160 (paraphrased in modern spelling)

He presents prerogative as inevitable in any government because laws cannot foresee every contingency. Proponents of Locke’s account view this as an early theory of emergency or executive power constrained by the people’s ultimate judgment. Critics worry that the line between prerogative and arbitrary rule is thin in practice.

Conquest

In discussing conquest, Locke argues that victorious rulers do not thereby gain unlimited authority over the conquered:

• Just war may yield rights over aggressors but not over innocent subjects.
• The conqueror cannot acquire absolute dominion over property or persons beyond what natural law permits.
• Conquered peoples retain rights to their property and, in many cases, to choose new political arrangements.

Commentators have debated how this doctrine related to contemporaneous colonial and imperial contexts, with some suggesting that Locke’s limitations on conquest were often ignored in practice.

Usurpation and Tyranny

Locke defines usurpation as the taking of another’s rightful power—e.g., seizing the legislative or executive office—without proper title or consent. Usurpers, even if they govern according to existing laws, lack legitimate authority until ratified by the people.

Tyranny is more substantive than usurpation: it is the exercise of power beyond right, for private advantage rather than the public good, and in violation of law and property. Tyranny may be committed by lawful monarchs or assemblies as well as by usurpers.

These distinctions provide conceptual tools for evaluating irregular political events and set up the final chapter’s discussion of dissolution and the right to resistance.

12. Resistance, Rebellion, and Dissolution of Government

Chapter XIX addresses the circumstances under which a government dissolves and the people may legitimately resist or rebel.

Dissolution of Government vs. Society

Locke distinguishes the dissolution of a particular governmental form from the dissolution of political society itself. The community (the people as a corporate body) may persist while one constitution or ruling personnel is replaced by another. Dissolution occurs when the governmental trust is violated, not merely when offices change hands.

Grounds of Dissolution

Locke identifies multiple ways a government can forfeit its authority:

• the legislative is altered without the people’s consent;
• the prince or executive subverts the laws, obstructs the legislative, or prevents it from meeting;
• rulers employ their power to invade property, reduce subjects to arbitrary rule, or transfer the community’s power to a foreign body;
• persistent violations demonstrate an intention to enslave the people.

In such cases, the government has effectively put itself into a state of war with the people, who may resume the powers they originally entrusted.

Right to Resistance and Rebellion

Locke contends that when rulers become tyrannical, the people have a right:

• to refuse obedience to unlawful commands;
• to appeal to Heaven—a metaphor for resorting to force when no earthly remedy remains;
• to establish new legislative and executive powers more faithful to the original trust.

He maintains that this right of resistance does not encourage frequent rebellion, arguing that people are generally conservative and endure many abuses before resorting to force. Critics, both contemporary and modern, have expressed concern that Locke’s criteria might nonetheless justify factional uprisings under the guise of defending liberty.

Interpretive Debates

Some scholars read Locke’s doctrine as a carefully limited defense of revolution against manifest tyranny, especially intended to vindicate the Glorious Revolution. Others see in it a more radical principle of popular sovereignty, implying a continuing right to restructure political authority. Still others emphasize its legalistic character: resistance is justified not by subjective grievance but by objective breaches of the constitutionally defined trust.

This framework has made Locke a central reference in later debates on civil disobedience, revolution, and constitutional change.

13. Key Concepts and Terminology

The Two Treatises employ a distinctive vocabulary that has shaped later political discourse. Some of the most important terms include:

State of Nature and State of War

• State of Nature: A pre‑political condition of freedom and equality under natural law, lacking a common judge. It is morally ordered but institutionally insecure.
• State of War: A condition of enmity and destruction arising when someone uses unjust force to place another under arbitrary power. It can exist within or outside political societies.

Natural Law and Natural Rights

• Natural Law: A moral law discoverable by reason, grounded for Locke in God’s will, commanding self‑preservation and the preservation of others.
• Natural Rights: Entitlements that individuals possess prior to and independent of civil law—especially rights to life, liberty, and property.

Interpretations divide on whether Locke’s natural law is primarily religious or can be reconstructed in largely secular, rational terms.

Property and Labor

• Property (Estate): Broadly, an individual’s life, liberty, and possessions; narrowly, material holdings justly acquired.
• Labor Theory of Property: The idea that mixing one’s labor with unowned resources generates private property, subject to “enough and as good” and spoilage provisos.

Forms of Power

• Political Power: The right to make laws backed by the community’s force for the regulation and preservation of property and the public good.
• Paternal Power: Limited parental authority for the care and education of children, distinct from political power.
• Prerogative: Executive discretion to act outside or against the letter of the law when necessary for the public good.

Illegitimate Power

• Usurpation: Seizing another’s rightful authority without title or consent.
• Tyranny: Exercising power beyond right, against law, and for private interest rather than the common good.
• Dissolution of Government: The breakdown of a particular government’s legitimacy, returning power to the people while the community may persist.

Consent

• Express Consent: Explicit agreement to join a political community or accept its government.
• Tacit Consent: Implied agreement inferred from conduct (e.g., residence, enjoying protection of the laws), a central but contested element in Locke’s theory of obligation.

These concepts form the scaffolding of Locke’s arguments, and variations in how they are defined or prioritized lead to differing interpretations of the Treatises as conservative, liberal, or even radical in their implications.

14. Philosophical Method and Theological Foundations

Locke’s reasoning in the Two Treatises combines empirical observation, conceptual analysis, and theological premises.

Philosophical Method

Locke adopts a broadly empiricist and analytical approach:

• He starts from seemingly simple, intuitive notions (e.g., freedom, equality, property) and builds arguments stepwise, often using definitions and thought experiments (such as the state of nature).
• He frequently appeals to “reason” as a common human faculty, inviting readers to judge arguments rather than defer to authority.
• He employs hypothetical scenarios to clarify moral principles even when they may not precisely reflect historical reality.

Some commentators see strong continuity with Locke’s epistemology in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding: both works stress the limits of knowledge and the need for probabilistic reasoning in practical affairs. Others argue that the Treatises operate with more normative axioms than the Essay would strictly justify.

Theological Foundations

Locke’s political theory is rooted in a theistic worldview. Key religious premises include:

• God as creator and owner of human beings, from which Locke derives the idea that individuals are God’s “property” and cannot arbitrarily destroy themselves or others.
• The notion that natural law is a manifestation of divine law, discoverable by reason but ultimately grounded in God’s will.
• Scriptural arguments against patriarchalism and for human equality, especially in the First Treatise.

Jeremy Waldron and others emphasize that Locke’s commitment to human equality and rights relies on the idea that all persons are equally God’s workmanship. More secular interpretations attempt to reconstruct Locke’s arguments without strong dependence on theological claims, treating references to God as rhetorical or background assumptions shared with his audience.

Reason, Revelation, and Authority

Locke treats reason as the primary guide in political matters, while acknowledging revelation in religious contexts. In the Treatises, he often uses scripture not as unquestionable authority but as evidence subject to rational interpretation, especially when disputing Filmer.

This dual use of reason and theology has been read in different ways:

• Some see Locke as a Christian natural‑law theorist, harmonizing reason and revelation.
• Others view him as edging toward a more secular, rights‑based liberalism, with religious language serving to legitimize rational arguments in a pious society.
• A further line of interpretation suggests strategic ambiguity, allowing the Treatises to resonate with both devout and more rationalist readers.

These methodological and theological underpinnings shape how scholars assess the scope and foundations of Locke’s political theory.

15. Early Reception and Controversies

The immediate reception of the Two Treatises was shaped by the politics of the Glorious Revolution and the broader debate over divine‑right monarchy.

Initial Circulation and Audience

Published anonymously, the Treatises initially circulated primarily among Whig politicians, pamphleteers, and learned readers. Within these circles, they were often regarded as an articulate justification of the revolution that had displaced James II and installed William and Mary. Locke himself was seen as a significant, though not universally acknowledged, intellectual ally of the Whig cause.

The work’s technical style and length meant it was less accessible than shorter pamphlets, so its influence was mediated through summaries and adaptations in sermons, tracts, and debates.

Tory and High‑Church Responses

Supporters of divine‑right monarchy and High Church Anglicans criticized Locke’s doctrines of consent and resistance as destabilizing. Some feared that grounding political authority in the people undermined both royal and ecclesiastical hierarchies. Writers defending Filmer or similar views rejected Locke’s scriptural interpretations and accused him of innovation in matters of church and state.

In legal circles, some jurists questioned Locke’s reliance on contract and natural rights, arguing that English constitutionalism rested instead on historical custom and the common law, not on abstract philosophical constructions.

Continental and Colonial Reception

On the Continent, the Treatises were slower to gain traction than Locke’s epistemological works, but they gradually became known among Enlightenment thinkers. In colonial North America, Locke’s ideas entered political discourse through republican pamphlets, sermons, and legal arguments, though there is debate about how directly colonists read the Treatises versus receiving them second‑hand.

Early Controversies

Some of the earliest controversies focused on:

• the historicity of the state of nature and original contract;
• the legitimacy of resistance, especially in light of fears of renewed civil war;
• potential tensions between Locke’s political theory and more traditional Anglican theology.

While Locke’s views did not go unchallenged, the Treatises increasingly became a reference point in arguments about constitutional monarchy, succession, and the scope of religious toleration, ensuring their continued presence in public debates.

16. Modern Interpretations and Critiques

Twentieth‑ and twenty‑first‑century scholarship has produced a wide range of interpretations of the Two Treatises, often emphasizing different aspects of Locke’s thought.

Liberal and Rights‑Based Readings

Many interpreters present Locke as a foundational liberal theorist. They emphasize his doctrines of natural rights, limited government, and consent, seeing him as a precursor to modern constitutional democracy and human rights discourse. This line of reading influenced political philosophy, law, and public rhetoric, especially in Anglophone contexts.

Contextualist and Historical Readings

Cambridge School historians, such as John Dunn and Mark Goldie, stress the Treatises’ embedding in late seventeenth‑century English politics. They argue that Locke’s arguments were crafted as interventions in specific controversies about succession, prerogative, and church–state relations, rather than as timeless, abstract theory. On this view, later liberal interpretations sometimes detach Locke’s ideas from their original rhetorical and polemical purposes.

Marxian and Critical Readings

From C. B. Macpherson onwards, Marxian and critical theorists have depicted Locke as articulating a doctrine of “possessive individualism”, in which individual ownership and market relations are central. They argue that his labor theory of property and endorsement of inequality help legitimate capitalist accumulation and class domination. Others highlight the role of Locke’s ideas in justifying colonialism and slavery, citing his involvement in colonial enterprises and the use of Lockean property arguments to rationalize dispossession.

Defenders of Locke contest some of these claims, pointing to his natural‑law constraints, emphasis on consent, and condemnation of arbitrary power as limiting the scope of legitimate economic exploitation.

Feminist and Post‑Colonial Critiques

Feminist scholars examine Locke’s treatment of conjugal relations and paternal power, arguing that his account leaves significant gender hierarchies intact despite its formal commitment to equality. Post‑colonial critics focus on Locke’s category of “waste” land and the valorization of “improvement,” contending that these concepts marginalize non‑European land uses and cultures.

Others attempt to recover more egalitarian or critical resources within Locke’s own framework, such as obligations to the poor, the provisos on appropriation, and the right of resistance.

Theological vs. Secular Locke

Debates also persist over whether Locke’s political theory is best read as theologically grounded or as a stepping stone toward secular liberalism. Some emphasize the indispensability of Christian premises for his notion of equality; others argue that key arguments can be reconstructed without explicit religious commitments.

These diverse interpretations make Locke a central, though contested, figure in contemporary discussions of liberalism, democracy, capitalism, and empire.

17. Legacy and Historical Significance

The Two Treatises of Government have exercised substantial influence on political thought, constitutional design, and public discourse from the eighteenth century onward.

Influence on Revolutions and Constitutions

Locke’s concepts of natural rights, consent, and the right of resistance informed the rhetoric and ideas of the American Revolution, notably in the Declaration of Independence, which echoes Lockean themes of natural rights and government as a protector of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (often linked to Locke’s “property”). Elements of his doctrine also influenced French revolutionary debates, though filtered through other thinkers.

Constitutional arrangements emphasizing separation of powers, limited government, and representative legislatures have frequently been interpreted, especially in Anglo‑American contexts, through a Lockean lens, even when directly shaped by other intellectual currents.

Development of Liberal and Rights Traditions

Locke’s work is widely seen as a cornerstone of classical liberalism, shaping later theories of individual rights, religious toleration, and economic freedom. His ideas provided resources for arguments in favor of freedom of conscience, private property, and government by consent, contributing to the development of liberal constitutionalism and rule‑of‑law ideals.

At the same time, critics argue that the same framework underwrote possessive individualism, market‑oriented social orders, and legitimations of colonial expansion. The Treatises thus occupy an ambivalent place in the genealogy of modernity: both empowering egalitarian and democratic claims and supporting hierarchical and exclusionary practices.

Continuing Philosophical Relevance

In contemporary political philosophy, Locke’s ideas remain central reference points in debates over:

• the justification of political authority (consent vs. alternatives);
• the nature and limits of property rights and economic inequality;
• the moral grounds for civil disobedience and revolution;
• the relationship between religion and public reason.

Modern theories of justice, human rights, and international law frequently engage—positively or critically—with Lockean notions of natural rights and sovereignty.

Educational and Cultural Presence

The Treatises continue to be widely taught in courses on political theory, intellectual history, and law, often serving as an entry point into early modern debates about sovereignty, liberty, and obligation. Their language—“life, liberty, and property,” “consent of the governed,” “right of resistance”—has entered the broader political vocabulary, shaping public understandings of legitimate authority and individual rights even beyond academic contexts.

In this sense, Locke’s Two Treatises remain a living part of ongoing conversations about the structure and purpose of political life.